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Recent developments in warfare such as cyber warfare or the growing use of
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Preface 
The 22nd August 2014 marked the 150th anniversary of the adoption of 
the first multilateral convention on International Humanitarian Law (IHL), 
the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field. One hundred and fifty years later, the 
application of IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities are confronted with 
new and increasing challenges in light of the changing nature of armed 
conflicts, the means of combat and the actors involved.  
The XXXVII Round Table on current issues of International 
Humanitarian Law, jointly organised with the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, as is the well-established tradition which the Institute is 
proud to maintain, offered military practitioners and IHL experts, from 
different regions of the world and with different backgrounds, the 
opportunity to examine the law and the practice governing the conduct of 
hostilities in current armed conflicts. 
The changing nature of conflicts, with the acute proliferation of non-
international armed conflicts and the conduct of operations within densely-
populated areas, calls for a rigorous application and enforcement of the pre-
existent norms, as well as for the need to analyse and address their 
application to new situations that continue to arise. Conflicts such as the 
one unfolding in Syria or the recent situation in Gaza exemplify the 
growing difficulties encountered by a strict respect for and observance of 
the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians and between 
civilian and military objects, as well as a frequently too loose assessment of 
proportionality, and an increasing disregard of principles of humanity. The 
consequence is an increasing exposure of civilian populations to suffering 
caused by armed conflicts. 
Current developments in warfare, such as cyber warfare or the growing 
use of autonomous weapons in combat situations, elicit debates not only in 
relation to the current application of International Humanitarian Law, but 
also to possible future developments and scenarios. Such debates are 
essential to ensure that international norms and standards are rigorously 
respected and observed in armed conflicts. The Round Table presented a 
multinational and interdisciplinary scenario where the most burning issues 
and challenges were extensively discussed.  
With the publication of these proceedings, the International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law intends to make the debates and discussions of the 
XXXVII Round Table available to the public, in keeping with its aim of 
promoting and disseminating the knowledge of International Humanitarian 
Law. 
Fausto Pocar 
President of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law 
 
Opening session 
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Opening remarks 
Fausto Pocar 
President, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Sanremo 
It is for me a great pleasure and a distinct privilege to open this 37th 
Round Table on current issues of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
and to welcome such a distinguished gathering of military practitioners and 
expert IHL specialists from all over the world on this prestigious occasion.  
Sono particolarmente lieto e onorato di porgere un caloroso benvenuto a 
tutti i partecipanti a questa Tavola Rotonda organizzata congiuntamente, 
secondo un’ormai consolidata tradizione, dall’Istituto Internazionale di 
Diritto Umanitario e dal Comitato Internazionale della Croce Rossa. 
Un vivo e sincero ringraziamento va innanzitutto a tutte le Autorità 
presenti, alle personalità, ai relatori che interverranno alla Tavola Rotonda, 
ai membri e agli amici dell’Istituto che hanno voluto essere presenti a 
questo consueto appuntamento internazionale, che da oltre quarant’anni 
l’Istituto organizza a Sanremo nel mese di settembre. Anche quest’anno 
non è mancato ai nostri lavori l’alto patronato del Presidente della 
Repubblica Giorgio Napolitano, al quale va la nostra riconoscenza per 
l’attenzione rivolta all’Istituto. 
Sono lieto di porgere il mio personale saluto e la mia gratitudine al 
Sindaco del Comune di Sanremo, Dr. Alberto Biancheri, per l’appoggio 
dato a questa e ad altre manifestazioni e attività dell’Istituto.  
Viva riconoscenza va altresì al Ministero degli Affari Esteri, in 
particolare al Sottosegretario Senatore Benedetto Della Vedova, che ci 
raggiungerà tra poco questa mattina per un saluto ai partecipanti alla Tavola 
Rotonda, e al Ministero della Difesa del Governo italiano, per il supporto 
offerto in passato e per aver accordato, anche quest’anno, il patrocinio del 
Ministero all’evento.  
Un grazie particolare, infine, al Governo svizzero, per il sostegno 
offerto nella realizzazione di questa Tavola Rotonda ed al governo svedese. 
Vorrei inoltre ringraziare, per la sua sempre preziosa collaborazione in 
tutte le fasi della preparazione e dello svolgimento della Tavola Rotonda, il 
CICR, che organizza da anni questo incontro insieme all’Istituto, e che oggi 
è qui rappresentato dalla Dr Helen Durham, Director for international Law 
and Policy of the ICRC. Un mio personale riconoscimento va anche ai 
coordinatori della Tavola Rotonda, alla professoressa e Vicepresidente 
dell’Istituto Elizabeth Wilmhurst, al Professore e membro del Consiglio 
dell’Istituto Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg e al Consigliere giuridico del 
CICR Laurent Gisel, che hanno formulato il programma della Tavola 
Rotonda e ne hanno seguito l’attuazione con la collaborazione preziosa di 
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tutto il personale dell’Istituto, al quale va la mia più viva gratitudine per 
l’impegno e la disponibilità prestata. 
La présente Table Ronde va aborder un sujet d’actualité extrême dans le 
monde contemporain: la conduite des opérations militaires, sa pratique et 
son droit, dans la perspective de son développement futur. Mais il s’agit 
également d’un sujet dont l’actualité remonte à l’origine même du droit 
international humanitaire. Il y a exactement 150 ans, le 22 août 1864, la 
première convention multilatérale de droit humanitaire a été signée à 
Genève par 16 États européens, qui adoptèrent des règles communes «pour 
l’amélioration du sort des militaires blessés dans les armées en campagne», 
dans le but d’introduire des principes d’humanité dans le traitement des 
soldats participant aux opérations militaires et d’en assurer le respect par 
les belligérants. A partir de l’adoption de cette convention les idées 
d’humanité desquelles elle s’inspirait ont fait un long chemin, et toute une 
série de conventions ont été élaborées – notamment à Genève et à La Haye 
– et ont été ratifiées par un nombre croissant d’Etats au cours du siècle et 
demi qui a suivi. Ces conventions – qui sont bien connues et sur lesquelles 
on n’insistera pas ici – ont pour but, soit d’introduire des nouvelles règles 
de protection des combattants et des civils, soit d’identifier les principes 
fondamentaux régissant la conduite des opérations militaires, pour en 
donner une réglementation concrète et pour en assurer la mise en œuvre 
durant les conflits armés internationaux et non internationaux.  
Tout ayant un domaine différent, les règles de protection (droit de 
Genève) et les règles de conduite (droit de La Haye) se présentent comme 
étroitement liées, la protection des combattants et des civils dépend souvent 
du respect et de la correcte application des règles de conduite des hostilités. 
Néanmoins, l’accent a été mis parfois sur les unes ou sur les autres 
séparément, et le plus souvent et récemment surtout sur les règles de 
protection plutôt que sur les règles de conduite. La jurisprudence même des 
tribunaux pénaux internationaux institués au fil des vingt dernierés années 
– qui représente la source importante la plus récente à consulter pour 
clarifier le contenu des règles du droit international humanitaire, 
coutumières ou conventionnelles, dont la violation constitue un crime de 
droit international – s’est concentrée notamment sur les règles qui visent 
directement la protection des combattants et des civils et a négligé ou a 
moins fréquemment abordé, à quelques exceptions près, l’interprétation des 
règles de conduite.  
C’est l’une des raisons qui nous a conduit – nôtre Institut et le CICR – à 
dédier cette Table Ronde à un examen du droit et de la pratique relatifs à la 
conduite des hostilités, à la lumière des principes fondamentaux du droit 
international humanitaire tels qu’appliqués dans les conflits armés 
contemporains, dans le but d’en approfondir les traits essentiels, un effort 
nécessaire pour faire en sorte que les règles existantes soient prises en 
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compte et rigoureusement respectées au cours des opérations militaires 
dans le monde.  
The subject of this edition of the Sanremo Round Table – the practice 
and the law on the conduct of hostilities – is of critical importance in the 
current complex scenarios which characterize contemporary armed 
conflicts, both with respect to the participants in those conflicts and to the 
impact of technological development affecting the conduct of hostilities. 
The application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is confronted 
with new increasing challenges in light of the changing nature of the 
conflicts, the means of combat and the actors involved. Striking the most 
appropriate balance between the fundamental principles of military 
necessity and humanity in the implementation of the rules of IHL presents 
new difficulties, but remains a key to limit the human cost of hostilities, 
including civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure. The 
Round Table will assess the current practice in the interpretation and 
application of the principles governing the conduct of hostilities and 
discuss how such principles should be interpreted and applied to the future 
evolution of warfare. 
In this context, the principle of distinction between civilians and 
combatants will be at the heart of the debate, and it has rightly been 
described as “cardinal” of IHL by the International Court of Justice in its 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
(1996). The notion of military objects and the prohibition of indiscriminate 
attacks will primarily be discussed particularly with reference to attacks in 
densely populated areas. However, that principle cannot be considered in 
isolation and must be accompanied by an in depth analysis of the principles 
which complement it, i.e. the principles of proportionality and precautions. 
How to assess proportionality, under which attacks are prohibited if the 
expected incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects is excessive 
compared to the anticipated military advantage, has always been regarded 
as a complex exercise, and presents new challenges in contemporary 
conflicts where civilians are the more and more exposed to the 
consequences of the use of modern weapons. Precautions in attacks, such as 
warnings to the civilian population, and precautions against the effects of 
attacks, in particular with respect to warfare in populated urban areas, are 
therefore of the utmost importance in the conduct of military operations, 
both in international and even more in non-international armed conflicts. 
But translating these binding principles into practice during combat 
operations requires military commanders to take carefully into account the 
reality of the battlefield, and offers a variety of experiences and 
perspectives also in relation to the various domains in which the rules on 
the conduct of hostilities apply. The aerial warfare and the specificities of 
naval and outer space warfare will serve as examples for investigation. 
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Furthermore, current developments in warfare, including cyber warfare, 
and the increasing use of autonomous weapons pose practical and ethical 
challenges of how far human judgment may be replaced by machines while 
still respecting the already mentioned fundamental principles of distinction, 
proportionality and precautions in attacks, and the legal obligations 
enshrined therein. 
Let me conclude by recalling that for almost forty-five years now the 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHL) has played an important 
and unique role in providing an international and informal forum for in-
depth reflections and open debates, bringing together experts and key 
personalities from diplomatic, military, humanitarian and academic circles 
from different regions of the world, with the aim of discussing current 
developments and challenges of relevance to International Humanitarian 
Law. Last year’s Round Table was devoted to challenges and responses 
raised by respecting IHL, and focused on ensuring compliance with its 
rules by enhancing the procedures tasked with their implementation, 
including the monitoring of their correct application. 
The theme of this Round Table is different, but a concrete assessment 
and knowledge of the law and practice of the conduct of hostilities is of 
paramount importance also for the shaping of compliance and monitoring 
mechanisms suitable to ensure that IHL rules are observed and for adopting 
legal, practical and political measures to this effect.  
We look forward with interest to the outcome of our debates during the 
forthcoming days and to the contributions that this Round Table will make 
to the assessment of the practice and law concerning the conduct of 
hostilities. 
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Welcome address 
Alberto Biancheri 
Sindaco di Sanremo 
Sono particolarmente onorato di prendere parte a questa Tavola Rotonda 
organizzata dall’Istituto Internazionale di Diritto Umanitario di Sanremo. 
Un incontro importante che consente di affrontare il tema della condotta 
delle ostilità, fondamento del diritto internazionale umanitario, al centro 
dell’attenzione in questo particolare periodo. 
In questa occasione saranno affrontati argomenti di attualità come 
l’applicazione delle norme di diritto umanitario, la prassi inerente alla 
condotta delle ostilità nonché le azioni da intraprendere per individuare 
nuove idee e sviluppi futuri. Sono certo che sarà dato anche un contributo 
fondamentale per l’approfondimento della materia e per l’applicazione del 
dirtitto internazionale umanitario. Per questo è particolarmente significativa 
la presenza di esperti e di professionisti provenienti dai circoli accademici e 
militari di tutto il mondo, a cui pongo il mio personale benvenuto.  
La Tavola Rotonda di questi giorni si inserisce nell’operosa attività 
dell’Istituto che, se da un lato permette di promuovere idee ed 
approfondimenti su tematiche di grande attualità, dall’altro configura la 
nostra città come significativo punto di riferimento per il diritto 
internazionale.  
Sanremo e l’Istituto Internazionale di Diritto Umanitario condividono 
gli stessi valori e gli stessi obiettivi e per questo il Comune conferma con 
convinzione la propria vicinanza ed il proprio sostegno all’Istituto 
riconoscendone il valore e l’importanza. L’Istituto è infatti uno dei più 
importanti centri di formazione internazionale, non solo nel settore del 
diritto umanitario ma anche nel campo del diritto internazionale dei 
rifugiati, del diritto delle migrazioni e dei diritti umani. 
La sua proficua attività determina ricadute positive per l’immagine della 
città di Sanremo e la sua economia. Tenuto conto del ruolo internazionale 
svolto dall’Istituto a favore delle tematiche relative alla promozione del 
rispetto del diritto, della pace e della giustizia possiamo trovare un riscontro 
di circa 8000 presenze ogni anno nelle strutture ricettive cittadine.  
Nel rinnovare i miei saluti e la mia soddisfazione nell’aprire i lavori di 
questa 37° Tavola Rotonda auguro a voi tutti buon lavoro. 
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Keynote address 
Benedetto Della Vedova 
Sottosegretario di Stato, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Roma 
 
È un onore poter partecipare alla ventisettesima Tavola Rotonda sui 
problemi attuali del Diritto Internazionale Umanitario, organizzata – come 
è ormai tradizione – dall’Istituto di Sanremo in collaborazione con il 
Comitato Internazionale della Croce Rossa, quest’anno, dedicata alla 
“Condotta delle ostilità: prassi, diritto e futuro”.  
Si tratta di un tema divenuto di grandissima attualità a causa dei 
numerosi focolai di conflitto che purtroppo si stanno propagando in varie 
aree del mondo. Ringrazio, pertanto, l’Istituto di Sanremo per aver acceso i 
riflettori sulle numerose problematiche connesse all’applicazione del 
Diritto Internazionale Umanitario nelle aree di conflitto, insistendo 
soprattutto sui profili pratici. La competenza dei relatori, che si 
alterneranno nell’ambito di ben dieci panel previsti, offrirà indubbiamente 
una visione completa e dettagliata del tema. 
Le modalità di conduzione dei conflitti armati e, in primo luogo, la 
capacità di porre attenzione alle parti indifese o non più ostili, testimoniano 
il grado di sensibilità e di rispetto per la vita e la dignità umana da parte 
delle forze belligeranti. Tali aspetti sono definiti compiutamente 
dall'insieme di norme che compongono il diritto internazionale umanitario, 
che nasce proprio per dare voce all’esigenza percepita dalla comunità 
internazionale di creare delle regole e porre dei limiti, non solo all’utilizzo 
dei metodi e mezzi di guerra da adottare durante lo svolgimento degli 
scontri, ma anche alle modalità di trattamento dei soggetti coinvolti, a vario 
titolo, nelle ostilità. È in questa prospettiva che si pone lo jus in bello e la 
sua evoluzione convenzionale mirante a disciplinare lo svolgimento dei 
conflitti armati.  
Il diritto umanitario non si pone dunque in termini antitetici con l’idea 
della conflittualità armata ma, al contrario, è espressione delle regole cui 
dovrebbe conformarsi la condotta dei belligeranti. La situazione di 
belligeranza non comporta infatti, come si potrebbe essere tentati di 
credere, la “sospensione” del diritto. Certo, le frequenti violazioni 
indurrebbero a ritenere che, dinanzi ad un conflitto armato, parlare di diritto 
umanitario – se non di diritto tout court – sia puro esercizio di retorica. 
Tuttavia, sebbene il diritto umanitario sia stato messo, anche in questi 
ultimi anni, a durissima prova, va riconosciuto che la sua codificazione, il 
suo sviluppo e la sua diffusione hanno indubbiamente contribuito in 
numerosi casi a migliorare le condizioni di coloro i quali, popolazioni civili 
e militari, nel corso di un conflitto si siano venuti a trovare in situazione di 
vulnerabilità. 
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Ad oltre sessant’anni dall’adozione delle Convenzioni di Ginevra, 
l’impianto giuridico del diritto umanitario deve oggi confrontarsi con nuove 
sfide: la proliferazione di gruppi armati non statuali, alcuni dei quali 
rifiutano l’esistenza stessa del diritto internazionale umanitario; la natura 
asimmetrica dei conflitti armati contemporanei, che accentua le differenze 
tra belligeranti in termini di capacità tecnologiche e militari; la crescente 
difficoltà di distinzione tra combattenti e civili nelle operazioni militari; 
l’outsourcing di attività militari a compagnie private; la possibilità del 
ricorso ad attacchi cibernetici. 
Siamo ben consapevoli di come, sempre più spesso, alla base dei 
conflitti vi siano gravi violazioni dei diritti umani e di come i conflitti che 
ne scaturiscano comportino nuove ed ulteriori violazioni di tali diritti delle 
popolazioni in una sorta di spirale difficile da arrestare. Di qui l’importanza 
di promuovere un progressivo innalzamento degli standard dei diritti umani 
(ed in particolare di determinate categorie di essi), l’importanza di sistemi 
di allerta precoce in chiave preventiva. Per la Farnesina la promozione e 
protezione dei diritti umani non solo in quanto tali, ma anche in chiave di 
prevenzione dei conflitti, l’educazione e la formazione ai diritti umani e la 
promozione del dialogo interculturale sono obiettivi prioritari nell’attuale 
contesto internazionale, caratterizzato da livelli di complessità finora 
inediti. 
Per rafforzare il rispetto dei diritti umani, occorre che il diritto 
umanitario possa utilizzare meccanismi efficaci; in questa direzione, si 
discute ancora oggi su diverse soluzioni: non è solo un esercizio teorico, ma 
anche un’esigenza pratica. Ringrazio, ancora una volta, l’Istituto di 
Sanremo per favorire questo dibattito. 
Su un piano operativo, per rafforzare il rispetto dei diritti umani, si sono 
affermate, negli ultimi anni, nuove tipologie di operazioni di pace, che 
assolvono su mandato internazionale funzioni sempre più diversificate, 
finalizzate alla prevenzione, ma anche alla gestione e soluzione di 
situazioni di crisi, assicurando al contempo la protezione dei civili e il 
rispetto dei diritti umani. Tali operazioni (Peace Support Operations) 
ricomprendono varie categorie di interventi (conflict prevention, peace-
making, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peacebuilding), che non 
possono più considerarsi in maniera distinta, ma sono qualificate nel quadro 
di un comprehensive approach. Ciò nella consapevolezza del carattere 
multiforme e multidimensionale delle sfide alla pace ed alla sicurezza e del 
legame indissolubile fra sviluppo, sicurezza e diritti umani.  
In tale contesto, le attività delle Nazioni Unite per la prevenzione dei 
conflitti e il mantenimento della pace e della sicurezza internazionali 
continuano a rappresentare il maggiore strumento multilaterale di sostegno 
alla convivenza pacifica e ai processi di transizione democratica e 
stabilizzazione delle aree di crisi. Per prevenire e gestire le crisi con 
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maggiore efficacia e tempestività, è peraltro sempre più essenziale la 
cooperazione tra l’ONU e le Organizzazioni regionali, come Unione 
Europea e Unione Africana (si pensi agli esempi del Mali, della RCA, della 
Somalia), l’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione Islamica. 
Il rispetto del diritto internazionale umanitario e dei diritti umani da 
parte del personale delle missioni e la capacità della missione di esercitare 
concretamente la protezione dei civili e di assicurare il rispetto dei diritti e 
delle libertà fondamentali delle popolazioni concorrono a rinforzare la 
legittimità della presenza internazionale e più in generale al successo delle 
operazioni. 
Per questo, l’Italia sostiene da sempre l’importanza di una adeguata 
formazione, secondo linee guida ONU standardizzate, e ha istituito nel 
2005 a Vicenza, in collaborazione con gli Stati Uniti, il CoESPU (Centre of 
Excellence for Stability Police Units), che ha contribuito e contribuisce in 
misura sostanziale alla crescente domanda di formazione delle unità di 
polizia schierate nelle missioni. Il CoESPU, con la collaudata formula del 
training the trainers, ha conseguito risultati significativi, addestrando solo 
nel 2013 1.200 unità, provenienti in larga misura da Paesi africani e asiatici. 
Il modello offerto dai Carabinieri fornisce personale con elevata 
preparazione e autonomia e capacità di dispiegamento in teatro. I corsi 
organizzati dal CoESPU includono moduli sul rispetto dei diritti umani, del 
diritto internazionale umanitario, la protezione dei civili e la Sexual and 
Gender-Based Violence.  
L’esigenza di assicurare la protezione dei civili e la sicurezza dei 
“caschi blu” in contesti altamente sensibili ci induce a considerare 
favorevolmente l’utilizzo delle “nuove tecnologie” nel peacekeeping. È 
questo il caso dei droni da ricognizione (autorizzati ad esempio dal 
Consiglio di Sicurezza per MONUSCO). L’utilizzo delle nuove tecnologie 
può contribuire al rispetto del diritto internazionale umanitario anche lì 
dove non sono attive missioni di peacekeeping, ma la Comunità 
Internazionale è chiamata al rispetto di specifiche risoluzioni del Consiglio 
di Sicurezza sull’accesso umanitario, come nel caso della Siria. 
Informazioni geospaziali, acquisite attraverso la tecnologia satellitare, 
possono essere utilizzate per verificare l’eventuale violazione di quanto 
stabilito dal Consiglio di Sicurezza. Per questo l’Italia finanzia il 
programma operativo per le applicazioni satellitari di UNITAR ed è – più 
in generale – a favore della modernizzazione delle capacità di intervento 
dell’ONU a sostegno della pace e della stabilità internazionali e del rispetto 
del diritto internazionale umanitario e dei diritti umani. 
I crimini internazionali e le atrocità di massa esigono risposte ferme e 
condivise, che sono rafforzate dallo stabilimento di un efficace sistema di 
giustizia penale internazionale. 
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Creata a Roma il 17 luglio 1998, la Corte Penale Internazionale ha 
segnato un fondamentale passo in avanti sulla strada della lotta all’impunità 
dei criminali di guerra attraverso l’applicazione di due principi-cardine del 
diritto: certezza della pena e sottoposizione ad un giudice naturale. A tal 
fine, è necessario assicurare la più ampia cooperazione da parte dell’intera 
comunità internazionale, in primo luogo nella consegna di coloro che si 
sono macchiati di crimini di particolare efferatezza nei confronti delle 
popolazioni civili. 
L’affermazione del principio dello stato di diritto e l’esigenza di 
preservare la vita e la dignità umana, anche negli scenari di conflitto 
armato, impongono alla comunità internazionale l’adozione di risposte 
immediate ed efficaci per queste nuove sfide e le altre che si 
manifesteranno negli anni a venire. Tali risposte non potranno non ispirarsi 
allo spirito delle Convenzioni di Ginevra, i cui principi continuano e 
continueranno a rappresentare la base fondamentale ed imprescindibile per 
proteggere i combattenti, i prigionieri e le popolazioni civili nei teatri di 
guerra.  
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Keynote address 
Massimo Barra 
Commissario Permanente della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna 
Rossa, Ginevra 
Il mio sarà un breve intervento di saluto, fatto più con il cuore che con la 
testa, per condividere alcune mie emozioni quando mi trovo ancora una 
volta in questo nobilissimo consesso che mette insieme gente di Croce 
Rossa e Mezzaluna Rossa, militari, giuristi ed esperti di diritto 
internazionale umanitario.  
In genere noi ci riuniamo per “razze” diverse, ognuno con i suoi simili, 
qui stiamo tutti insieme e questo è un grande added value dell’Istituto e di 
Sanremo, questo si può fare a Sanremo. È difficile farlo in altre parti del 
mondo.  
Devo dire, avendo girato il mondo, che forse l’Istituto è più conosciuto 
all’estero che in Italia. Penso, tuttavia, che il legame tra l’Istituto e la città 
di Sanremo, confermato dal Sindaco, sia un valore importante da preservare 
per il futuro, anche in tempi di ristrettezze economiche, per promuovere la 
città di Sanremo ed il diritto internazionale umanitario in tutto il mondo.  
Ho avuto l’onore di partecipare, da giovanissimo pioniere della Croce 
Rossa Italiana, alla prima ed alla seconda Tavola Rotonda di Sanremo e 
sono quindi un testimone oculare di come la Tavola Rotonda sia cresciuta 
in questi anni. Come italiano sono fiero di questa Tavola Rotonda, e lo sono 
anche come crocerossino per l’opportunità che ci dà di unire il Movimento 
Internazionale della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa all’Istituto di 
Sanremo.  
Non posso però non essere triste per quello che sta accadendo nel 
mondo. Ieri sera una professoressa dell’Università di Ginevra mi diceva 
«c’è il rischio che noi parliamo solo tra di noi, tra persone che capiscono il 
concetto di diritto internazionale umanitario e poi la maggior parte del 
mondo se ne sta lontana, non lo capisce e non lo mette in pratica. C’è il 
rischio che noi diventiamo una sorta di “circolo Pickwick” di persone 
illuminate, “inspired”, mentre il mondo va tutto in altra direzione». Ed è 
proprio quello che succede nel mondo oggi; che è successo ieri, l’altro ieri, 
un mese fa. Non mi sembra infatti che le regole del diritto internazionale 
umanitario siano esaltate, anzi mi pare succeda l’esatto contrario, che si 
vada contro tali norme.  
Chi opera sul terreno si trova di fronte a dei problemi spesso 
insormontabili. Pensate, ad esempio, al problema dell’accesso alle vittime 
dei conflitti armati. Recentemente in Siria oltre 30 operatori della 
Mezzaluna Rossa siriana sono morti mentre portavano soccorso in prima 
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linea. È un pedaggio molto pesante, anche perché la distinzione tra 
coraggio e temerarietà si fa sempre a posteriori: se è andata bene è stato 
coraggioso, se è andata male è stato temerario.  
Come possiamo orientare i nostri volontari? Noi abbiamo 12 milioni di 
persone che danno il loro generoso contributo nell’arduo compito di 
prestare soccorso alle persone in situazioni molto difficili. Come li 
orientiamo? Come possiamo fare in modo che il diritto d’accesso alle 
vittime dei conflitti venga rispettato? Come ci rapportiamo con i “cattivi”? 
Che potere abbiamo? Abbiamo un potere? Credo che questa Tavola 
Rotonda come leitmotif debba anche porre la questione del “potere” in 
mano a chi applica il diritto umanitario, perché il mondo è cambiato, perché 
esiste internet e tutti possono sapere le cose in tempo reale. Quello che una 
volta era uno scambio di messaggi cifrati oggi è possibile leggerlo 
addirittura sul telefono. La gente vede quello che succede, la gente giudica, 
e per questo quando c’è una violazione del diritto umanitario si indigna.  
Quale è il nostro atteggiamento? Noi non possiamo limitarci a fare un 
elenco “notarile” delle violazioni. E se c’è un conflitto tra due parti noi non 
possiamo essere equidistanti, l’equidistanza o equivicinanza, è un concetto 
politico non umanitario. Il concetto umanitario di “equidistanza” è nel 
principio fondamentale di imparzialità, che contiene in sé il principio di 
proporzionalità. Come l’imparzialità ci guida nell’assistenza alle vittime, 
allo stesso modo l’imparzialità (e cioè la proporzionalità) ci deve guidare 
nella denuncia delle violazioni delle Convenzioni di Ginevra che portano 
quotidianamente nefaste conseguenze per le popolazioni civili che 
dovrebbero invece essere tutelate da queste violazioni. 
Come riusciamo noi a rendere “sexy” il diritto umanitario? Come 
riusciamo a finire sugli smartphone, sui social networks che orientano 
l’opinione pubblica, dando la possibilità ad ogni cretino di scrivere quello 
che vuole e di trovare altri paranoici che gli danno ragione? Come ci 
inseriamo in questo meccanismo? Con i nostri sistemi vecchi? Siamo 
destinati a fallire. Io credo che in passato si abbia peccato di segretezza, la 
segretezza in questo mondo attuale è finita e quindi anche il CICR si deve 
porre il problema del dilemma tra la segretezza ed il rendere pubblico. Fino 
ad oggi siamo stati molto prudenti per evitare reazioni. Ma con l’opinione 
pubblica quanto abbiamo guadagnato o perso con la segretezza? In questo 
mondo non c’è più niente di segreto. Tutti sanno tutto o credono di sapere 
tutto e noi abbiamo il dovere di esprimere il nostro punto di vista per 
orientare in maniera efficace l’opinione pubblica.  
Detto questo, penso che il tema scelto per questa Tavola Rotonda si 
presti anche ad una riflessione sotto questo angolo, che vi invito a fare 
coraggiosamente perché ne va di mezzo la nostra credibilità futura e la 
credibilità del mondo. 
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Un’ultima osservazione riguarda la tortura. Io credo che sulla tortura si 
debba essere molto chiari perché nel terzo millennio la tortura non deve 
avere diritto di cittadinanza a nessun livello. La tortura provoca delle 
reazioni dinamiche scomposte, delle reazioni a catena in cui si sa dove si 
comincia e non si sa dove si finisce. Credo che vada fatta una riflessione sul 
nostro atteggiamento comune, singolo e/o collettivo nei confronti della 
tortura, come tra l’altro già richiamato ultimamente anche da Papa 
Francesco. 
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Keynote address1 
Helen Durham 
Director of International Law and Policy, International Committee 
of the Red Cross, Geneva 
Today the human cost of current conflicts is abysmal. Too often, as we 
all know, civilians bear the brunt. They are victims of direct or 
indiscriminate attacks against the very principles that we are gathered here 
today to talk about, the principles relating to the conduct of hostilities. 
Indeed, today armed conflicts, once again as we all know, are not 
conducted along clearly delineated lines. We don’t really have clearly 
identified parties at times. Hostilities often take place in densely populated 
areas where civilians are victims, or civilian residencies become dwelling 
places for the fighters or roof tops of civilian infrastructure become 
launching beds for attack. And too often in these environments humans 
become human shields or civilians do.  
The heavy fighting in urban areas with devastating destruction in places 
such as Syria, Ukraine, Gaza, Libya and Iraq recently, demonstrates how 
homes and places of worship are destroyed. Public services, that are 
absolutely essential for the survival of the civilians, get reduced at times to 
rubble. Humanitarian workers are either killed or have fled; infrastructures 
such as water and electricity have been attacked; schools, hospitals and 
universities are no longer in existence. All this, plus dangers of just fear, 
require or force millions of people to flee with increasing consequences and 
horrors long after the conflict has ceased. Furthermore, another thing that 
should be considered is that nowadays armed conflicts have become 
increasingly fragmented, and we can see that once again in Syria, in 
Somalia, in Yemen, in Democratic Republic of Congo and in the Central 
African Republic. On top of this, non-state armed groups very often don’t 
have the clarity and the aims of military or political determinations and that 
makes it very, very difficult to engage with them.  
All these situations often occur in a context of a very weakened State 
which perpetuates the difficulties in having a degree of control and 
command over those who are engaged in the fighting.  
Still, armed conflicts are often fuelled today by ethnic, national or 
religious grievances which often under shadow or don’t have the space for 
the most basic considerations of humanity. The increasing radicalization, at 
times, in this area complicates the search for lasting peace, but it is very 
important in all of our deliberations in the next few days to deeply reflect 
                                                     
1 Text not revised by the author. 
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upon the concept that despair becomes a consequence and also a cause of 
reoccurring hostilities. Now, despite there being cynicism about the IHL 
framework, today it’s wanted and needed more than ever.  
One hundred and fifty years ago, the first Geneva Convention was 
created and the principles contained in that are not things we should be 
cynical about. It’s the application that we need to strive harder for and, as I 
think we all discussed at the last Round Table, it’s an issue of compliance 
by States and non-state armed groups, all parties to a conflict. It’s a 
compliance issue that we have really got to search deeply about. The 
outcome of both last year’s Round Table and the one organized in 2007 by 
the Institute, when we last looked at this topic, was not that we needed new 
rules but interpretive guidance of the applicability of the existing law.  
Promoting respect for IHL, including the conduct of hostilities which 
we are going to discuss in these days, has formed an integral part of the 
ICRC’s DNA, I would say, for decades. Every day ICRC’s delegates, 
colleagues go into the field to work on the issues of compliance but they’re 
not looking at it through a lovely international conference, they are on the 
ground engaging directly with armed forces and non-state armed groups 
coming up, in particular, with concrete and practical propositions of how 
ways to avoid the violation of the rules that govern the conduct of 
hostilities can be envisaged.  
The work that ICRC does, as many of you are aware or have been 
involved in, entails a number of preventive activities. The concept of 
prevention is a difficult one, at times, to capture and prove the outcome 
because what we obviously do in trying to prevent these atrocities is not to 
demonstrate what we have been able to achieve in the positive but in the 
negative. How can we explain to the world as well as to ourselves the rules 
that apply to such preventive activities as, having discussions, training 
individuals on the rules, clarifying the rules, engaging in non-state armed 
groups? The concept of prevention is a really important one when 
clarifying the legal articulation of these rules.  
The outreach of the ICRC does not only allow us to engage with groups 
or in circumstances that are very difficult, but it also allows us to start 
gathering a better understanding of what motivates or influences arms 
carriers. One of the key topics my colleagues in the ICRC is working on is 
a further study of the concept of rules of behavior. What actually changes 
the rules of behavior of those who are engaged in armed conflict? This is a 
very important research which should engage non-state armed groups in 
particular. All of these activities, at least, aim to reduce the human cost of 
suffering in conflicts, which today should be an overriding humanitarian 
imperative.  
States, and more generally the International Community, must treat this 
humanitarian imperative as a strategic policy goal, not abstractly as 
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something to talk about once a year and put aside, not as a theoretical 
paradigm to look at, but as a real strategic policy goal so as to incorporate 
the humanitarian imperative. But for the law to be effective, it requires 
belligerents to know clearly what they need to be doing, to have clarity 
around conflicts, which is what we are going to discuss for the next few 
days. And, as it has been mentioned previously, what is at stake are fairly 
basic principles: distinction, proportionality, precautions. But we need to 
engage in their application and clarity. 
With this in mind I would like to quickly look at five key points that are 
important in this area of discussion. 
Firstly, and I think we all agree, the major issue in this field is the 
principle of distinction. We are all struggling and working together with a 
global approach on interpreting the notion of direct participation in 
hostilities. The 2007 Sanremo Round Table on The Conduct of Hostilities. 
Revisiting the Law of Armed Conflict 100 Years after the 1907 Hague 
Conventions and 30 Years after the 1977 Additional Protocols examined 
this issue. Two years later, the ICRC brought out its interpretative guidance 
on the notion of direct participation in hostilities. The interpretative 
guidance does not endeavor to change the binding rules of IHL in this area, 
rather does it represent ICRC’s recommendations as to how IHL rules 
relating to the notion of direct participation in hostilities should be 
interpreted. It argued that irregular armed forces and organized armed 
groups consist of only those individuals who have continuous combat 
functions. Individuals performing political, administrative, judicial or law 
enforcement functions retain their civilian status and protection against 
direct attacks. Now, the guidance drew criticisms from both sides and I get 
the feeling that if we are getting criticized from both sides we must be 
doing something right. Many argued that this guidance was too strict in its 
criteria while others claimed that it was too permissive. ICRC absorbed 
these criticisms and deliberated on them before preparing the final text of 
the guidelines, which, in our view, provides a very careful balance taking 
into account military, legal and operational considerations. ICRC continued 
to closely monitor and listen to these debates. It is also open to criticisms in 
relation to the interpretations and hopes that this will be a really strong 
starting point for discussion and eventually persuade States and non-state 
armed groups to help better protect civilians during armed conflicts. 
We are not going to discuss this issue again as it was deeply discussed 
in 2007. However, I would like to address one particular issue that was not 
discussed in 2007. In the ICRC’s view, although it is clear that a combatant 
may be captured or wounded hors de combat without additional risks to the 
operating forces, there could be a policy argument that they should be 
captured. Because to kill an adversary, or refrain from giving him or her the 
right to surrender, when manifestly there is no necessity for the use of 
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force, would indeed defy the basic notion of humanity. And it should be 
very clear that there are no additional risks involved for those who are 
capturing. So it’s really looking at the principle of the use of force. This is 
obviously something we are very keen to discuss with you – this capture or 
kill philosophy.  
Secondly, contemporary warfare also raises a number of challenges in 
relation to the notion of military objective. While the definition as we all 
know it given in article 52 of Additional Protocol I is customary, a number 
of its elements remain debated, such as the term “purpose” which cannot be 
understood as merely the possibility that an object might be converted into 
military use in the future. If this were the case there would be no limit to 
targeting. Another concern, from the ICRC’s point of view, is the definition 
of objects that merely contribute to the war-sustaining capacity of a party to 
a conflict. Those objects who have “merely contributed” have sometimes 
been considered as constituting military objectives, which, in our view, is 
contrary to the requirement that an object has to make an effective 
contribution to military action.  
Thirdly, another issue that is attracting growing scrutiny and concern, 
which was also discussed during the 2007 Sanremo Round Table, is the use 
of explosive weapons in populated areas. As the world has witnessed 
helplessly with the devastation caused by hostilities in Syrian cities over the 
last two years and in Gaza today, the use of these specific explosive 
weapons needs to be discussed and deeply examined.  
Fourthly, urban fighting and the intermingling of fighters and civilians 
in recent conflicts have highlighted the important principle of precautions, 
both precautions in attack and against the effects of attacks. With regard to 
the former, precautionary measures such as warnings and their 
effectiveness have been discussed at length at various independent forums 
since 2007 and this has been a worthy exercise. Another issue arising from 
the ICRC’s work in current armed conflicts is the limits on targeting 
objectives, which are normally used for civilian purposes, when only a part 
of the object is used for military purposes. First of all, an object has to be 
strictly defined: for example, a school comprising of several buildings is 
not one object for the purpose of the definition of military objective. Each 
object needs to be looked at individually. But when looking at one 
individual object partially used for military purposes, for instance, a multi-
storey building where only the roof or one apartment is used for military 
purposes, the prevailing understanding of the notion of military objective is 
that once an object is used in such a way as to fulfill the definition of 
military objective, the entire object becomes a lawful target. The principle 
of precaution nevertheless requires that only the part of the building used 
for military purposes should be targeted, to the extent feasible. Those 
planning a military attack must, indeed, consider the effects of the 
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destruction of the apartment used by civilians and the potentially long 
lasting effect on health and well-being. The principle of proportionality 
forbids the attack if incidental or civilian harm is expected, including 
indirect harm, and if this harm is excessive in comparison to the direct and 
concrete military advantage. The relevance of passive precautions cannot 
be underestimated either. While locating military objectives in or near 
densely populated areas is only prohibited to the maximum extent feasible, 
complete disregard for passive precautions may lead, depending on the 
circumstances, to human shields which is an absolute prohibition. Now, to 
draw a precise line between the two is very challenging, particularly in 
many complex contexts and, while it is clear that violations of IHL 
committed by one belligerent in no way relaxes the obligations of the other 
towards protected persons and objects, such violations can only increase the 
already enormous challenges raised by the planning and execution of 
military operations in densely populated areas. The ICRC would welcome 
any additional discussion or clarification on the concept of precaution in 
attack, particularly what is really feasible in the fog of warfare taking into 
account all military and humanitarian considerations.  
The final issue I would like to reflect upon is the future challenges of 
new technology during armed conflicts. IHL applies to all new means and 
methods of warfare. However, we need to deeply reflect on whether the 
preexisting legal rules in the face of new technologies raise questions about 
whether these rules are sufficiently clear and applicable. This is particularly 
true with regard to the development of cyber capacities and autonomous 
weapons systems, two very interesting issues which will be discussed in the 
last session of the Round Table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Setting the scene 
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The importance of the law in theatre 
Lone Kjelgaard 
Senior Assistant Legal Adviser, NATO Headquarters, Brussels 
This conference will focus on law in international military operations. A 
topic that could hardly be more important or more topical, whether to 
policymakers in capitals or to the lawyers wrestling with applying the tools 
and constraints of law, while warring against an opponent who recognises 
none of the same constraints.  
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not only a military alliance, 
albeit this might be our most visible role. NATO is a political alliance, with 
broad political objectives, such as supporting the principles of the UN 
Charter, strengthening our free institutions founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, promoting stability and 
well-being, eliminating economic conflict and encouraging economic 
collaboration. 
These political goals are so much an assumed part of our background, 
and NATO and its members have been so successful in support and 
advancing them, that we sometimes lose sight of the contribution that 
political element gives to NATO’s effectiveness and its legitimacy, as it 
expands the scope of its actions. 
Coupled with these fundamental values, there has been NATO’s 
commitment to consensus decision-making, a method which has allowed us 
to balance the need for effective common action with full respect for the 
views and legislation of each Ally. The collaborative methods nurtured 
through the forty years of the Cold War has served NATO well as it has 
developed new flexibility in responding to the constantly changing 
international landscape of the last twenty years.  
It would not be an understatement to say that NATO has quite some 
experience with regards to training for, planning and conducting 
multinational military operations. Nor would it be an understatement to say 
that NATO places a high value on compliance with both International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) and, as applicable, Human Rights Law (HRL). 
NATO’s approach towards IHL and HRL is directly related to its 
mission and history and resulting structure. As a political as well as military 
alliance, Allies’ common values drive both its political and its military 
actions. NATO is designed to be and functions as a mechanism for 
common action by sovereign states rather than as an autonomous, 
empowered entity and thus does not have a developed body of legal 
doctrine; rather, it applies IHL and HRL in NATO operations in a manner 
reflecting the individual national legal positions of the 28 Allies.  
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I will elaborate on this pragmatic approach using three examples of 
current and past NATO operations and finally touch upon future efforts in 
Afghanistan a little bit later. Before doing so, please allow me to elaborate 
a little on the specifics of the Alliance.  
There is no doubt that other Intergovernmental Organisations, notably 
including the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), have 
great experience in conducting multinational peacekeeping operations. 
None, however, has experience comparable to NATO’s in planning and 
carrying out military combat operations. This experience is among the 
reasons that NATO has so often been called upon to contribute military 
resources and structures to achieving the common goals of the international 
community. 
Another reason is the seriousness with which the Allies take their 
obligation to abide by both the spirit and the letter of applicable principles 
of IHL and HRL, when planning and carrying out Alliance military 
operations. NATO sees itself as setting a high standard for the lawful 
conduct of military operations. The members of the Alliance fully 
appreciate the importance for the Alliance’s credibility and the perceived 
legitimacy of its actions for meeting a high standard in complying with 
international legal rules applicable to its operations. 
Not only do Nations bring their own high standards to the table when 
planning military operations, they have also agreed and implemented 
doctrine applicable throughout the entire Military Structure. In the doctrine 
it says: «NATO commanders at all levels must be aware of the relevance of 
the proper use of force on the perceived credibility and legitimacy of 
operations» and it continues to say: «The use of force in non-Article V 
Crisis Response Operations depends upon a complex mixture of right and 
obligations, which are proved by international and national mandates, the 
UN Charter, applicable international rules, regulations and agreements, the 
law of armed conflict, international law and national laws and rules». 
As just mentioned, NATO operations are planned and conducted strictly 
in accordance with all applicable international law and conventions. In 
cases where not all Allies are party to the same agreements, such as for 
example the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions or the 
European Convention on Human Rights, NATO adopts the maximalist 
approach and not the lowest common denominator. So, we believe that we 
position ourselves appropriately from a legal point of view. For all Member 
States this is of paramount importance and they view this as an essential 
part of conducting operations and, therefore, legal aspects are duly reflected 
in all our operational planning.  
Here I believe it to be prudent to shed a little light on the structures of 
NATO to allow us all to comprehend some of the complexities, which have 
an impact on the Alliance’ relationship with IHL and HRL. 
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First, NATO decisions are made by consensus of all 28 Allies. Any 
Member State can block any decision or action by refusing to join the 
consensus. By the same token, a decision taken by the Allies still requires 
an Ally’s consent to take specific action to implement it.  
Secondly, the Organization has practically no autonomous or developed 
authorities. That is, NATO has legal personality, but unlike the UN, NATO 
has no “charter” through which the Member States permanently empower 
the Secretary General or the secretariat to take decision. Almost all 
decisions are taken by the Member States themselves through the North 
Atlantic Council or subordinate committees.  
NATO as an Organization is in essence tools through which the Allies 
choose to advance their broad national security ends or particular objectives 
when they consider it desirable or feasible to do so.  
Turning now to NATO’s relationship with the law, HRL as a separate 
body of law was embryonic in the formative years of the Alliance and at 
that time there was little reason to consider that HRL, as it was developed 
at that time, had any relevance in situations of armed conflict. Civilian 
protection was depicted in the provisions of IHL. The legal framework 
applicable to NATO was, therefore, rather simple: in case of World War III 
the law of armed conflict including IHL would be applicable. NATO forces 
trained and exercised extensively together and common understanding of 
legal obligations regarding the conduct of combat operations emerged. 
Here it is important to recall that all NATO military operations are 
conducted by the national forces of the Member States, and other States 
that may accept an invitation to join a NATO-led operation. Such forces are 
voluntarily committed by the respective sending States, and remain only 
under NATO command and control as long as those States choose to leave 
them there. The troop-contributing States retain ultimate, and at times 
substantial, daily operational control over their forces even when they are 
under NATO command. 
And this brings us to a key point: the law applicable to NATO 
operations is essentially the collection of individual legal frameworks of 
each of the 28 Allies and any other States participating with them.  
There is, of course, considerable overlap among those 28 legal 
environments. All Allies are party to key "universal treaties" at the heart of 
both IHL and HRL, including the Geneva Conventions and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. There is, moreover, 
general agreement on certain basic propositions with respect to the 
applicability of these two bodies of law, including that the standards of 
HRL are generally applicable to non-armed conflict operations. In addition, 
while IHL is lex specialis applicable to situations of armed conflict, IHL 
and HRL may in certain circumstances both be applicable to the same 
operation. 
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Allies agree as well that other bodies of law may apply in some cases. 
This is most obviously so in the case of operations built on UN Security 
Council Resolutions (and virtually all NATO operations have been based 
on such resolutions) but could also include other special bodies of law such 
as the Law of the Sea (in the case of counter-piracy or other maritime 
operations), or the national law of host countries when operations are being 
conducted in support of and within the territory of such countries. 
Therefore, NATO addresses legal questions, including issues of the 
relationship of IHL and HRL pragmatically rather than doctrinally. Once 
Allies agree in principle to undertake a military operation, NATO planners 
develop an Operations Plan (OPLAN) and associated Rules of Engagement 
(ROE) that will permit the operation to succeed and which all agree are 
lawful. If they have agreed on the OPLAN and ROE, whether or not Allies 
or other participating States agree on the exact legal justification or 
explanation underlying them, is in principle of little interest to NATO as an 
organization. Thus, rather than requiring adherence to a single common 
body of law, the Alliance's expectation is that all States participating in a 
NATO or NATO-led operation will act lawfully within the legal framework 
applicable to them.  
With respect to any particular operation or proposed operation, the 
question of applicable law will be addressed pragmatically, in the specifics 
of the OPLAN and the ROE. What the planners prepare and SACEUR, 
through the Military Committee, presents for Council approval takes 
national positions into account, but in practical terms proposes specific 
rules and approaches for particular anticipated circumstances rather than 
offers conceptual views on the applicability of one or another legal doctrine 
or body of law.  
Any such differences are in any event likely to be relatively minor and 
inclined to being addressed at the level of implementation. Moreover, no 
Ally is required to participate in any NATO operation, thus in many cases 
domestic political or legal issues need not prevent joining consensus to 
approve an operation that will be carried out by others. In the case of Libya, 
for example, Germany was able to join consensus on the mandate for 
Operation Unified Protector despite having abstained on Security Council 
Resolution 1973 of 11 March 2011, the basis for the NATO operation, and 
being unprepared to participate in the operation itself.  
Participating States are also able to limit their participation in other 
ways that may resolve for them, individually, any questions relating to their 
specific legal obligations. They may choose to participate in only parts of 
an operation. Or they may choose to participate with "caveats" reflecting 
national legal or political concerns. 
Now, please allow me to give a couple of practical examples of how the 
Organization does this in more practical terms. 
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Operation Ocean Shield is NATO's counter-piracy operation off the 
coast of Somalia. The key point of reference for NATO in identifying the 
applicable legal framework has been Security Council Resolutions and, in 
particular, Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008). 
The Somalia resolutions present a complex legal picture: they identify 
the law of the sea and, in particular, the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), as setting the legal framework for counter-piracy 
operations. UNSCR 1851, in particular, authorizes the taking of «all 
necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia» to counter piracy, thus 
contemplating and allowing use of force, permits the taking of counter-
piracy action on land in Somalia, even though the law of the sea is not 
applicable on land, and indicates that such actions must be consistent with 
«applicable international humanitarian and human rights law». 
Unpacking these complex provisions is not easy. In particular, the 
references to IHL and the authorization of «all necessary measures», and 
the contemplation of such measures in areas to which the UNCLOS 
framework is clearly inapplicable, are puzzling. Happily, however, for 
NATO's purposes it has not been necessary to untangle these knots, at least 
to date. The reason is that Ocean Shield is framed in essentially law 
enforcement terms, in essence, a legal common denominator on which all 
Allies can agree. From the beginning, the operation was built on the 
assumption that captured pirates would be tried as criminals in courts 
applying national law. 
The prudence of this approach has been confirmed by decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights and national courts applying its 
jurisprudence that have treated the terms of the ECHR, notably including 
its procedural requirements, to the counter-piracy operation -- and in so 
doing effectively determining that the core law applicable to the 
participation of 26 Allies is HRL. These decisions are in practice treated as 
binding by parties to the Convention, but they have no such status for 
Canada and the United States, however, the ECHR's decisions are an 
inescapable factor in the context of a NATO operation.) 
Because many Allies are reluctant to pursue national prosecutions in 
Europe, the operational consequence is that many participants in Ocean 
Shield follow a so-called "catch and release" approach in which pirates are 
captured and briefly detained, but in the end released rather than being 
prosecuted. Suspected pirates could in principle be transferred to a regional 
State which is party to an applicable prisoner transfer agreement, but 
NATO is not yet a party to any such agreement, yet we are pursuing the 
conclusion of such agreements.  
It is instructive in this context also to consider another and less well 
known NATO maritime operation, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE). 
OAE was adopted in the aftermath of 9/11 as a counter-terrorism mission. 
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It is the only NATO operation ever authorized under Article 5, the mutual 
self-defense article at the heart of the North Atlantic Treaty. While it might 
seem evident that a self-defense operation necessarily implies an armed 
conflict paradigm, and with it the application of IHL, in fact the operation 
has from the beginning been implemented essentially as a law enforcement 
mission with search and boarding rules and practices consistent with those 
applicable in any maritime law enforcement action. This approach is 
consistent with the fact that the Mediterranean Sea, the principal area in 
which OAE is conducted, is not a combat zone and that more extreme use 
of force is not necessary to conduct search activities in that environment.  
These two examples reflect the pragmatism with which NATO designs 
and carries out its operations. The missions can be carried out effectively 
without reference to IHL and thus there is no requirement to consider 
applying that body of law despite the existence of plausible arguments for 
doing so. 
A third case, the NATO operation in Libya, Operation Unified Protector 
(OUP), was mandated by Allies to implement Security Council Resolution 
1973, which authorized UN Member States to take a range of actions to 
address the repression of protests by the Qaddafi regime.  
OUP had three elements. The first was a maritime arms embargo to be 
conducted on the high seas, the second element of OUP, the no-fly zone 
preventing flights over Libyan territory other than those for humanitarian 
assistance purposes or as authorized by States enforcing the no-fly zone, 
and the third and by far most important element of the operation was the 
mission to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas from land attack. 
In this context, it was evident that the relevant legal construct was IHL, 
and the NATO OPLAN and ROE for the protect-civilians element of OUP 
were drafted on that basis. Among the fundamental elements of IHL are the 
principles of necessity and proportionality, both aimed in significant part at 
minimizing harm to civilians. In addition, the express purpose of 
Resolution 1973 and of the Council's mandate in OUP was to protect 
civilians, further underscoring the importance of avoiding civilian 
casualties to the extent possible. In fact, immense care was taken to avoid 
harm to civilians both in the weapons used, virtually every weapon used 
was a precision-guided one, and in the "zero civilian casualties" standard 
adopted by the targeteers. In the event, in over 7000 strikes there were 
credible reports of no more than 70 civilian deaths, a literally 
unprecedented performance for a major military operation. 
NATO will conclude its combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of 
this year and, at the clear invitation of the Government of Afghanistan, we 
will commence the Resolute Support Mission on January 1st 2015 (if we 
get the necessary legal framework in place). 
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It is of interest to note that one highly-charged issue relating to the 
application of IHL in the context of a NATO-led operation has been that of 
treatment of persons detained by ISAF forces in Afghanistan. The issue is 
politically salient and has been faced continually by NATO forces 
throughout NATO's decade-long presence in Afghanistan. Because 
detainees are captured by individual national units, however, responsibility 
for their treatment thereafter falls to the individual participating States and 
is determined by each such States’ own understanding of its IHL 
obligations toward detainees, including the implications of its classification 
of the conflict. The ISAF commander has no authority to dictate a common 
general policy on detentions and the Allies have not considered it necessary 
to agree on one on an Alliance basis. 
Like in OUP a paramount factor in our operations in Afghanistan has 
been a desire to implement a higher standard than required by law. In 
October 2001 Gen Allan, COM ISAF stated that he wanted to «eliminate 
civilian casualties». Gen Allan was well aware that this commitment not to 
reduce, not to mitigate, but to eliminate went beyond and above the legal 
requirements. With Afghanistan now in the lead of all operations, ISAF’s 
focus has shifted from exhaustive efforts to reduce our own civilian 
casualties to training our Afghan Partners to do the same. This effort will 
continue with the Train, Advice and Assist mission, where NATO-led 
trainers will emphasize the importance of law and respect for the rule of 
law to our Afghan partners, as they conduct their domestic operations.  
By way of conclusion allow me to re-emphasise.The Alliance was 
founded on respect for rule of law and respect for applicable law has been a 
hallmark of its training and operations. Among the Allies are States that 
have long been world leaders in developing and applying human rights law; 
many of the same States have long led in developing and applying IHL as 
well. It is important to both groups, and indeed, to the Alliance and its 
members as a whole, that NATO operations be carried out in a manner 
fully respecting and consistent with both bodies of law. NATO has long 
seen itself as setting the standard for the effective and lawful conduct of 
military operations and is aware of the importance of its own credibility 
and the perceived legitimacy of its actions of meeting a high standard in 
complying with international legal rules. 
However similar their basic legal obligations and perspectives may be, 
the Allies are sovereign and do not view all legal questions identically. 
NATO is an alliance, not an institution and it has no mandate or ability to 
enforce a common view. There is thus no systematic "NATO doctrine" on 
the relationship between IHL and HRL. 
As an alliance of sovereigns, NATO approaches issues relating to the 
legal framework for its military operations in a pragmatic manner. An 
operation will not even be proposed if it is known that it cannot command 
42 
consensus. The primary point of reference for deciding what kind of actions 
are legally available and appropriate within an operation will be the 
underlying UN Security Council Resolution, where there is one. ROE and 
other governing documents will be drafted with a focus on operational 
effectiveness and ensuring a high legal "comfort level" on the part of all 
participating States rather than on any a priori view of the law. 
What may differentiate the situations of NATO and other entities 
conducting multinational military operations, however, is the fact that 
actions of the Organization are, under NATO rules, indistinguishable from 
the collective, common action of all its individual member States. Not only 
is every major NATO decision taken by the North Atlantic Council rather 
than by the Secretary-General on the basis of conferred or delegated 
authority, but each such decision must be taken through a consensus 
process in which no Ally can be outvoted and for the outcome of which 
each Ally therefore bears responsibility. Every NATO operation is thus 
initiated by the consensus authorization of all Allies; every OPLAN and 
every set of ROE, and every amendment to them, are similarly approved by 
consensus of all Allies. The Allies decide when to initiate an operation, and 
when to terminate it. In such contexts it may seem strange to ascribe a 
responsibility to NATO, at least separately from individual States 
participating in an operation.  
Happily, NATO has to date not had to face serious legal questions 
relating to the allocation of responsibility for alleged violations of IHL. 
This fact is far from accidental, however, and reflects the seriousness with 
which the Organization, its member States and NATO operating partners 
take their responsibility to comply fully with their obligations under IHL.  
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L’évolution du droit international humanitaire 
applicable à la conduite des hostilités 
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Le droit international applicable à la conduite des hostilités s’efforce de 
trouver un juste milieu entre les nécessités de la guerre et les lois 
d’humanité au cours des conflits armés1. Longtemps applicable aux seuls 
conflits armés internationaux, ce corpus de normes s’est étendu par voie 
coutumière aux conflits armés non internationaux2. L’application de ces 
normes doit aujourd’hui faire face à deux défis: la lutte engagée contre le 
terrorisme (I) et l’apparition de nouvelles technologies sur le champ de 
bataille (II). 
 
 
1. La lutte contre le terrorisme et le droit international humanitaire 
 
Depuis quelques années, une tendance se dessine à étendre, au nom de 
la lutte contre le terrorisme pour etendre le champ d’application spatiale de 
ces normes (1.1) et l’on observe une nette propension à attaquer des 
personnes ne participant pas directement aux hostilités (1.2). 
 
 
1.1. Extension du champ d’application spatiale du droit international 
humanitaire 
 
L’application du droit international humanitaire à la conduite des 
hostilités est conditionnée par l’existence d’un conflit armé. La 
qualification d’une situation de conflit armé relève du droit international 
                                                     
1 Déclaration de St Pétersbourg, 11 décembre 1868. 
2 La Chambre d’appel du Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex Yougoslavie, dans 
l’arrêt relatif à l’appel de la défense concernant l’exception préjudicielle d’incompétence 
(Aff. n° IT - 94 – 1. AR 72 – 2octobre 1995 Le Procureur c. Dusko Tadic alias Dule), 
déclare: « Ce qui est inhumain, et par conséquent interdit, dans les conflits internationaux, 
ne peut pas être considéré comme humain dans les conflits civils » (§ 119 de l’arrêt). 
L’étude menée par le CICR sur le droit international humanitaire coutumier (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts et Louise Doswald-Beck, Bruylant 2006) arrive à cette conclusion que la plupart 
des règles du droit international humanitaire relatives à la conduite des hostilités 
s’appliquent aussi bien aux conflits armés internationaux qu’aux conflits armés non 
internationaux. 
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humanitaire qui fixe des critères objectifs pour définir un conflit armé3. Au 
cours de ces dernières années, certains Etats ont qualifié de « guerre » la 
lutte contre le terrorisme4, alors même que la situation n’avait pas atteint le 
seuil fixé par le droit international humanitaire. A supposer que, dans 
certains cas, on puisse admettre que le seuil requis soit atteint, l’application 
du droit international humanitaire doit se limiter au théâtre effectif des 
combats et ne pas s’étendre aux territoires d’Etats non belligérants sans leur 
consentement. On se doit de constater que ces limites n’ont pas toujours été 
respectées, particulièrement pour ce qui est du champ de bataille5. 
On constate que, dans certains cas, ce champ a été étendu au gré des 
déplacements des personnes supposées être impliquées dans des opérations 
terroristes, pratique suivie par les Etats-Unis et Israël. Selon les Etats-Unis, 
le droit des forces armées d’utiliser la force contre Al Qaïda ne se limite 
pas au champ de bataille effectif mais s’étend au-delà. D’après cet Etat, le 
droit international l’autoriserait à recourir à la force sans qu’il soit dans 
chaque cas nécessaire de se demander si nous sommes en situation de 
légitime défense ou non. Il se réserve en effet ce droit dès lors qu’un Etat 
serait incapable de prendre les mesures qui s’imposent ou refuserait de le 
faire6. Cette thèse est évidemment rejetée par les organes internationaux 
compétents dans le domaine du droit international des droits de l’homme. 
Le Rapporteur spécial du Conseil des droits de l’homme des Nations 
Unies sur l’« exécution extra judiciaire et arbitraire » est d’avis que 
l’existence d’un conflit armé et le champ d’application géographique des 
normes du droit international humanitaire sont déterminés par des critères 
objectifs. D’après le Rapporteur spécial, certains Etats se sont référés au 
droit international humanitaire au mépris de ces critères parce que cette 
branche du droit offre, contrairement au droit international des droits de 
                                                     
3 Cf. art. 2 commun aux Conventions de Genève de 1949 et l’article 1 du Protocole 
additionnel pour ce qui est des critères sur la base desquels on peut qualifier un conflit armé 
d’international. S’agissant des conflits armés non internationaux, ce sont désormais les 
critères fixés par le Tribunal pénal pour l’ex Yougoslavie dans l’affaire Tadic précitée qui 
prévalent. D’après le Tribunal, on entend par conflit armé non international « un conflit 
armé prolongé entre les autorités gouvernementales et des groupes armés organisés ou entre 
de tels groupes au sein d’un Etat » (§ 70 de l’arrêt). Cette définition est reprise par le Statut 
de Rome pour la Cour pénale internationale reprend dans son article 8 § 2 (c). 
4 Des expressions telles que « War against terrorism » ou « Global war » ont été utilisés 
par les autorités des Etats-Unis d’Amérique pour qualifier la lutte qu’ils mènent contre le 
terrorisme. 
5 Louise Arimatsu, “Territory, Boundaries and the Law of armed conflict”, Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law Vol. 12 (2009) pp. 157-192. 
6 Selon John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, “The US do not view our authority to use military force against Al Qaida 
as being restricted solely to hot battlefields like Afghanistan because we are engaged in an 
armed conflict with Al Qaida” Address at Harvard Law School : “Strengthening our 
Security by Adhering to our Values” (Sept. 16, 2011). 
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l’homme, plus de liberté d’action pour tuer (more permissive rules for 
killing), tout en assurant l’immunité à la personne menant l’attaque. Dans 
ces conditions, la privation de la vie s’apparente à une exécution sommaire 
et arbitraire et oblige l’Etat dont les forces armées en sont responsables à 
mener une enquête7. 
De même, le Comité des droits de l’homme, examinant le rapport que 
les Etats-Unis lui ont soumis, s’est déclaré préoccupé par l’étendue spatiale 
de l’application des normes du droit international humanitaire. Le Comité 
met par ailleurs en cause le recours excessif à la notion de menace 
imminente8. Ces préoccupations sont partagées par le CICR. Son président 
s’était demandé s’il était possible d’utiliser la force létale contre une 
personne participant directement à un conflit armé et se déplaçant sur le 
territoire d’un Etat non belligérant. Selon lui, le droit international 
humanitaire ne saurait s’appliquer contre une telle personne. Emettre 
l’opinion inverse signifierait que le monde entier est un champ de bataille 
potentiel9. Point de vue partagé par le Parlement européen qui déclare que 
« le droit international, en matière de droits de l’homme, interdit les 
assassinats arbitraires en toutes circonstances, considérant que le droit 
international humanitaire ne permet pas l’assassinat ciblé de personnes qui 
se trouvent dans des Etats non belligérants »10. 
A supposer même que la personne ciblée se trouve sur le champ de 
bataille, l’attaque ne pourrait être considérée comme licite que si cette 
personne participe directement aux hostilités. 
 
 
1.2. Ciblage de personnes qui ne participent pas directement aux hostilités 
 
Selon les deux Protocoles additionnels aux Conventions de Genève de 
1949, les civils jouissent de la protection accordée par le droit international 
humanitaire sauf s’ils participent directement aux hostilités et pendant la 
durée de cette participation11. Cette exception vise les personnes qui 
assument une « fonction de combat continu » (continuous combat 
                                                     
7 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston, on “Extra Judicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Execution” UN.Doc A/HRC/14/24/Addendum 6 on Targeted Killing, 28 août 
2010. D’après le Rapporteur special “Whether a conflict exists is a question that must be 
answered with reference to objective criteria” (§ 46 et 47 du rapport). 
8 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the fourth US periodic report 
CCPR/C/USA/4 and Corr. 1 § 9. 
9 Interview de Peter Maurer, Président du CICR, 10 mai 2013. 
10 Résolution du Parlement européen du 27 février 2014 sur l’utilisation de drones 
armés (2014/2567 [RSP]) Point F.  
11 Art. 51 al. 3 du Protocole I additionnel et art. 13 du Protocole II additionnel. 
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function)12 concrétisée par des actes hostiles à l’égard de l’ennemi. Il s’agit 
d’actes qui, par leur nature et leur but, sont destinés à frapper le personnel 
ou le matériel des forces armées13. On ne saurait donc inclure dans cette 
catégorie les activités qui contribuent à « l’effort de guerre », parmi 
lesquelles celles destinées à soutenir « le moral de la population »14. 
Selon les Etats-Unis et Israël, non parties à ces Protocoles, ces 
dispositions ne reflètent pas le droit international coutumier. Ces Etats se 
fondent plutôt sur le critère d’appartenance à un groupe hostile pour 
qualifier de participation directe aux hostilités les activités menées par les 
personnes qui y sont affiliées et justifient ainsi les attaques menées à leur 
encontre. Il en va ainsi des activités menées par des responsables politiques 
ou des leaders spirituels contre leurs intérêts. D’après le Procureur général 
des Etats-Unis, l’assassinat ciblé de hauts responsables d’Al Qaida, se 
trouvant en dehors du territoire américain, est justifié dans la mesure où ils 
sont engagés dans la planification d’opérations destinées à tuer des citoyens 
américains ou dans le cas les autorités américaines sont arrivées à la 
conclusion qu’ils représentent une menace imminente pour les Etats-Unis et 
qu’il n’est pas possible de les capturer15. Tout critère éminemment subjectif 
laissé à la libre appréciation des autorités qui prennent la décision 
d’attaquer. La Cour Suprême d’Israël s’est fondée à son tour sur le critère 
de l’appartenance de la personne ciblée à un groupe armé. Néanmoins, cet 
Etat prend le soin de souligner que la licéité de l’assassinat ciblé doit 
s’apprécier au cas par cas16. 
                                                     
12 « Guide interprétatif sur la notion de participation directe aux hostilités en droit 
international humanitaire » CICR, octobre 2010. Le Rapporteur spécial sur les exécutions 
extra judiciaires, sommaires ou arbitraires se réfère au (§ 62) de son rapport sur ce guide 
pour conclure que seules ces personnes peuvent être ciblées alors qu’elles se trouvent sur le 
champ de bataille. Cf. William J. Fenrick ICRC guidance on direct participation in 
hostilities Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law Vol. 12 (2009) pp. 287-300. 
13 Commentaire de l’al. 3 de l’article 51 du Protocole additionnel I préparé par les soins 
du CICR, Genève 1986 § 1942. 
14 Ibid. § 1945. 
15 Lors d’un discours prononcé le 5 mars 2013 au Northwestern University School of 
Law, l’Attorney General, Eric Holder, a déterminé dans quelles conditions les Etats-Unis 
s’autorisent à procéder à des assassinats ciblés hors de leur territoire. Selon le Procureur, 
l’assassinat ciblé est justifié «If the targeted citizen (il s’agissait de Al Awlaki, citoyen 
américain ciblé alors qu’il se trouvait sur le territoire du Yémen) is a senior operational 
leader of Al Qaida or associated forces, if he is actively engaged in the planning to kill 
Americans, if the US Government has determined that the individual poses an imminent 
threat of violent attack on US, if his capture is not feasible and if the operation would be 
conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war». Cf. Beth Van Schaack The 
killing of Osama Ben Laden and Anwar Al Awlaqi: Uncharted Legal Territory Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law Vol. 14 (2011) pp. 255-326. 
16 The Public Committee against torture et al. v. the Governement of Israël et al. HCJ 
769/02, 14 décembre 2006 “Thus, it cannot be determined in advance that every targeted 
killing is permitted according to customary international law”. 
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Dans les situations qui ne peuvent être qualifiées de conflit armé, le 
recours à la force létale ne peut se justifier qu’en cas de légitime défense. 
En aucun cas, la privation du droit à la vie inhérent à la personne humaine 
ne doit être interprétée dans un sens restrictif17. Malheureusement, on se 
doit de constater que, dans de nombreux cas, les personnes visées ont été 
privées de leur vie alors que la possibilité de les capturer existait, ce qui a 
conduit le Rapporteur spécial sur l’exécution extra judiciaire et arbitraire à 
affirmer qu’en dehors des situations de conflits armés les assassinats ciblés 
sont rarement considérés comme étant licites18. Qui plus est, toute privation 
du droit à la vie doit, selon le droit international des droits de l’homme, 
faire l’objet d’une enquête, ce que les autorités responsables se sont 
abstenues d’entreprendre dans la plupart des cas19. 
 
 
2. L’utilisation d’armes nouvelles 
 
Selon la Déclaration de St Pétersbourg, il appartient aux parties 
contractantes de s’assurer que les perfectionnements que la science pourrait 
apporter à l’armement soient respectueux des principes qu’elles ont posés. 
L’article 36 du Protocole I additionnel, selon lequel les parties ont 
l’obligation de déterminer dans chaque cas si l’emploi d’une nouvelle arme 
est conforme à ses dispositions, est fondé sur cet instrument20. C’est sur 
cette base que la Cour International de Justice est arrivée à cette conclusion 
que l’emploi de l’arme nucléaire, en tant que nouvelle arme, doit être 
conforme au droit international humanitaire, sans quoi on méconnaîtrait la 
nature intrinsèquement humanitaire des principes qui imprègnent tout le 
droit international humanitaire21. La question se pose désormais de savoir si 
l’utilisation de drones et le recours aux cyberattaques au cours de conflits 
                                                     
17 Observation générale n° 6, art. 6 (Droit à la vie) HRI/GEN Re 9 (Vol. 1) Comité des 
droits de l’homme, seizième session, 30 avril 1982. Selon la pratique constante du Comité, 
le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques dont l’article 6 est applicable aux 
actes d’un Etat agissant dans l’exercice de sa compétence en dehors de son propre territoire. 
Pratique relevée par la C.I.J. dans son avis du 9 juillet 2004 sur les « conséquences 
juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le territoire palestinien occupé » (§ 109 de l’arrêt). 
18 Pour le Rapporteur spécial Ph. Alston, «Outside the context of armed conflict, the use 
of drones for targeted killing is almost never likely to be legal» (§ 85 du rapport). 
19 Ph. Alston estime que «The failure of States to comply with their human rights law 
and international humanitarian law obligations to provide transparency and accountability 
for targeted killing is a matter of deep concern» (§ 87 du rapport). 
20 «A guide to the legal review of new weapons, means and methods of warfare: 
measures to implement art. 36 of additional Protocol I of 1977» in International Review of 
Red Cross Vol. 88 n° 864 pp. 864 et s. (December 2006) Cf. également Kathleen Lawand 
Reviewing the legality of new weapons, means and methods of warfare” Ibid. pp. 925 et s. 
21 Avis consultatif du 8 juillet 1996 « Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes 
nucléaires » § 86. 
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armés peuvent être conformes aux normes applicables à la conduite des 
hostilités. 
 
 
2.1. La conformité de l’attaque menée par des drones avec le droit 
international humanitaire 
 
Si le recours aux drones est rarement conforme au droit international des 
droits de l’homme, comme cela a été mis en exergue dans le cas des 
assassinats ciblés commis dans des situations qui ne peuvent être qualifiées 
de conflit armé, il n’en va pas de même dans le cas de l’utilisation des 
drones comme arme lors des conflits armés. En effet, les drones permettent 
une surveillance aérienne en temps réel. On aurait pu s’attendre à ce que le 
choix des cibles puisse se faire dans de meilleures conditions et que des 
mesures de précaution soient prises afin d’épargner au maximum la 
population civile22. Ce n’est malheureusement pas toujours le cas. 
L’utilisation de drones sur différents théâtres d’opérations a montré que la 
technique n’est pas encore en mesure de conférer à ces appareils une 
capacité autonome pour reconnaître les cibles choisies et déterminer le 
moment optimal pour passer à l’acte avec le moins possible de dommages 
collatéraux. Question qui se posera avec encore plus d’acuité lorsque les 
armes autonomes seront mises en service. La réunion des Etats parties à la 
Convention sur certaines armes classiques s’en est préoccupée. Elle leur a 
permis de commencer à explorer les questions fondamentales d’ordre 
juridique et éthique que ces armes poseront. La question se pose de savoir 
si, en plein combat, les armes autonomes seront capables de distinguer un 
civil d’un combattant ou si elles seront en mesure d’annuler une attaque 
qui, après avoir été lancée, s’avérerait génératrice d’effets collatéraux 
disproportionnés par rapport à l’avantage militaire attendu23. Le Parlement 
européen s’est préoccupé des implications en matière de droits de l’homme 
de l’utilisation de drones et de robots autonomes en temps de guerre24. 
Mis à part ces risques résultant de défaillances techniques, on devrait 
s’interroger sur les effets que l’éloignement des combattants du champ de 
bataille pourrait avoir sur la mise en œuvre du droit international 
                                                     
22 « Le droit international humanitaire et les défis posés par les conflits armés 
contemporains » Rapport établi par le CICR (octobre 2011) pour la XXXI ème Conférence 
internationale de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge, Genève 28novembre-1er décembre 
2011 p. 45. 
23 Réunion du 12 mai 2014, communiqué de presse CICR. Selon une étude menée par 
Amnesty International intitulée «Will be next» et publiée en 2013, au cours des années 2004 
à 2013 les quelque 300 attaques menées par des drones américains au nord du Pakistan ont 
tué de 400 à 900 personnes, dont seules 2 % étaient ciblées. 
24 Rés. 2014/2567 (RSP) précitée. Le parlement européen s’inquiète. 
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humanitaire. Des études ont montré que si on déconnectait un soldat du 
champ de bataille, il serait tenté, dans la mesure où il ne craint pas pour sa 
vie, de commettre, en ciblant son adversaire, des abus en violation du droit 
international humanitaire25. On pourrait au contraire soutenir que, ne se 
voyant pas menacé, le combattant prendrait le temps d’évaluer sa cible et 
ne tirerait qu’après s’être assuré de sa nature militaire26. Toutes ces 
questions ont été abordées lors des réunions organisées par l’Assemblée 
Générale des Nations Unies27 et le Conseil des droits de l’homme28. Ce 
dernier organe exhorte les Etats qui ont recours aux drones dans la lutte 
contre le terrorisme d’enquêter sur les faits quand il existe un indice 
plausible de violation du droit international des droits de l’homme et 
d’assurer, dans ce cas, un procès équitable aux victimes innocentes des tirs. 
Dans le cadre d’un conflit armé, les Etats qui ont recours à cette arme sont 
tenus de respecter les principes de distinction, de proportionnalité ainsi que 
celui de précaution29. 
 
 
2.2. La conformité du recours à la cyberattaque avec le droit international 
humanitaire  
 
Ce qui nous préoccupe ici est de savoir dans quelles conditions une 
opération cybernétique peut être considérée comme une attaque au sens du 
droit international humanitaire. Selon le Manuel de Tallinn sur 
l’applicabilité du droit international à la guerre cybernétique, une 
cyberattaque au sens du droit international humanitaire est un cyber 
opération, offensive ou défensive, raisonnablement susceptible de blesser 
ou de tuer des personnes ou d’endommager ou même détruire des biens30. Il 
s’agit d’une définition restrictive dans la mesure où une opération 
                                                     
25 « Le droit international humanitaire et les défis posés par les conflits armés 
contemporains », op. cit. p. 45 et rapport précité du Rapporteur spécial Alston § 80. 
26 Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer Légalité et légitimité des drones armés Politique 
étrangère 3 (2013) p. 123. 
27 Réunion du 25 octobre 2013 de la troisième Commission de l’Assemblée Générale 
consacrée à l’examen des rapports des Rapporteurs spéciaux Christof Heyns et Ben 
Emmerson, respectivement sur les exécutions sommaires et sur la promotion des libertés 
fondamentales et la lutte contre le terrorisme. Les deux Rapporteurs spéciaux ont insisté sur 
l’obligation des Etats de faire preuve de plus de transparence. 
28 Réunion débat du Conseil des droits de l’homme organisée le 22 septembre 2014 
(Rés. A/HRC/25/L.32 – 24 mars 2014). 
29 Rés. A/HRC/25/L.11 – 21 mars 2014. Les Etats-Unis et Israël ont voté contre cette 
résolution. 
30 Tallinn Manual on the International Law applicable to Cyber Warfare, prepared par 
the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defense Center of Excellence, Cambridge University Press 2013. Ce manuel énonce 95 
règles. La règle 30 définit l’attaque cybernétique. 
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cybernétique qui ne cause pas de préjudice à des individus ou de dommage 
matériel à des biens ou objets n’est pas considérée comme une attaque au 
sens du droit international humanitaire. Ainsi, lorsqu’une manipulation du 
système de contrôle aérien entraîne le crash d’un avion, des coupures 
d’électricité ou interrompt la distribution d’eau potable, elle constitue 
incontestablement une attaque soumise aux règles pertinentes du droit 
international humanitaire. 
En revanche, l’opération qui entraîne la neutralisation des données se 
trouvant dans un ordinateur, à supposer même qu’elle ait pour conséquence 
l’interruption des communications de l’ennemi, n’est pas considérée 
comme telle. A l’appui d’une telle interprétation, on peut soutenir que les 
données ne peuvent être considérées comme un objet tangible. On a 
soutenu à juste titre que la simple neutralisation, même réversible, d’un 
bien peut présenter un avantage militaire précis et être considérée de ce fait 
comme un objectif militaire susceptible d’être attaqué31. Ainsi, il n’est pas 
nécessaire que l’opération cybernétique entraîne la destruction d’un bien. 
Sous certaines conditions, sa simple neutralisation pourrait qualifier l’acte 
hostile d’attaque32. La pratique subséquente des Etats apportera la réponse à 
cette divergence de vues. Quelle que soit la définition retenue, l’attaque 
cybernétique doit être menée en conformité avec les normes du droit 
international humanitaire réglementant les opérations militaires. 
De sérieux doutes ont été exprimés quant à la capacité des 
cyberopérations à respecter ces règles, plus particulièrement la règle 
fondamentale du droit international humanitaire de la distinction entre 
population civile et combattants ainsi qu’entre objectif militaire et civil. 
L’interconnexion entre les réseaux informatiques civils et militaires rend le 
respect de cette règle aléatoire. De plus, l’introduction d’un virus 
suffisamment puissant pourrait affecter le système informatique civil de 
l’Etat ciblé, voire au-delà de ses frontières et perturber ou détruire les 
infrastructures reposant sur ces systèmes. Au regard du droit international 
humanitaire, de tels virus seraient considérés comme frappant sans 
discrimination33. Ces risques sont d’autant plus prévisibles que la 
responsabilité des auteurs de telles attaques ne sera jamais engagée en 
raison de l’anonymat qu’offre l’espace cybernétique. 
                                                     
31 Art. 52 al. 2 du Protocole I additionnel. 
32 Thèse soutenue par Knut Dörmann Applicability of the Additional Protocol to 
computer network attacks, contribution électronique 2004 p. 6. L’affirmation de l’auteur est 
fondée sur l’article 52 al. 2 du Protocole I additionnel déterminant dans quelle mesure un 
bien constitue un objectif militaire, à savoir, entre autres, la “neutralisation” d’un bien 
offrant un avantage militaire précis. 
33 « Le droit international humanitaire et les défis posés par les conflits armés 
contemporains », op.cit. p. 44. Pour une étude critique et approfondie du Manuel de Tallinn, 
Cf. Rain Liivoya and Tim Mc Cormack Laws in the virtual battlespace: the Tallinn Manual 
and the Jus in bello Yearbook of International Humanitrian Law Vol. 15 (2012) pp. 45 et s. 
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Le droit international humanitaire applicable à la conduite des hostilités 
a été codifié par le Protocole I additionnel aux Conventions de Genève de 
1949 dont la plupart des dispositions peuvent être considérées comme 
reflétant le droit international coutumier. Mais aujourd’hui, ces règles sont 
confrontées à de graves défis. Pour tenter d’y répondre, comme le montre la 
pratique dominante, ces dispositions restent malgré tout un point de 
référence incontournable. Les tentatives tendant à étendre leur application à 
la lutte contre le terrorisme continuent de heurter, au sein des organes 
internationaux compétents en matière de droits de l’homme, l’opposition de 
la très grande majorité des Etats, le respect des droits de l’homme dans la 
lutte contre le terrorisme ne cessant d’être régulièrement bafoué. 
Paradoxalement, pour relever le défi de l’emploi d’armes nouvelles, on 
s’est toujours efforcé d’ériger les normes pertinentes du Protocole en 
modèle d’une réglementation plus appropriée de leur utilisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Operational planning 
and targeting decision processes 
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Planning and decision-making: differences 
in processes for pre-planned targets, targets 
of opportunity and troops in contact situations. 
National perspectives 
Richard C. “Rich” Gross 
Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Washington D.C. 
I am here on a personal capacity – I am not speaking for the Department 
of Defense, the Joint Staff, or the US Army.  
I would also like to thank the scholars and the academics because they 
do a great service to us in the military, to those of us who are practitioners. 
We don’t often give the luxury of a great deal of time to advise our 
commanders and our bosses on important legal issues. We are often given 
five, ten minutes to make a decision or to give a legal opinion to a 
commander who has to make a tough call about a military strike, operation 
or detention. It’s the great work of scholars and academics, including the 
Institute and the ICRC, that develops the law. So, we can learn and be 
better prepared to give that advice.  
I think that if there were a theme to my remarks today, it would be that 
an operational law attorney or a practitioner really has the most value and 
the most opportunity to be influential before a military operation and not 
necessarily during. There was a famous TV show called “JAG” (Judge 
Advocate General) and everybody in America has probably watched or at 
least made fun of that show. There was one episode where the commander 
is discussing an airstrike with multiple aircraft and he turns to the lawyer, 
the JAG, and says: “I want you to lead the airstrike because you know the 
ROE” [Rules of Engagement]. That never happens in real life; in fact, not 
only are you not asked to be on the strike, you are often not in the room 
when you really ought to be, because the commander brings the 
intelligence officer and the operations officer together and they may not 
have brought the JAG in for a very important discussion. I have been 
blessed with bosses who have always had me in the room. But I still think 
the greatest influence that a JAG practitioner has, before an operation, is in 
the development of the rules of engagement and training which two of our 
panelists will talk about, and not only the training in the rules of 
engagement but also the training in the law of armed conflict or 
international humanitarian law. Now, I was asked to talk about three 
specific aspects of operational targeting: pre-planned targeting, troops-in-
contact targeting, and, what has been labelled as “targets of opportunity”, 
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which I think is probably the most controversial and challenging aspect for 
a practitioner and probably gives the most cause for discussion and back 
and forth dialogue.  
So let’s talk about preplanned targeting. Obviously, this is the most 
deliberate type of targeting we do in the military and frankly it’s where I 
think the systems can be emplaced to ensure the least amount of civilian 
casualties, the most compliance with IHL and the most compliance with the 
rules of engagement because you put a process in place that allows you to 
frame an operation in such a way you can make sure you are following all 
the appropriate rules. That is where we, as lawyers, can have a lot of 
influence, at the beginning. 
Now, one of the speakers referred to a kind of PlayStation (videogame) 
mentality when it comes to drone strikes. I found that funny, because that 
analogy only works if you play PlayStation in your room with twenty 
people watching over your shoulder telling you when you can or cannot 
take the strike, because that’s how deliberate targeting works. There’s a 
process. Deliberate targeting or preplanned targeting really starts with a 
nomination. That’s when a unit, a tactical or operational unit will make a 
nomination. They’ll nominate a target, whether it’s a military objective like 
a site or person or a particular training camp or some other sort of military 
objective, and put forward a justification under both the law of armed 
conflict as well as policy, rules of engagement and their words as to why 
this objective fits their military purposes and what’s the military benefit. 
Why are we taking the strike? Why is it legal? And so forth. And they’ll 
put that forward and that’ll move up through policy-makers, decision-
makers, commanders, intelligence officers and lawyers and it’s vetted at 
every step – there is a formal process.  
This is not just a United States process, I mean, we do it in the United 
States for US-only operations but I have seen it at work when I was a ISAF 
legal advisor, a very deliberate system within ISAF, the NATO process to 
vet targets and to take it up to a targeting board where multiple individuals 
are reviewing those targets for a number of things. Certainly the lawyers 
are looking at it for compliance with the law of armed conflict, for 
compliance with ROE, but you also have intelligence officers determining 
if the intelligence supports a particular operation; you have an operations 
officer reviewing it to ensure it meets the objectives of that military 
operation, etc. Each person gives it a “green” or “red”, a go or no-go, as 
part of that targeting board, which is a recommendation to the commander 
who can authorize that strike. It’s not a voting process where the majority 
wins. A single red vote is essentially a veto that goes to the commander, 
and that commander makes the final decision. As part of that process, we 
do a very complex collateral damage assessment process, something that 
was developed within the US military as part of our doctrine that has since 
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been adopted by NATO. It involves a very scientific methodology of 
looking at a particular objective and looking at factors, like is it daytime or 
night time, is it in a rural area or is it in an urban area? Is it typically 
populated or not? Is it a work place or residence, etc.? And that data is used 
to determine what the appropriate approval level is to authorize a particular 
strike. It’s not a substitute for a proportionality test under the law. The 
commander still has to determine whether or not a strike is proportional and 
whether or not any civilian casualties would be proportional to the military 
benefit gained. The collateral damage estimate process can help inform a 
commander’s views of how that preplanned target goes. 
Once that target has been thoroughly vetted and goes to the commander 
who makes the decision, then he decides whether or not to take that strike 
and, if so, with what weapon system. So it’s a very deliberate process, one 
that often has challenges, particularly in a coalition environment. In a 
coalition environment you are faced with interoperability issues and 
different (ROE national) caveats. Different countries come to the fight with 
different rules, particularly in the area of self-defense. I can think of all the 
countries that were in the ISAF coalition, there were probably different 
national self-defense rules of engagement for every country, and it’s 
something we have to work through. In addition, they may have caveats 
when it comes to the rules of engagement for deliberate targets, preplanned 
targets. The most common example I can think of is that some nations 
came to ISAF with the caveat that they would not do counter-narcotics 
operations. So they would not participate in an operation if they thought it 
was a counter-narcotic type of operation, therefore, we had to consider this. 
So, turning to the next area, probably the easiest area of these three 
types of targets, is troops-in-contact. It’s not hard to figure out who the 
enemy is when someone is shooting at you. So typically, in those types of 
scenarios we don’t really have those situations where it’s a question of 
whether or not to respond with lethal force or deadly force. There are 
proportionality issues certainly and other issues. There are interoperability 
issues with troops-in-contact situations and we have had situations where, 
for example, you have one nation’s troops under fire, you have another 
nation’s troops controlling the aircraft overhead and a third nation piloting 
that aircraft. So with three different nations involved in that self-defense 
situation whose rules of engagements apply? And I can tell you that while 
troops are being shot at, it’s not the time to figure that out. And we had that 
situation once. We think we had it settled but as people change over I 
cannot tell you what the status is right now. 
Finally, the last area of targeting I was asked to discuss is targets of 
opportunity. I have given it some thought and I really think this area has the 
most risks. I will not consider self-defense scenarios where someone is 
shooting at you and it’s easy, nor the preplanned targets when we have 
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determined someone or something as a lawful military objective and the 
commander has made that decision. So, I shall consider everything else in 
the middle as a target of opportunity. I think that it all boils down to one of 
two scenarios: the first type of target of opportunity might be where a 
commander and a unit are faced with a possible enemy that, based on 
something they are doing, they think is a lawful military objective under 
their orders. So, for example, you come upon a unit, a group of individuals 
who are armed and you think they might be Taliban in Afghanistan and so 
you are trying to determine whether or not it is an appropriate target to hit. 
Again, lawyers can influence that situation by the way we write the rules of 
engagement to deal with this situation. According to the NATO/ISAF rules 
of engagement, for example, a target of opportunity like that had to go to a 
higher level, a certain level of commander for approval. So, the commander 
on the ground, if he is not faced with a self-defense situation, he is not 
being shot at and the other party may not even know he’s there, often has to 
seek approval from a higher level commander. This decision allows for a 
calm head, for someone who’s a little detached from the situation to help 
make that decision. 
The other kind of category of target of opportunity is really the harder 
one where someone’s behavior is such that it makes you think they might 
be an enemy or they might be about to do something. Certainly, if it rises to 
a level of hostile intent, self-defense would have to be considered, but if it 
is just short of that, you are looking at their behavior to determine whether 
or not this is a target of opportunity – those situations are extraordinarily 
difficult to deal with. Let me give you a couple of examples. A scenario we 
were asked about quite frequently, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, was where 
you had a military base and at certain times there would be an individual on 
a cell phone and within minutes there would be incoming mortar fire or 
rounds, or a helicopter would land, an individual watching would make a 
call on a cell phone, and suddenly there would be incoming mortar rounds. 
So, the question becomes, is that individual on his phone calling in the 
strikes or is it someone who happens to be on the phone? This is a target of 
opportunity and it is a very, very hard call for a commander.  
The commander may not have time to contact a lawyer and so we try to 
compensate for this beforehand by teaching the rules of engagement and so 
forth to make commanders equipped to respond to that situation. Certainly 
deadly force is not the only way to deal with that kind of situation. You can 
send out someone and talk to the individual on the cell phone, perhaps 
temporarily detain them and determine if they have other items on their 
person to indicate whether or not they are actually an enemy or just an 
innocent cell phone user outside the base.  
Another difficult scenario that came up a lot in Afghanistan were folks 
digging at night. We come from a lesser agrarian society nowadays. Most 
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of us are not really used to life on a farmland or the high temperatures they 
have in Afghanistan. It shouldn’t surprise us (but it often did) that farmers 
in Afghanistan will sometimes dig at night, and they are digging for their 
crops not digging in IEDs. And yet that was a lesson we had to teach 
commanders i.e. not everybody digging at night is up to nefarious purposes. 
They may have a legitimate, agricultural reason for digging at night. It’s 
hot during the day and they can get more work done. So that was one of 
those areas where it may look like a target of opportunity but proper 
training in the rules of engagement and frankly alternative means of 
addressing it, could be helpful to a commander.  
We also ran into the check-point scenario in Afghanistan quite a bit. 
You run a NATO/ISAF check-point to slow traffic down or to search cars 
and of course the Afghan police do the same thing. As cars approach the 
check-point, you have a number of signs, warnings, lights, lasers [to slow 
them down]. You wouldn’t believe the measures in place we had, and cars 
still sped up and headed towards the checkpoint despite the multiple 
warnings, sounds, everything. So that was a frustrating, scary, situation for 
our soldiers. It was a frustrating situation for our commanders. And soldiers 
would often treat it as a hostile intent-type scenario and react and fire at the 
vehicle – sometimes with warning shots, sometimes without –and that 
became a difficult situation which required a lot of training and so forth. 
Because often we found that it was just an Afghan family who thought they 
would be stopped by the Taliban, so they sped up. So as we advise our 
commanders often we have to look at culture as well as the law, as culture 
can make a difference. 
I think, in our role as an operational law attorney, we should be there 
throughout the operation, we should be present in the operation center, we 
should be at the commander’s side, advising. Where I really think we have 
the most impact as practitioners is in advance of the operation, when we 
have developed the training, when we’ve developed the rules of 
engagement so that they are clear and don’t sound as if a lawyer’s written 
them, but sound as if an operator wrote them, so operators can understand 
them when they are under a lot of stress and often in danger. I think that’s 
when lawyers have the most impact. 
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Training and political guidance 
as a comprehensive approach towards 
improving operational decisions and RoE? 
Cynthia Petrigh 
Founder, Beyond (peace); Member IIHL 
I will speak of a specific example of how we can improve political 
guidance, decisions, rules of engagement and behaviour with training and 
with the support of political guidance.  
I was based for eleven months in the European Union training 
mission in Mali. The purpose of this mission is not to be a combat 
mission but a training mission. The sole purpose is to train the Malian 
armed forces in all kinds of tactical, military skills, from infantry to 
JTAG, to commandos, to mortar shooting. My specific role was to train 
them on IHL, Human Rights and the prevention of sexual violence. 
We’ve had unexpectedly very good results and impact. Now, you can 
ask me how we measured this impact, how we knew we had good 
results. 
Well, first, I used the same questionnaire on the arrival of the 
troops in our camp and on their departure. We received battalions of 
seven hundred people for ten weeks. In week one, I would ask them to 
complete a questionnaire and, in week ten, the exact same 
questionnaire and there I could measure the acquisition of knowledge. 
For example, on week one, for a particular battalion, I had 70 per cent 
of the seven hundred saying that torture was normal and what they had 
to do when they took a prisoner. On week ten I had only three persons 
replying with the same answer, that torture was normal. So we could 
measure a big difference from week one to week ten. Or, for example 
when we asked the participants “what did you learn on this course?”, 
they would say “before attending this class, I would have tortured an 
enemy who had surrendered. I’m lucky I took this course and will not 
commit this crime”. Or a participant who said on week one that “rape 
is the beauty of war”, on week ten said that he will treat women “as his 
sisters and his mother”. So we had a very clear impact on knowledge 
acquisition.  
Now, you would ask “ok, that’s fine that they learn the rule, it’s 
already fantastic but what is the impact on the ground? How did you 
measure that?” Unfortunately, I was not authorised to go to the North. 
After training with us, the Malian military were immediately deployed 
to the conflict area in the North. I was not authorised to go and see 
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what they were doing, but I could make contact with other troops and 
other organisations that were operating in the North, like the Serval 
French Operation, like the MINUSMA, like Human Rights NGOs. 
They were reporting to me that there was an improvement in the 
behaviour and the kind of incidents that were reported to them and 
which they shared with me: at the beginning they included incidents 
like cutting the ear of the enemies; in the end the kind of incidents was 
like the bargaining of the price of a motorbike to pay less because they 
are militaries. So the kind of problems that were reported to me 
decreased in seriousness. 
Therefore, we were able to measure knowledge acquisition and to 
receive feedback. I also had the immense chance to be able to de-brief 
troops that had been trained with us, deployed to the North and returned 
after six months. They asked for a refresher course because they had 
changed some of their personnel. I see an African brother smiling. I 
don’t know where he is from, but maybe afterwards we can chat a bit. I 
asked them: “Was what we taught you last year before you were 
deployed, useful for you when you were deployed? / Was it useless or / 
Did it create a problem for you?” Most of them said that it was very 
useful, but the Malians are a very friendly and polite people, so I wanted 
to know if they had a concrete example where it had been useful. I 
asked “do you have a concrete example?” and they answered “yes, we 
made prisoners and we didn’t kill them”. I said “would you have killed 
them before the course” and they said “Of course!”, with great 
enthusiasm. One of them said that for them it was not useful at all and 
when I asked why he answered “because we couldn’t torture them and 
this prevents us from doing our job”. So we had very interesting 
discussions and conversations. Some of them said “It was very positive 
because it changed the relation with the population, the population was 
more supportive because they were less scared of us and because we 
created good contacts”. These examples show that they could also see 
the tactical benefits in improving behaviour.  
Lastly, we could also check the change in behaviour through 
practicing drills because as you can see in the photos we were running a 
lot of exercise in addition to lecturing. I’m impressed by the level of 
sophistication of what was described by the previous speakers but, as you 
can see in the photos, we didn’t have this kind of sophistication. But, for 
example, we would create some exercises and drills and in one of them 
we would ask the troops to identify “What is there, just observe, can you 
describe what you see? Do you see enemies? Do you see protected sites? 
Do you see a threat?”. One group said “Yes, there’s an enemy there”. And 
we said “How do you know it’s an enemy?” and they said “They are 
wearing a shesh”, the Tuareg costume. For them, this identified this 
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person as an enemy. I would be glad to have the kind of problems you 
had. Our problem was that, at the beginning, many of them would identify 
the target just by their ethnic belonging, not by the fact that they were 
combatants or non-combatants. We, therefore, really had to explain quite 
a number of things, ethically, politically, tactically, legally; we used all 
kinds of fields.  
We could only do that, and we could only have these results because 
we had the highest support from the political authorities: 1. from the 
Malian political and military authorities, because they were encouraging 
and accompanying this change. You cannot train troops in this 
comprehensive and effective way if you don’t have the highest political 
support. 2. Also, of course, we had the highest political support from the 
EU, which was organising this mission and wanted the troops to behave 
and the Malian army to remain under the control of the civilian 
authorities. 
What I want to say here is that the key to success in changing decision-
making, the rules of engagement and the behaviour is, as it was said this 
morning, through prevention and information. It is very trendy now to 
speak about prosecuting people but many of them don’t even know what 
the rules are. So let us first explain to them what the rule is before jumping 
to prosecuting them. A successful change goes through a very tailored 
training. To do this training I had to build a very tailored training, otherwise 
it wouldn’t have been successful. We conducted an applicable law analysis, 
a context analysis, a pattern of abuse analysis, an audience profile, etc. We 
created all these exercises and these tools specifically for these troops. In 
summary, tailored training on the one hand and political support, political 
guidance on the other hand; these, I believe, are the two factors that were 
key to success. 
Just to tease the audience a bit, I want to add that, surprisingly, 
where I found more resistance was sometimes from the European troops 
themselves because, although I had good support from the highest 
command of the mission, sometimes the European soldiers were saying 
“what are you teaching them? You will make them gay”. Or one officer 
who was in charge of training other officers said “It’s very nice what 
you are doing but, you know, it’s very hard to respect during war.”, and 
I said “IHL is only meant to be respected during war!”. I was surprised 
that even at officers’ level we had quite some ignorance, maybe due to 
the fact that many of the [EU] troops who were participating had good 
behaviour on the ground for other reasons. For example, they had good 
Rules of Engagement, they had a good sense of ethics, they had precise 
weapons, but they were not calling it IHL, they didn’t know they were 
applying IHL. 
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One of the most successful aspects of this mission is that we managed to 
bring together the military, IHL and Human Rights aspects; IHL and 
Human Rights became a real part of the military training and conduct. It 
was not something optional, and the soldiers understood that you are a 
professional soldier not only when you have good tactical skills but also 
good behaviour. 
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Operational planning and decision-making 
process. The challenges of interoperability: 
NATO-type operations and operations 
in partnership with local forces 
Ben F. Klappe 
Director, Administrative Law Department, Ministry of Defense, 
The Hague; Member IIHL 
By the end of this year over 350,000 Afghan National Army officers 
and Afghan national police will have been trained over the last decade by 
NATO forces and ISAF will have been transformed into a training and 
advisory assistance mission in Afghanistan. Interoperability amongst 
thousands of NATO soldiers and others and also thousands of interactions 
and operations in partnership with the Afghans occurred over the last 
decade. Numerous lessons on interoperability were learned and will 
continue to be learned as there are no clear cut solutions for all the 
challenges that NATO forces are confronted with and will face in the near 
future. 
Most of the examples I will use are based on my experiences in Bosnia 
back in 1993 as a company commander and during my tour in Afghanistan 
in 2012. I have also consulted a number of officers who served during 
operations abroad in various international staff and leadership positions. 
When talking about interoperability there are certain definitions in 
NATO as to what it is. You can only work effectively and efficiently 
together with 28 different nations in operations if there are provisions in 
place to assure smooth cooperation. This has been the case since the 
organization was founded in 1949 but it has become even more important 
over the last decade since the alliance began mounting operations outside 
its normal area of operations, ranging from cold war deployments and 
exercises of national units in host nations like Germany to the 
establishment of multi-national divisions, rapid deployable headquarters 
and brigades. Moreover, there have been NATO deployments in Bosnia, 
coalitions of the willing in Iraq and Afghanistan (including other countries 
such as Australia and New Zealand) and the anti-piracy mission. So, here’s 
that definition that I just mentioned. Coalitions are often formed on an ad 
hoc basis with partners joining and leaving or scaling down their 
commitments during the course of the operation. But interoperability does 
not necessarily require identical military equipment. It is important that the 
equipment provides the possibility to interact effectively amongst nations. 
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Interoperability will support the implementation of recent NATO initiatives 
as the SMART defence and connected forces initiatives. 
This is a picture of the current NATO force structure and the idea is to 
have multi-national rapid deployable headquarters throughout Europe. An 
example is the German-Netherlands headquarters in Munster, Germany. I 
had the pleasure of working there back in 1995 when it was established. It 
is an integrated headquarters where the Corps Commander is either German 
or Dutch – every three years senior positions at the headquarters rotate 
between both nations and staff officers making a mix. There are all joint 
staff elements J 1, J 2, J3.  
When talking about interoperability one can consider the interoperability 
concerning the political objectives of NATO – as we speak there is an 
ongoing summit in Wales and one of the topics on the agenda is the 
establishment of a very highly rapid deployable unit, brigade size about 
four thousand – that may be the outcome of a discussion on the political 
situation in the Ukraine. That part is the most difficult for member States to 
agree on. What is the end game? Once we commence operations what is the 
desired outcome? For the military – strategy and doctrine, operations and 
procedures – this is business as usual and also an ongoing debate as 
doctrine and strategy will be impacted continuously by developments in 
nowadays conflicts. What is not depicted in the picture is the so-called non-
technical interoperability: issues that you can’t solve by adopting a joint 
publication. 
That part of interoperability is about preparedness, understanding, 
command and ethos. Ethos considers levels of trust and cultural values, 
understanding non-verbal communication, body language, verbal 
communication, etc. There is also a command structure and command style. 
The functioning of a headquarters much depends on the experiences and 
language skills individuals - commander and staff alike - will bring.  
Fundamental principles of joint operations provide some guidance on 
how best to employ NATO forces to achieve strategic objectives and create 
a common baseline using agreed NATO terminology. And as we speak the 
guidance for operations planning (GOP) in short is going to be replaced by 
a comprehensive operational planning (COPD) directive and you can see 
the difference in wording. 
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One was a guidance used as a draft study and COPD is more directive.  
An example concerning communication can be seen in the early stages 
of operations in Iraq in 2003. One country contributing to that operation 
clearly had not understood what should have happened with prisoners. 
Prisoners were flown to the national capital, whilst only US and UK were 
considered occupying powers at the time.  
Another example from that period is where one of the countries 
providing security to an airfield stopped patrolling after 17.00. After that 
time security was no longer guaranteed. You can imagine the anxiety of 
other units flying missions and working at the airfield discovering they 
were protected only during the day.  
In 2003, a Dutch contingent was deployed back in Iraq and one day two 
men in civilian attire arrived at the gate of the compound and identified 
themselves as the new battalion commander and the new brigade 
commander, stating they were going to take over the compound. There was 
no prior information given to the Dutch commander on the spot and that 
again was an example of a lack of proper communication.  
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This slide is an overview of what is called the NATO allied joint 
doctrine (AJP) and you can see that in the various areas policy on Personnel 
is absent. It starts with AJP2, intelligence; AJP1 is, of course Personnel and 
that is mostly a national issue; AJP3 refers to operations and there you see 
peace operations, you see support to civil authorities, etc. Green indicates 
that it’s promulgated, that is, a joint-established doctrine agreed by Member 
States. When it’s brown it’s still under development and you can see that 
the AJP file that I have just mentioned on planning is still under 
development. What is available in the AJP2 are captured persons, so there 
is a doctrine on captured persons. This morning the senior legal advisor of 
NATO said that they didn’t need a joint doctrine on legal operations 
because, in effect, it’s a combination, it’s a collection of individual State’s 
legal frameworks. I agree that commanders and legal advisers should be 
very pragmatic, but I think there is room to have a joint publication on legal 
issues as Rich Gross just mentioned. An example where there was no time 
to consult is when a decision has to be made in split seconds on really 
important legal issues. And particular when headquarters are more and 
more integrated, a commander from one country and a deputy commander 
from another country, staff officers from multiple countries, what law are 
we going to apply? Pragmatic law? I agree to a certain degree but let’s 
68 
make sure that all nations that contribute, not only staff officers but also 
forces on the ground, agree to a basic legal framework and let’s put it in 
writing in a joint doctrine publication. There was a dispute between very 
senior leaders in the mission in Afghanistan when it came to a discussion 
about direct participation in hostilities. Were all those involved in narco 
trafficking and in the poppy production directly participating in hostilities? 
One view was that all farmers and traffickers were sustaining the fight of 
the Taliban. So all were directly participating in hostilities and were to be 
targeted. It took lengthy discussions up in the NATO command structure to 
clear this whole issue. If participating States agree on such legal issues 
before military operations start it would be very welcome.  
This is just to map out, for those of you who have never been in the 
military, what the operations planning and decision-making process is all 
about. One determines the objectives based on political objective, strategic 
objective, determines the new mission given by a higher level, creating 
opinions, developing courses of action, forming an opinion and then a 
decision by the commander is made to implement that decision from the 
concept of operations to an operational plan. This is an ongoing process 
once the operations start, it continues to be reviewed and assessed during 
the execution until there is a new mission and Military leaders accept the 
idea that the plan is already old once the operation starts. 
This is just to give you some background on planning processes. In 
reality there are planning directives but it often comes down to the 
commander’s decisions and the flexibility and the knowledge and 
experience of staff and senior staff implementing the plan and developing 
the plan. Considerations while planning: what is the desired end state? 
What are the strategic objectives? What is the military operational end 
state? Etc. 
In respect to changing views during a deployment, we’ve seen that in 
Afghanistan, particularly in 2009, where there was all of a sudden that 
sense of urgency for transformation and transfer of authority to the Afghans 
in five years’ time, there were changing views with new appointed Force 
commanders on how to fight the insurgency. Rules of engagement, for 
example, were releasable to the Afghan National Army. Until then, it was 
NATO restricted or NATO secrets. Particularly during that episode, 
General McChrystal tightened the rules. There were heavy debates with the 
now President Karzai about issues such as civilian casualties and there were 
huge restrictions to the use of force, leading to situations where soldiers felt 
that their safety wasn’t really taken seriously. So they were restricted in 
using and employing force and soldiers felt their lives no longer counted. 
But of course that was a result of what happened on the battlefield. 
Sometimes troops were behaving very aggressively on the roads, with their 
military vehicles, Afghan civilians just making phone calls were perceived 
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as potential opponents triggering improvised explosive devices. In 2012 
there was a discussion on the night raids resulting in civilian casualties and 
you always see the impact of decisions that restrict or enable military force. 
Now let’s finally get to another issue, that is, the interoperability and the 
local forces. It starts with “we are there eventually to leave and handover 
security, responsibility to the nation we are deployed in”. They should have 
ultimate responsibility for security, that’s why we were training the Afghan 
National Army and Afghan National Police. It is about accountability and 
reliability. Do we NATO soldiers really trust our Afghan brothers in arms? 
Are we willing to share information? Can we rely on them when they ask 
for close air support on specific targets that there is real and imminent 
danger and not just something to settle with the neighbours. Operations 
security was the name of the game. When I spoke last week to a German 
planning officer in Mazar-i-Sharif he confessed to have no issues with 
Operations Security (OPSEC): because ‘we share all information with the 
Afghan National Army’. When the question came up as to whether there 
were any compartments in the headquarters where Afghan officers were not 
supposed to work, the discussion became a bit blurred. And, of course, 
there are smaller types of multi-national operations where the Afghan 
National Army was not involved in.  
Operational mentoring liaison teams was another issue, An international 
unit of some 15 to 30 staff officers were deployed with an Afghan 
contingent, battalion or brigade, acting as advisors. They helped in the 
planning processes and training of the Afghan units. They helped to assure 
that these units were receiving necessary support including close air 
support and medical evacuation. These teams were from several countries 
and, in the period of 2009, some 60 operation mentoring liaison teams were 
deployed and, in fact, the teams complemented the US-led training teams 
which were performing similar duties.  
The next picture visualizes the so-called non-technical interoperability.  
So ethos and understanding is important. The people in the picture are 
all police officers. Do we share intelligence? What is the non-verbal 
communication? What is the guy on the right hand side of the picture 
doing? Is he snoring? Is he watching her? What is the body language? Do 
we trust each other? And I have tried to translate what is written on the 
white board and you can see that the text on the left is in English and on the 
right in Arabic and the pictures – well, they don’t match but here is what it 
says: House search - the military police officers, coincidentally from the 
Netherlands, are explaining to the two house searchers what a house search 
should look like. Why would you do a house search? Knowledge is 
imparted before doing a house search, how to go about it and being aware 
of the law regulating a house search. It is very basic, explaining to the local 
police some background and they may be very interested or they may not 
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be too interested particularly regarding the law regulating house searching 
because they have been doing house searching for many, many years and 
why would they think that what the officer is telling them is much better 
than their way of acting? 
So, in 2011 and 2012, resulting from the assistance to local forces, and 
interacting with the local forces and interoperability we had green on blue 
incidents where, an Afghan policeman or Afghan soldier opens fire on his 
trainers and, very unfortunately, only three weeks ago, there was this 
incidence that drew international attention where an American two-star was 
killed by a so-called green on blue incident. These incidents were 
increasing with 53 killed and 80 wounded in 2012. Research pointed out 
that some were infiltrators. Once the disarmament process was over they 
were recruited and hired and the selection process wasn’t done to the best 
effect. But that was a smaller percentage. 
Another smaller percentage were those, once recruited, were not 
planning to attack ISAF soldiers, but were forced to do so due to pressure 
and because of threats to their families. But also quite a few of these deadly 
incidents resulted from a clash of cultures. Afghan men feel perhaps rather 
quickly insulted. ISAF soldiers were simply not always aware of cultural 
sensitivities. 
The final aspect I would like to highlight is the so-called evidence based 
operations. General Allen, who was the ISAF commander at the time, said: 
“I want to move from capture or kill to capture and prosecute”. If we want 
to move to a democratic state we can’t continue to kill. We need to have a 
process in place and that process implies that once you make an arrest make 
sure there is a trial and make sure that this is a trial that can stand the heat. 
So the idea was to track what’s happening from the moment of the arrest to 
the days in court and systematically find the weak parts of the process. 
Fear was that once you arrest an individual he will be released in the 
next two or three weeks so we needed to find out what was wrong. And it 
starts from the collecting of evidence at the crime scene. We have 
prosecutors on board during raids, making sure that evidence is being 
collected and then, in the next phase, find out why the prosecutor is 
dissatisfied with the evidence and then why, if at all, if it comes to a 
criminal case, why isn’t the individual convicted? And it boils down to the 
idea that a terrorist act is also punishable under Afghan criminal law.  
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Taking decisions in hostilities situations. 
Best training practices 
Jamie A. Williamson  
Head of the Unit for Relations with Arm Carriers, 
Division of Integration and Promotion of the Law, 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 
I will present a concise list of matters that I believe need to be taken into 
account when considering the training of arms carriers in a variety of 
situations.  
From an ICRC perspective, it should be noted that in assessing training 
needs, a contextual approach should be taken. Any discourse on training 
should also include reflection on education and the integration of IHL into 
doctrine and practice. For the ICRC, our area of expertise lies first and 
foremost in the interpretation of IHL, and of its proper application by the 
parties to the conflict in different contexts. IHL sets the framework within 
which the arms carriers must operate. Enhancing their understanding of this 
framework to ensure respect of IHL at all times is therefore the key 
objective of any training programme.  
Allow me therefore to put forward a few key points which may merit 
further reflection by this round table.  
The first concerns the ICRC’s study on the roots of behaviour of war. 
Through this study, published in 2005, the ICRC sought to better 
understand the factors which are crucial in conditioning the behaviour of 
combatants in armed conflict, so as to improve their compliance with IHL. 
One of the main conclusions to arise from this study, relates to the role and 
the responsibility of superiors in ensuring respect for IHL and in preventing 
violations of IHL, by their subordinates. In particular it was noted that a 
proven way to affect the behaviour of arms carriers was not by trying “to 
win them over” personally but rather to influence those in their chain of 
command who have ascendancy over them.  
Thus, if training programmes are to succeed in having positive effects, 
the “buy-in” of the higher echelons is required: military as well as 
political/civilian. Without this ownership by the superior, training efforts 
may be futile. Moreover, it should be recalled that pursuant to the Geneva 
Conventions, all States party to these instruments have a responsibility to 
ensure the dissemination of IHL and to provide extensive and regular 
training of IHL to their armed forces. For its part, the ICRC works closely 
with armed forces and national authorities globally to assist in the 
development and provision of relevant training programmes. The ICRC has 
also advised countries around the world on the establishment of inter-
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ministerial committees or IHL commissions, many hosted by Ministries of 
Defence, to act as focal points and coordinators of IHL training activities to 
the armed forces. By having civilian as well as military authorities provide 
the requisite oversight of such IHL bodies as strengthened IHL training and 
dissemination endeavours, and the receptiveness of the arms bearers to 
these.  
Turning to my second point, which relates to training capacity, if one 
were to map the number of legal officers/JAGs staffing the various armed 
forces in the four corners of the world, it goes without saying that the 
numbers would vary dramatically. Some armed forces, such as those of the 
United States, can call upon hundreds of JAGs within their ranks. Many of 
these JAGs will play an important role in integrating IHL into doctrine, 
education and training of their respective corps. By comparison, numerous 
armed forces elsewhere in the world will not find themselves in the 
privileged position of being able to call upon “experts” in IHL to help 
develop a better understanding and acceptance of this body of law amongst 
the troops. Moreover, without this legal capacity, it can be more 
problematic “translating” IHL legal concepts into tangible and 
comprehensible standards catered for a myriad of operational realities. As 
such, one of the main challenges and priorities for the ICRC is to be able to 
adapt its approaches to enable effective IHL training, best suited to the 
context and to the logistical reality of the environments.  
As a third point, allow me to address succinctly the matter of 
innovation. As any instructor would be able to confirm, one of the main 
challenges in training is to be able to distil extensive material and 
oftentimes complicated issues into an easily accessible and understandable 
format. Ultimately, the audience needs to be receptive and interested in the 
issues if these are to influence their behaviour. Throughout its 150 years of 
history, the ICRC has continuously sought to innovate and to find new 
approaches to training and dissemination, to ultimately improve compliance 
with IHL. Whilst traditionally most training materials were paper based, 
today, thanks to technological advances, there is a plethora of opportunities 
to innovate and develop new e-platforms to make training materials more 
readily available and enticing. Recently, the ICRC has been involved in the 
development of videogame-style Virtual Reality Training tools (VRTs) 
which can be stored on USB keys and used in most contexts with the 
trainer only requiring a laptop and projector to make good use of this new 
technology. In addition, the ICRC in discussion with video game 
programmers is looking into how we could make use of existing video 
games to encourage respect of IHL. Indeed, many war themed video games 
offer the potential to introduce fundamental IHL principles. Rather than 
encouraging excessive violence, an idea could be to create incentives for 
the gamers to respect IHL, by, for instance, only allowing progression to 
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higher levels if the means and methods used in an attack against the virtual 
enemy complied with IHL. Bonus points could be introduced for each 
civilian spared, or if attempts have been made by the gamer to exercise 
precaution and minimise collateral damage. Ultimately, the aim is to make 
complex legal IHL questions, many of which can be debated ad infinitum, 
practicable and understandable to soldier in theatre, who will be called 
upon to take split second life or death decisions concerning an individual’s 
“direct participation in hostilities”.  
Fourthly, besides developing an understanding of IHL by the armed 
forces, it is often through these training programmes that new recruits and 
soldiers in pre-deployment are first exposed to the ICRC. Meeting with 
troops before they are deployed provides the opportunity for the ICRC to 
brief on its mandate and the nature of its operations in the relevant contexts. 
During the training, they will receive a first-hand explanation of the 
ICRC’s modus operandi, namely as relates to security, access, and 
detention visits, and hopefully appreciate the importance of the operational 
dialogue that the ICRC has with all parties to the conflict. Indeed, it is 
through the operational dialogue that steps can be taken to improve greater 
compliance with IHL, whether for instance through the modification of 
tactical directives and rules of engagement during the hostilities, or through 
the integration of lessons-learnt into doctrine, and subsequent training.  
I will now address in the time remaining a few specific questions on 
topical issues arising from contemporary conflicts.  
Allow me to put on the table the practical question of training of 
peacekeepers. It would be fair to say that, in recent times, we have 
witnessed interesting developments in the nature of mandates given to 
peace-keeping missions by the United Nations Security Council. 
Peacekeepers are being entrusted with a variety of tasks, including 
custodial responsibilities, intervention brigades have been established, and 
they are being asked to operate in many complex environments which 
vacillate between law enforcement and armed conflict paradigms. 
Peacekeepers, be they military or police personnel, need therefore to have a 
greater number of arrows in their training quiver and require greater 
versatility and adaptability in their operations. Moreover, since 2005 there 
has been a steady increase in the number of military and police troops being 
contributed by countries to UN Peacekeeping Missions. From an average of 
67,000 monthly contributed troops in 2005, by 2014 this figure reached 
approximately 97,000. Given the dynamics of Peacekeeping Missions, 
thousands of troops are being rotated in and out of these missions annually. 
And all of them require training in IHL if they are being deployed to 
conflict zones. Ideally, such training needs to be effectuated before 
deployment. Mechanisms need therefore to be in place with relevant 
military authorities of troop contributing countries, through for instance 
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their respective national peacekeeping institutes, or coordinated by DPKO, 
to ensure that the required training and dissemination of IHL is carried out. 
Moreover, as with state armed forces, lessons learnt from peacekeeping 
missions (for instance on use of force in self-defence or detention 
procedural safeguards) need to be integrated into DPKO reflection and 
‘doctrine’ or equivalent. The ICRC continues to assist troop contributing 
countries and DPKO in these endeavours and to continue building on 
efforts by States and the UN to ensure respect of IHL by peacekeepers. 
Similar issues arise as regards to bilateral military cooperation efforts 
between States, which include training components. Naturally, as 
mentioned above, such agreements are to be welcomed, to the extent that 
they allow for capacity building of armed forces with limited resources and 
the sharing of expertise by sophisticated militaries. As recent experience in 
a couple of contexts have shown though, despite having received such 
training and benefitted from capacity building, certain militaries have 
nonetheless allegedly gone on to commit violations of IHL. A question then 
that we must ask ourselves, is whether there is any residual responsibility 
on the part of the training authorities in terms of follow up with these 
offending militaries? Should we expect the trainers to go back to them to 
assess what went wrong in practice and seek to ‘re-train’ accordingly? Are 
the necessary mechanisms in place to ensure that lessons learnt and any 
shortcomings can be incorporated into future training programmes?  
And the very last two points, the first relating to specific training on 
sensitive issues. Most militaries involved in training would agree that 
teaching on generic IHL issues such as detention standards, use of force, 
targeting and even direct participation in hostilities are unproblematic in 
terms of core subject matter. Whilst there may be disagreement as to their 
exact contours, discussing concepts such as precaution, distinction and 
proportionality, is objectively straightforward. By contrast, introducing 
more delicate issues into training may give rise to social, cultural and 
religious sensitivities. For instance, there is agreement within the 
international community that there is an urgent need to put an end to the 
perpetration of sexual violence in times of armed conflict. It has been 
recognised that criminal accountability alone is insufficient to address this 
ill, and that efforts need to be redoubled to prevent sexual violence from 
being committed in the first place. Training and education of soldiers are 
therefore pivotal. Yet, it many contexts it may be taboo to speak of sexual 
violence, and trainers and trainees alike will feel uncomfortable speaking 
on this topic. Notwithstanding, education on the prevention of sexual 
violence cannot be simply side-lined as an awkward subject matter. 
Militaries need to develop the right tools and personnel to be able to 
systematically incorporate the prevention of sexual violence into training 
and doctrine.  
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Finally, and given the legal nature of this round table, allow me to note 
the significance of the jurisprudence which has emanated from the ad hoc 
UN tribunals over the past two decades. Many of the judgements delivered 
by the UNICTR and the UNICTY have dealt with core IHL concepts and 
sought to bring greater clarity to the application of IHL to military 
operations. Not every judgement has been met with universal acceptance, 
as the earlier discussion on Gotovina demonstrated, but that is 
unfortunately the nature of International Criminal Justice and the 
interpretative nature of IHL. Although some military practitioners may find 
fault with some of the case law or the civilian nature of the tribunals, it is 
nonetheless important to ensure that, where applicable, the jurisprudence of 
these tribunals be incorporated into military doctrine. As these Tribunals 
wind down, they leave behind a rich and diverse jurisprudential legacy, 
which can hopefully enhance the respect for and understanding of IHL.  
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Current challenges with regard to the notion 
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perspectives 
Noam Lubell 
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1. Military objectives in cyber operations  
 
The problem that arises, and which is relatively unique to cyber 
operations, is whether data itself can be considered an object. While there is 
no definitive answer to this question, the currently prevailing view among 
LOAC experts appears to hold that in most cases data, for the purposes of 
targeting, should not itself be considered as an object. I will begin by 
presenting why this conclusion requires further thought and that there is in 
fact good reason to consider data as a potential object. Following this, I will 
also raise some of the difficulties such a conclusion would create. 
This reasoning is said to be supported by the Commentary to Protocol 1, 
according to which the term object refers to something which is “visible 
and tangible”. This, prima facie, certainly does not seem to include data. 
But there is good reason to consider this issue further and raise the 
possibility that data may nevertheless be akin to an object in this context.  
The reference to “visible and tangible” is not part of the Protocol 
definition, but rather the understanding given to it in the commentary at a 
particular point in time and in a specific context. This must be examined 
more closely to see whether the same reasoning applies today.  
At the time of drafting it is unlikely that they would have considered the 
possibility of data destruction separate from physical damage. Destroying 
data at the time would have meant physically damaging the storage method, 
such as the paper files. Nowadays it is, however, perfectly possible to 
destroy vast amounts of vital data without physically destroying the 
computers on which they are stored.  
Placing this in context, it begs the question whether a kinetic attack 
which results in setting on fire of five hundred mail bags, is any more 
harmful than a cyber-operation which permanently deletes five million e-
mails. This is a scenario that could hardly have been contemplated when 
the Commentary made the reference to objects being “visible and tangible”.  
It is also important to see in the Commentary what it was that was being 
excluded. In fact, the reference to tangible objects was made in order to 
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distinguish objects from the very different concept of “general objective (in 
the sense of aim or purpose) of a military operation”. Consequently, it is at 
least arguable that computer data is closer to what they wanted to include as 
objects, than it is to the notion of what they wanted to exclude as aim or 
purpose.  
Insofar as interpretations of the law are required to develop with time, 
LOAC might need to learn from domestic legal systems, which have 
demonstrated the ability to evolve beyond physical conceptions of damage, 
and recognise that rather than physical damage to a computer system, the 
focus should be on the harm to the contents of the system – data included.  
The question of data as an object is complicated by the matter of 
existing backup data. However, there are a number of reasons that this 
should not disqualify data from consideration as an object. First, how 
would this work in practice? How can the attacker know if there is a 
backup or if the data is irretrievable?  
Second, one may question whether potential restoration capability is the 
correct test for determining the nature of the object and the lawfulness of 
targeting it. This is not the test we use for physical property. In fact, most 
physical property is not irretrievable – buildings can be rebuilt, cars can be 
remanufactured; it is often just a question of time and cost. Restoration of 
complex digital data might be restorable from a backup, but this too has a 
cost. Why is causing one costly act more lawful than the other and is it just 
a question of the degree of time and money involved?  
Once again it is useful to compare this scenario to a non-data situation: 
if a paper document facility or a library is destroyed, do we say it was 
acceptable because there are copies of the same books in another facility or 
library? Why treat computer data differently? 
Notwithstanding the above, this argument will take on a different shape 
in the context of cultural objects. It is possible that digital archives might be 
considered cultural property and as such benefit from added protections to 
objects of this type. In this context, backup copies may well play a role, 
since the uniqueness of an object will often be one of the reasons behind its 
cultural property protection.  
If, therefore, it is verifiable and known that additional and equal copies 
exist and that they will remain unharmed, it may be that a digital item 
might not benefit from the special protection. But the relevance of backup 
copies is considered here only in the context of the applicability of extra 
protections for unique items of cultural value, and the general rules on 
attacking objects should not be affected by this.  
We must accept that the law cannot forever be interpreted and applied in 
exactly the same manner. If we wish to ensure the relevance of the rules to 
the 21st century, it is vital that they are interpreted in light of modern 
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reality, and that goes equally for the matter of military objectives in cyber 
operations.  
Proposing new interpretations is not the same as saying that the law 
itself is inadequate to deal with new challenges. There should be no doubt 
that existing law can apply to the cyber sphere (and the impressive Tallinn 
manual is an excellent example of this), but there must be room for further 
new approaches and interpretations that might differ from the manner in 
which the same law was read in the past.  
All the above notwithstanding, viewing data as an object presents real 
challenges. First, it has been argued that such a conclusion would make it 
impossible to carry out any cyber operations, as the nature of joint networks 
means that all operations are likely to adversely affect civilian data at some 
point. To this one could respond that the principle of proportionality is 
well-suited to resolve this concern. Accepting data as an object does not 
mean that civilian data can never be harmed, but simply that the intended 
target must be military and any harm to civilian data must be proportionate. 
The second concern is more complex and relates to the way we deal 
with militant propaganda websites. It has been noted that state practice 
demonstrates that states consider it acceptable to engage in cyber 
operations against such websites, regardless of whether they are civilian. 
The answer to this concern must take a number of forms. First, it may well 
be that the actions against some of these websites is not part of an armed 
conflict and law enforcement (including international cooperation in this 
realm) can provide a legal basis for these actions. We must also 
acknowledge that many cyber operations are currently occurring in the 
legally murky waters of espionage and such operations are just one small 
example of many activities which we are not certain how to regulate (or 
even acknowledge). Finally, the answer might be found in an attempt to 
distinguish between different types of cyber operations on the basis of the 
level of harm caused, so that the rules on attacks would only apply to those 
that cause harm which is more than propaganda activity. Conversely, 
massive deletion of data from institutional archives (e.g.educational 
institutions, local councils, government offices…) is an example of an act 
which can cause a significant level of harm without leading to destruction 
of a physical object and these should be viewed as civilian objects, just as 
data on military servers can be a military objective.  
Problems clearly remain and further work must be done in order to 
reach a workable interpretation. However, it should proceed on the premise 
that the law itself does not exclude the possibility of considering data as an 
object; rather, those who exclude data do so by relying on past 
interpretations of the law that were necessarily wedded to the time. Instead, 
it is perfectly possible to remain true to the object and purpose of the law – 
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and indeed to the letter of the law itself – by interpreting it in light of the 
modern day context in which it is being implemented.  
 
 
2. Military objectives when fighting armed groups during urban 
warfare 
 
A host of challenges emerge in the context of military objectives when 
fighting against armed groups in urban warfare. When discussing common 
military objectives such as military barracks / command centres / weapon 
storage facilities, we tend to assume that these will be on a clearly 
identifiable military base. But in urban warfare against armed groups, these 
activities are more likely to occur from within civilian buildings. The 
definition of military objectives includes “use” as one of the criteria for 
identifying an object as a legitimate target. Recent conflicts have 
highlighted differences in how this criterion might be interpreted and the 
emerging debates provide some interesting food for thought.  
The example of a home allegedly being used as a command and control 
centre is a useful place to start. To be clear, this is not about the targeting of 
individuals while they are in the home, but the separate question of when 
the building itself might be a legitimate military objective. Clearly, a 
militant commander making phone calls from his home does not make the 
house itself into a military objective, just as we would not accept the same 
for the home of every military officer in any army. On the other hand, if a 
home has a fixed installation of secure lines and communications systems 
built in and these are the primary lines of communication for issuing 
military commands, then this might turn it into a legitimate objective.  
Matters get even more complex when discussing the question of homes 
used as regular meeting places for the command staff of the opposing party. 
This is where the second half of the military objective definition could 
become important. The definition states that «In so far as objects are 
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military 
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in 
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.» 
There are many debates over whether these two halves are indeed 
separate. Clearly they can be seen as pointing at two different matters, but 
some commentators are of the view that when put to the test, in most cases 
anything that satisfies the first half will also satisfy the second. It would 
seem to me that the case of a house used as a regular meeting place might 
be one of the cases in which the need for the two halves of the definition 
could be demonstrated: the first half might be satisfied in that the building 
is being used to contribute to the enemy’s military actions but one might 
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argue that its destruction does not provide the second half’s definite 
military advantage if all they need to do is sit in the building next door to 
have the same effect. The case would be different if there were something 
unique about this house, for example, if there were a secure entrance, such 
as through a tunnel, and a fortified meeting bunker that does not exist in 
most other buildings and which makes the destruction of this specific house 
into an act that offers the required military advantage. In such 
circumstances the location criterion could also be relevant. 
There has also been some confusion over the interpretation of the “use” 
criterion in relation to the temporal aspect. There is a temporal element in 
the military objective definition in relation to the question of whether, in 
the circumstances ruling at the time, an advantage would be gained by 
attacking it. But some commentators appear to be adding further temporal 
restrictions by taking the “for such time” requirement from the rule on 
direct participation in hostilities by individuals, and misapplying it to the 
concept of military objectives. Accordingly, they argue that in the scenario 
such as the one described above, the building can only be targeted during 
the precise moments in which a meeting is taking place. This, I would say, 
is a mistake. The relevance of the meeting taking place at that time is 
indeed paramount if the targeting operation is based on the legitimacy of 
targeting certain individuals who are there at the moment, and in which 
case the building is a question of collateral damage. However, if it has been 
ascertained that the structure itself is a legitimate military objective because 
of a fixed communications installation or a tunnel shaft leading to a 
meeting room, then there is no requirement to only target it at the moment 
someone is speaking on the communication system or climbing out of the 
tunnel. Even if “use” were interpreted in such a restrictive manner, there is 
also the ‘purpose’ element which can apply to such a structure in respect to 
its intended use at a later time.  
 
 
3. The interaction between the determination of military objectives 
and the rule of proportionality in urban warfare 
  
When speaking of the law of armed conflict in the abstract confines of 
books and manuals, we tend to view each of the rules as being separate 
from each other, going through each one in great detail but not always 
acknowledging the interaction between them. However, when it comes to 
operationalising them, it is not always clear when one rule ends and the 
next one begins. This is very much the case when looking at the 
relationship between the notion of military objectives and the rules on 
proportionality and precautions. 
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The proportionality principle requires consideration of the harm to 
civilians and civilian objects when carrying out attacks against military 
objectives. But in order to assess the expected outcome of an attack in light 
of this rule, one must be able to identify where the military objective ends 
and the civilian object begins. This is particularly acute in urban warfare, 
where, as noted earlier, the opposing party is likely to be operating from 
within civilian areas and using civilian structures.  
For example, let us assume that the enemy is using one floor of an 
apartment building as a command and control centre, or even a missile 
launch centre. We often focus more on civilian lives rather than objects in 
these debates and, accordingly, the proportionality calculation would be 
relatively straightforward in that we know that while there are some 
fighters in the building, any civilians in the same building as them must be 
considered on the civilian side of the proportionality assessment. But what 
about the civilian objects? For this part of the assessment, we need to know 
if the whole building is a military objective, or just the one floor utilised by 
the enemy. I think it’s fair to say that many would view the building as a 
single military objective and not require distinguishing one floor as a 
separate object. They would, of course, still consider all civilians in the 
building within the proportionality assessment. However, the result of this 
approach means that as far as objects are concerned, the parts of the 
building not used by the enemy military might not be considered in the 
proportionality calculation.  
Now we could say that the answer depends on the ability to strike the 
one floor separately – for example, it makes all the difference if this is the 
bottom floor, the roof, or a floor in the middle of the building. But this 
takes us into a different set of rules, in particular on the precautions in 
attack and choice of means and methods, for example, the possibility of 
using precision weapons. However, this approach creates a ‘chicken and 
egg’ relationship between the rules, since the precautions are there to avoid 
harm to civilians and civilian objects and applying the rule on precautions 
therefore requires a predetermination of whether the whole building is the 
military objective or if it’s just part of the building, with the rest being a 
civilian object. Again, if the whole building is a military objective, do the 
rules on choosing means and methods to minimise harm apply in relation to 
the other floors of the building?  
My impression is that many militaries would on the one hand consider 
the whole building as a military objective, but nevertheless consider the 
harm to the non-military part in their proportionality calculation. This may 
be wise policy, but it might also be seen as a mixed up version of the law. 
A similar question arises in the context of assessing proportionality for 
dual-use objects which are a military objective, but the damage of which 
causes clear harm to civilians. In all these cases, the question is how much 
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of the harm to a military objective must be considered in the proportionality 
(and precautions) assessment – is it the direct harm caused to the building 
itself, despite it being a military objective? Is it the incidental harm to the 
civilians as a result of losing the building (and can this be distinguished 
from the harm to the building itself)? Is it the indirect longer-term effect on 
everyone affected? While views on the appropriate answer do exist, there is 
no clear agreement on this. Nonetheless, it may be the case that while there 
are differences over legal interpretation, the policy in practice of many 
militaries could contribute to advancing agreement. 
The recent hostilities in Gaza brought a focus on the issue of tunnels. Of 
course, tunnels are not new and fighters have used underground networks, 
for example, for hiding in the Parisian catacombs in WW2 and most 
memorably by Viet Cong soldiers in the Vietnam War. There’s no question 
that in some circumstances the tunnels themselves can be a legitimate 
military objective, but here too there is a question of defining their precise 
physical contours. Assuming the whole of the underground tunnel is a 
military objective, there is of course a need to consider the collateral harm 
to everything above ground. But could some of the area above ground also 
be considered part of the tunnel? The entry/exit shafts into the tunnel will 
often be inside a civilian building. Again, does this mean that a whole 
house is now a military objective because it is covering the entrance to the 
tunnel? Or is the tunnel entrance viewed as separate to the building, in 
which case the building must be considered in the collateral harm? 
Urban warfare heightens the need to consider the relationship between 
the notion of military objectives and the other rules on conduct of 
hostilities. In particular, determining the precise physical contours of the 
military objective will have weighty implications for the assessment of 
proportionality and precautions in attack. The IHL community is 
increasingly devoting attention to new emerging concerns and we must not 
forget that many of the early challenges relating to the most basic of 
concepts – such as military objectives – are still the subject of controversy. 
Maintaining the appropriate balance between military necessity and 
humanity, and ensuring protection for victims of war, cannot be achieved 
without clarification of these basic concepts. 
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Military objectives and lethal autonomous 
weapon systems  
Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer 
Policy Planning Staff, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris; 
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Technological progress has always been an important challenge to 
International humanitarian law (IHL). Today, the robotisation of armed 
conflicts is part of it. By robotisation, I mean the general trend in many 
armies to use more machines that are more or less autonomous. According 
to a widely used definition, endorsed by the American and British 
Governments, by Human Rights Watch and the UN Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions, autonomous weapon 
systems – I will not use the acronym “laws”, which would be quite 
unfortunate, especially here – are weapons systems that, once activated, can 
select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. 
The important part here is “once activated”: I will come back to that. I will 
not say more on their nature and operational capacities, as there is a 
complete panel exclusively devoted to them on Saturday, chaired by 
Ambassador Benoît d'Aboville. My angle here is to focus on the notion of a 
‘military objective’ and how it is affected by such a technological 
development. 
So, what is the problem? The targeting rules, based on the notion of a 
“military objective”, are nothing but a corollary of the most fundamental 
IHL principle: the principle of distinction between civilians and 
combatants. Hence the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, explained as 
“(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; (b) those 
which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a 
specific military objective” (Protocol I, art. 51). As for the means, that is 
the weapons, there are two kinds of indiscriminate weapons: ones which 
cannot be directed at a specific military objective, and ones whose effects 
cannot be limited. So, the question is: can lethal autonomous weapons be 
directed only at a military objective, and can their effects be limited? If the 
answer is “no”, then, clearly, they should be banned. There is an obligation 
to ensure that targets are military objectives (Protocol I, art. 57.2). In doubt, 
if we are not sure the machine would be able to detect it, we should ban the 
weapon. Armed drones can be aimed only at military objectives because 
they are operated by humans, but what about lethal autonomous weapons? 
Can something other than a human- and that is the deepest question here- 
identify a military objective? 
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The first difficulty is in the distinction itself. Roboticists often 
exaggerate their ability to program IHL, that is, to convert laws into 
algorithms. Not being lawyers, they have a simplistic understanding of 
these rules, reducing them to unequivocal commands such as “if it’s a 
civilian, do not shoot” and “if it’s a combatant, shoot”. Not only is it less 
and less easy in contemporary conflicts to distinguish between civilians and 
combatants, but it may also be legal to shoot a civilian as long as he takes 
direct part in the hostilities and that is a complex notion giving rise to 
contradictory interpretations. I’m thinking of, on the one hand, the ICRC 
and, on the other, the U.S. and Israel, for instance. It may be illegal to shoot 
a combatant, as long as he is hors de combat, which is not always easy to 
establish, even for humans. Therefore, the principle of distinction depends 
on the context. Will lethal autonomous weapons be able to sense and 
interpret such a context?  
That’s the first problem. The second difficulty is that the notion of a 
“military objective” implies proportionality, because targeting a military 
objective may kill a number of civilians, either accidentally or deliberately, 
and this does not alter the legitimacy of the military objective, provided that 
these civilian casualties are not excessive in relation to the military 
advantage gained. Now, how will lethal autonomous weapons interpret 
“excessive”? Measuring the excessive collateral damage according to the 
anticipated military advantage involves a case-by-case analysis and, again, 
depends on the strategic and political context, which the machine would 
simply not be aware of, at least not today. It’s difficult to imagine a weapon 
system that would be capable of such knowledge in the future, except if 
they were informed by a human in constant communication with the 
machine, transmitting information on the context. But, in that case, the 
weapon system would not be fully autonomous, but would only be under 
what could be called “supervised autonomy”, and we would not be talking 
about the same issue.  
So, what would be a potential solution for these problems? I believe it is 
in a number of safeguards. Firstly, given the previous difficulties with 
distinction and proportionality, it’s probable that lethal autonomous 
weapons will not be able to fully respect these principles. That being said, 
we have to keep in mind that humans themselves are not capable of fully 
respecting them, which is why IHL is so often violated and creates endless 
doctrinal and judicial controversies. You think of the difficulty for a lethal 
autonomous weapon to identify a civilian object, but wasn’t it because of a 
human error that the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian airliner in 1988? 
We must, therefore, reject the argument of the opponents of lethal 
autonomous weapons who invoke the incapacity, not only temporarily and 
currently, but absolutely and eternally- even in the future- to respect IHL, 
because they require infallibility instead of a lesser or equal fallibility to 
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humans. It must be demanded that the machine pass what Lucas calls the 
‘Arkin test’, from the name of the American roboticist: a robot meets the 
legal and moral requirements and can, therefore, be deployed when we 
demonstrate it can comply with the law of armed conflict as well as, or 
better than a human in similar circumstances - not perfectly. What must be 
demanded of the system, for example, is to be able to recognise the 
wounded, not as God could do, but as a human being could, as Marco 
Sassòli explained at the CCW meeting last May. There is no reason to say 
today that these machines will not be able, one day, to comply with IHL, 
not perfectly, but as well as or better than us. 
Secondly, only use the weapons against certain military objectives. An 
object is a military objective by its nature, location, purpose or use, as we 
have already said, it’s established in P1 article 52.2. Here, it may be useful 
to distinguish between two categories: objects that are military objectives 
by nature because of their intrinsic character or military significance; and 
objects that become military objectives by their location (if it is in an area 
that is itself a legitimate target, i.e. that has special importance to military 
operations), purpose (when we know the object will be used for military 
reasons) or use (its current function). Location, purpose and use show the 
dynamic nature of IHL: civilian objects can become legitimate military 
objectives and this difference is relevant for lethal autonomous robots.  
Some objectives are easy to identify: objects like military installations, 
bases, fortifications, barracks, camps, airfields, ports, etc.); vehicles of all 
types (ground, warships, aircrafts, etc.), weapon systems (artillery, missiles 
etc.), and munitions. Others are more difficult to identify, either because 
they are potential dual-use-objects (factories, laboratories, power plants, 
bridges, media, etc.) or because they involve people (combatants).  
Even if lethal autonomous weapons are not capable of distinguishing a 
civilian from a combatant, they can easily identify and be programmed to 
automatically detect and engage military targets of the first subcategory, 
like bases, vehicles or radars, for instance. Military objectives by location, 
purpose or use are more difficult to determine, but it is not necessarily a 
problem for lethal autonomous weapons, which could be programmed to 
attack only military objectives that are so by their nature, so that they do 
not need to make difficult judgements, like assessing if an ambulance, a 
school or a hospital, for instance, has lost protection from attack because it 
became a military objective by location, purpose or use.  
There is an objection here. The objection is that a by nature military 
objective, like a tank, can cease to be one by its location- say the tank is 
parked in a school, for instance, or a column of refugees is walking nearby. 
A lethal autonomous weapon can be programmed to detect the tank, the 
military object, but can it assess its environment and the context? So it’s 
always the problem of the context that comes back. The autonomous 
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weapon may not be equipped to know and to interpret such a context. The 
solution is that if you can’t control the weapon, from that point of view, just 
control the context in which it is deployed. 
So, thirdly: only use the weapons in certain contexts. Lethal autonomous 
weapons’ opponents already imagine them on the ground, deployed in 
populated areas where the distinction between civilians and combatants is 
extremely delicate, even for humans. And their argument is to say that they 
won’t be able to distinguish. They are right, but by doing this they ignore 
the very strong environmental logic in which the more or less autonomous 
systems operate. They are especially suitable to underwater, marine, air and 
space environments where there is very little risk of meeting civilians, they 
are of very little operational interest – not only ethical, I insist: operational 
– in urban environment, because the risk of targeting civilians make them 
useless weapons to win the hearts and minds of the population, and we 
know how important this is in today’s counterinsurgency conflicts.  
Therefore, it is sophistic to say that because lethal autonomous weapons 
won’t be able to distinguish a civilian from a combatant they should be 
banned. It is sophistic because they will not be deployed in a context where 
they have to make such a distinction. This supposed inability – that has yet 
to be proved, but let us suppose for the sake of the argument that these 
machines won’t be able to distinguish a civilian from a combatant – is a 
sufficient reason not to deploy them in urban guerrilla warfare. It is not a 
sufficient reason to ban them altogether, if they can be deployed elsewhere 
in less problematic environments. As Schmitt explains, «even an 
autonomous weapon system that is completely incapable of distinguishing a 
civilian from a combatant or a military objective from a civilian object can 
be lawful per se. Not every battlespace contains civilians or civilian objects. 
When they do not, a system devoid of any capacity to distinguish protected 
persons and objects from lawful military targets can be used without 
endangering the former». So, in the middle of the desert, or on the high 
seas, in areas where there is certainly no civilian person or object, there is 
no problem using an autonomous weapon unable to recognise a civilian 
person or object, just like there was no problem using the Scud missiles in 
the 1990-1991 Gulf War: they were inaccurate but could be nevertheless 
employed discriminately in a desert environment. In other words, lethal 
autonomous weapons could be used only in exceptional situations and 
specific contexts.  
Moreover, there are additional precautionary rules, like prioritising 
military objectives. The second condition in Protocol I article 52.2 is that 
military objectives must be objects which are effective contributions to 
military actions and whose destruction offers a military advantage, as we 
saw earlier. The expressions “effective contribution to military actions” and 
“definite military advantage” again give rise to divergent interpretations. 
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You have the narrow one of the ICRC, excluding potential or indeterminate 
advantages from definite ones, versus the broader one of the U.S., including 
any war-sustaining objects. So, here you can ask: what will be the lethal 
autonomous weapons’ interpretation? Isn’t it an additional difficulty? 
Well, not really, because these subtleties are only necessary for 
borderline cases and contentious targets, like dual use objects, against 
which lethal autonomous weapons will not be used first and foremost. If 
their use is confined to clearly unambiguous military objectives, like an 
important military base or a high-tech military plane, it’s difficult to 
pretend that their destruction is not an effective contribution to military 
action and does not offer a definite military advantage. In other words, to 
avoid these interpretative complications, we have to limit the use of lethal 
autonomous weapons to certain most obvious military targets, as I said 
earlier.  
Moreover, in conformity with Protocol I, article 57.3. («When a choice 
is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar 
military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on 
which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to 
civilian objects»), it is possible to introduce such a prioritisation. It has 
been done by Lockheed Martin’s Low Cost Autonomous Attack System 
(LOCAAS), currently in the final phase of development. «Prior to the 
mission, the flight plan and general search area assigned for patrol are 
uploaded to the weapons. LADAR [the sensor] enables the weapon to find, 
track, identify and engage specific target vehicles while ignoring other 
targets which are defined as "low priority" or "non-combatant". In tests, 
LOCAAS searched a large area for SA-8 and Scud-B targets, detected but 
ignored T-72 tanks, which were defined as "low priority" targets, and 
finally located, identified and engaged the SA-8 mobile SAM targets.» 
Another precautionary rule is “doubt”. Faced with an unexpected 
situation that its programming does not allow it to evaluate, the lethal 
autonomous weapon should be programmed to stop and consult its 
commander, which is an application of the rule “if in doubt, do not shoot”. 
But the enemy could take the opportunity to create an unexpected situation 
to paralyse these machines all the time and, given the current set of IHL, it 
does not necessarily constitute an act of perfidy. 
An additional precautionary rule is “overwatch”. In conformity again 
with ICRC rule 19 of customary IHL, («each party to the conflict must do 
everything feasible to cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent 
that the target is not a military objective or that the attack may be expected 
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated»), humans 
must maintain a veto power, that is, an ability to switch the machine off. 
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And, last but not least, IHL itself is a precaution, because an 
indiscriminate lethal autonomous weapon system, unable to be directed at a 
specific military objective, will simply not be fielded. It will not be fielded 
not only for legal reasons (article 36), but for purely pragmatic and strategic 
reasons. It is in the interest of no army in the world to use incontrollable 
weapons, causing too many civilian casualties and, potentially, even 
friendly casualties. 
The conclusion is that the idea behind these safeguards is predictability, 
which is ironic because lethal autonomous weapons may have, by 
definition, uncontrollable effects, for the very reason that they are supposed 
to be autonomous. That is why we are not talking about fully autonomous 
weapons (that not only do not exist but will never exist in the complete 
sense of “fully autonomous weapons”, which wouldn’t be useful at all, on 
top of being dangerous), but of relatively autonomous weapons, being 
deployed only because we believe we can predict their behaviour. It should 
be predictable, for instance that they will shoot at legitimate military targets 
and behave in accordance with IHL or, rather, that they will have the 
capacity to do it at least equal to that of humans, and that is a different 
requirement.  
The difficulty, of course, is that predictability is limited to a finite 
number of situations while, on the battlefield, the machine will face a 
multitude of situations. A way to answer this difficulty is to limit its 
deployment to areas where only a finite number of predictable situations 
can occur, like I said earlier.  
My conclusion is that, with these safeguards, it may be legal and 
legitimate to use lethal autonomous weapons in exceptional circumstances 
and specific environments and doing so is not inconsistent with the law of 
targeting activities. Therefore, there is no reason to defend a preventive 
ban. 
There are even reasons to defend the development of such weapons 
because their targeting recognition system may be much more sophisticated 
than what we already have. With all their sensors, they could access 
information on the exact nature of the target we would not have and, 
therefore, they could better comply with the principle of precaution, 
requiring one to do everything feasible to verify that the target is actually a 
military objective. In other words, they could potentially be, not less, but 
more discriminate. Plus, the machine will not target a non-military 
objective if it is not on its pre-programmed list, while how many soldiers 
have executed illegal orders? 
Now, going back to my initial question, does that mean that the notion 
of a military objective does not need a human determination? No, I believe 
it still does need human determination, that only humans can fully 
understand, interpret and debate what a legitimate military objective is. 
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That is why we have all these safeguards. The lethal autonomous weapon is 
not released free, able to choose its own battlefield and targets. By limiting 
its use to certain areas, by programming a specific list of military objectives 
by nature which it can target, by supervising it, we humans are still in 
control of the targeting. It is still a human targeting. Therefore, it does not 
make IHL a post-human humanitarian law, as we see sometimes. We are 
not talking about post-human warfare, where armies of robots would fight 
each other. War will stay human and the introduction of robots among 
soldiers will not necessarily dehumanise it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. Indiscriminate 
and disproportionate attacks  
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Come valutare la proporzionalità 
Gian Marco Chiarini 
Rappresentante militare dell’Italia presso i Comitati militari 
della NATO e dell’UE, Bruxelles 
Affronterò il tema dei Collateral Damages portando esperienze 
operative. All’inizio della preparazione di queste brevi note ho pensato di 
vedere in Internet quale fosse la percezione di questo concetto. Escludendo 
tutte le definizioni a contenuto osceno o di scarso valore intellettuale, devo 
dire di avere trovato spiegazioni piuttosto singolari quali: 
- linguaggio militare per definire il massacro di civili effettuato 
attraverso l’impiego di armi che si sa essere imprecise; 
- tu sei un collateral damage se sei coinvolto in una rissa fra due 
persone con cui non hai niente a che fare; 
- esplosione inutile che causa la perdita di donne, bambini o edifici; 
- si ha quando un cecchino spara ad una persona senza sapere che ve 
ne è un’altra dietro. Un solo proiettile per due uccisioni. 
Credo sia quindi necessario avere una definizione meno artistica di 
questo concetto. Secondo la terminologia in uso presso le Forze Armate 
U.S., il termine si riferisce a “danni non intenzionali od accidentali 
provocati a personale non combattente o materiali di loro proprietà”.  
Nella storia è sempre stato abbastanza difficile avere comportamenti che 
preservassero il personale dalle operazioni di combattimento. Basti pensare 
al fatto che sino a pochi secoli fa il sostentamento di un esercito, in assenza 
di strutture logistiche, si basava sul saccheggio dei territori attraversati. Le 
cronache sono poi piene dei racconti di città espugnate, seguite dall’eccidio 
di tutti i residenti e non fa eccezione l’occupazione di Gerusalemme da 
parte dei Crociati nel 1099. Anche in tempi recenti durante le due guerre 
mondiali l’argomento è stato oggetto di dibattito. Se, infatti, nel corso della 
prima guerra mondiale i danni alla popolazione civile sono stati limitati, nel 
corso della seconda i morti civili si sono contati a milioni ed in alcuni stati 
il loro numero ha largamente superato quello delle vittime in uniforme. Nel 
1920 il Generale italiano Douhet scrisse un libro profetico Il dominio 
dell’aria in cui tra le altre cose immaginava che in un futuro conflitto le 
popolazioni civili potessero essere oggetto di attacchi dall’aria. Venne 
considerato quasi un terrorista e venne anche rinchiuso per alcuni mesi in 
fortezza. In realtà la sua visione si dimostrò anche troppo realistica alcuni 
anni dopo. Ma vi è un secondo fenomeno che ha caratterizzato in maniera 
significativa la seconda guerra mondiale e cioè la guerra partigiana.  
Questa forma di lotta non è così recente, infatti il termine guerriglia fu 
coniato dagli spagnoli durante le guerre napoleoniche; però solo nel corso 
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del secondo conflitto mondiale ha avuto una estensione su così larga scala, 
tanto da divenire un elemento importante nella strategia bellica dei due 
contendenti. Ancor di più nei conflitti successivi, sia in Asia che in Africa, 
la guerra di guerriglia è divenuta una forma di lotta largamente in uso e 
spesso ha portato alla sconfitta di eserciti regolari. Ovviamente la guerriglia 
porta a sfumare i contorni del mondo civile e militare rendendo sempre più 
difficile una loro differenziazione. Il guerrigliero vive all’interno della 
società da cui si distacca solo per le azioni armate. Ciò rende molto 
difficile, prima che il suo contrasto, la sua identificazione e la 
chiarificazione della sua rete di sostegno con tutti i dubbi di conseguenza. 
Ad esempio chi rifornisce di cibo un guerrigliero è da considerare 
combattente o no? Ciò ha portato alla formulazione nel primo Protocollo 
aggiuntivo del 1977 alla Convenzione di Ginevra del 1949, con varie 
chiarificazioni su chi potesse essere considerato legittimo combattente. I 
conflitti recenti hanno ulteriormente complicato la situazione portando a 
quelli che vengono chiamati hybrid o asymmetrical conflict. Parliamo di 
quei conflitti in cui l’avversario non fa riferimento ad una entità politica o 
statale ma ad un movimento religioso o ad una organizzazione sociale che 
non solo è difficilmente identificabile, ma che altrettanto difficilmente può 
essere chiamata a rispondere degli atti compiuti.  
Quanto detto sinora può solo servire a definire il quadro in cui ci 
muoviamo, ma è il caso di stabilire anche quali comportamenti responsabili 
siano da adottare in questo quadro. La presenza sempre più determinante 
dei cosiddetti conflitti asimmetrici, oltre ad esaltare le caratteristiche della 
guerriglia (difficile identificazione dell’avversario, situazioni che si 
materializzano all’improvviso, indeterminatezza delle aree di operazione) 
portano anche altre conseguenze. La prima è l’estrema dilatazione delle 
aree di operazione e la rarefazione delle unità sul terreno. Per fare un 
esempio, io ho partecipato alla missione NATO in Kossovo KFOR nel 
2000, dove le forze di peace-keeping superavano le 50.000 unità. Nel 2004 
ho comandato la missione Antica Babilonia in Iraq, ove per il controllo 
della Provincia di DI-QUAR, che per estensione e popolazione è uguale al 
Kossovo, con città come Nassirya che ha mezzo milione di abitanti, ho 
potuto contare su di una task force di 3500 uomini e donne. Ciò comporta 
che le comunicazioni diventano difficili e la struttura di comando diviene 
problematica. Il controllo minuto delle attività diventa impossibile e 
pertanto il livello di responsabilità nel dirigere le operazioni viene spinto 
verso il basso. In questo tipo di situazioni è molto frequente che un 
caporale od un capo team si trovi a prendere decisioni, senza la possibilità 
di una verifica dall’alto e queste decisioni vengono ad avere una 
importanza enorme. Ciò che è importante non è quindi dare ordini 
minuziosi che rischiano di essere inapplicabili nello scontro con la realtà, 
ma dare direttive generali concrete e chiare su gli obiettivi da raggiungere; 
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nell’ambito di queste direttive i comandanti subordinati cercheranno la loro 
strada per ottenere l’effetto desiderato, basandosi sulla situazione reale ed 
assumendosi anche la responsabilità di quanto deciso. 
Veniamo quindi all’elemento fondamentale di tutto questo 
ragionamento e cioè il fattore umano, perché dopo tutte le varie 
disquisizioni che possiamo fare, chi decide se deve sparare o no è un uomo 
con un’arma in mano. Sia che facciamo disquisizioni giuridiche, sia che 
tracciamo frecce sulle mappe per visualizzare manovre incredibili, dietro vi 
è sempre un soldato. Un soldato che non può vedere le nostre mappe e le 
frecce colorate, che non può partecipare ai dibattiti, ma che probabilmente 
si trova in una postazione infreddolito, con i piedi bagnati, affamato. Lui 
che è probabilmente oppresso da tutti questi problemi, alla fine dovrà 
decidere in pochi istanti se impiegare l’arma contro una ragazza che gli 
sorride ma che ha una cesta sospetta, contro un ospedale da cui arrivano 
raffiche di mitragliatrice, contro un’auto che procede a zig zag verso il 
posto di blocco, ma che potrebbe avere solo un autista ubriaco. Tra questi 
esempi ve ne è uno che mi è particolarmente vicino, in quanto a Nassirya ci 
spararono per giorni dall’ospedale. E i nostri soldati? In quel caso non 
hanno mai risposto al fuoco. Perché nella maggior parte dei casi il 
personale, se è ben addestrato, se ha fiducia nei superiori e conosce bene le 
direttive generali, è anche in grado di discernere le situazioni, senza alcuna 
conoscenza di norme giuridiche, ma con una grande dose di buon senso. 
Ciò non toglie, però, che qualsiasi ragionamento che noi facciamo non 
possa prescindere dal fatto che la sua applicazione sia devoluta ad un 
soldato, il quale mentre riceve proiettili ha in mente solamente il fatto che 
vorrebbe continuare a vivere! Cosa si può fare per questo? Fare in modo 
che quel soldato, che comunque ha una mente pensante, anche se tale 
facoltà è spesso sottoposta a stress in situazione di combattimento, riceva 
pochi ordini chiari e sicuramente applicabili. Ricordo che in alcune 
missioni gli ordini per l’impiego delle armi recitavano che «l’uso 
dell’armamento è consentito al solo fine di tutelare l’incolumità personale e 
solo dopo la chiara manifestazione di una volontà ostile». In questi conflitti 
di rado qualcuno manifesta la propria volontà. Quindi la possibilità di 
colpire involontariamente civili inermi esiste, ma può essere mitigata 
dall’addestramento, dall’organizzazione e dalla capacità di discernimento 
del personale. Questi elementi sono tutti collegati fra loro.  
Resta però aperto un altro problema e cioè: fino a che punto posso 
pianificare operazioni che comportino un danno a civili? Ritengo che sia 
molto difficile dare una risposta razionale a questo quesito e penso che la 
risposta risieda essenzialmente sul piano etico e morale e cioè fino a che 
punto ritengo di poter rinunciare alla mia umanità per conseguire un fine.  
Nell’esperienza storica le grandi distruzioni non hanno mai portato a 
grandi vantaggi tattici. Ricordo che la distruzione dell’Abbazia di 
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Montecassino da parte dei bombardieri alleati la trasformò in un 
imprendibile centro di resistenza presidiato dai paracadutisti tedeschi. Ciò 
premesso, le valutazioni sul “redditizio” o meno sul “vantaggioso” o meno 
risalgono tutte a quel complesso di scelte che fanno parte delle funzioni di 
un Comandante e sino ad ora, per quanti manuali siano stati scritti, non 
credo ve ne sia uno atto a salvaguardare un comandante dal complesso 
delle sue scelte e responsabilità. Per offrirvi un fatto concreto: il giorno 
della prima battaglia dei ponti a Nassirja, sulla sponda nord del terzo ponte 
ci siamo trovati insorti che spingevano davanti a sé donne e bambini come 
scudi umani. Abbiamo quindi deciso di non procedere alla conquista della 
spalla nord, che al momento non aveva un valore così rilevante. Giusto, 
sbagliato? Ogni Comandante è solo nelle valutazioni di cui risponde. Credo 
sia impossibile codificare un comportamento per ogni situazione. Come ho 
detto le valutazioni non sono solo militari, ma soprattutto di natura etica e 
morale.  
A conclusione di queste brevi note vorrei fare un cenno alla percezione 
che si ha dei collateral damages e cioè alla funzione dei Media. Come si 
può vedere, già Eschilo, cinque secoli prima di Cristo, aveva intuito come 
sia difficile stabilire quale sia la verità in guerra e lui oltre ad essere un 
grande drammaturgo aveva partecipato alle guerre contro i Persiani. In 
effetti le “stragi di civili” o i “danni immotivati” sono spesso percepiti con 
modalità legate al modo ed al tempismo con cui una notizia viene diffusa. 
Nella mia esperienza in Iraq ho constatato come noi non fossimo adeguati 
in questo, in quanto avevamo sottostimato la capacità avversaria di gestire 
le informazioni. Ad ogni scontro, infatti, vi era una troupe degli insorti che 
filmava alcune scene e dopo poco tempo metteva queste immagini su 
Internet con i loro commenti sulla vicenda, ovviamente senza 
contraddittorio o valutazioni sgradite.  
Poiché non tutti gli organi di informazione hanno la possibilità di avere 
reporter sul luogo degli scontri, una notizia riportata su Internet diviene 
subito fonte di informazione e nessun organo informativo vuole essere 
secondo nel diffondere una notizia. Noi non avevamo valutato 
correttamente questa possibilità e ci siamo sempre trovati ad inseguire il 
flusso informativo. Avevamo dalla nostra parte il fatto che diversi 
rappresentanti dei “media” nazionali erano presso di noi e, quindi, anche se 
in ritardo potevamo dare la nostra versione dei fatti. Anche questo però non 
era sufficiente, in quanto rimestare una notizia già vecchia non crea la 
stessa impressione che comunicare un fatto nuovo. Durante gli scontri 
siamo ad esempio stati accusati di avere sparato alcune granate di mortaio 
sul mercato di Nassirja provocando molti feriti. Ho quindi solo potuto 
dimostrare che non avevo mai schierato i miei mortai e le distanze erano 
comunque tali da non consentirmi di raggiungere il mercato. I feriti 
andavano quindi imputati ai nostri avversari – forse per una esplosione 
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accidentale. La spiegazione però, per quanto inconfutabile, non creò lo 
stesso effetto dell’annuncio iniziale dei ferimenti al mercato. Nel giudicare 
i danni collaterali penso sia quindi essenziale non essere presi 
dall’emotività degli annunci iniziali e basarsi su dati certi che vengano, se 
possibile, da un’indagine indipendente. Quando si hanno scontri con forze 
non regolari, che non portano uniformi o insegne e sono quindi difficili da 
identificare, i caduti tendono ad essere sempre passanti casuali o vittime 
innocenti e le abitazioni utilizzate come centri di fuoco sono, purtroppo, 
case civili senza valore bellico. 
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The use of explosive weapons 
in densely populated areas 
and the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks* 
Laurent Gisel 
Legal Adviser, Legal Division, International Committee 
of the Red Cross, Geneva 
This presentation is divided in three parts. The first part discusses the 
notion of indiscriminate attack. The second part highlights the effects of the 
use of explosive weapons in populated areas in light of the prohibition of 
indiscriminate attacks. The last part proposes a few forward-looking 
considerations.  
Let us turn first to the notion of indiscriminate attack. The prohibition of 
indiscriminate attack appeared between the two World Wars, in the 1923 
Hague Rules of Air Warfare and in the 1938 Draft Convention for the 
Protection of Civilian Populations. Both texts prohibited aerial 
bombardments against military objectives so situated that they cannot be 
bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian 
population.1 The prohibition of area bombardment was also included in the 
1956 New Delhi draft Rules.2 None of these texts was adopted by States as 
a treaty. 
The first prohibition of indiscriminate attacks that made it into treaty 
law is to be found in the 1977 First Additional Protocol (hereinafter AP I). 
It has been described as the confirmation of «the unlawful character of 
certain regrettable practices during the Second World War and subsequent 
armed conflicts. Far too often the purpose of attacks was to destroy all life 
in a particular area or to raze a town to the ground without this resulting, in 
most cases, in any substantial military advantages».3 The prohibition of 
                                                     
* The views expressed in this opinion note are those of the author alone and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the ICRC. The author would like to thank Knut Dörmann, 
Kathleen Lawand, and Jean-François Quéguiner for their useful comments on earlier drafts 
of this presentation.  
1 Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, 
The Hague, 1923, Art. 24(3) of the Rules of Air Warfare; Draft Convention for the 
Protection of Civilian Populations Against New Engines of War, Amsterdam, 1938, Art. 
5(2). 
2 Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers incurred by the Civilian Population in 
Time of War, ICRC, 1956, Art. 10.  
3 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on 
the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987 (ICRC Commentary), commentary on Art. 
51(4) AP I, para. 1946. 
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indiscriminate attacks flows from the principle of distinction, which 
requires parties to armed conflicts to distinguish at all times between on the 
one hand civilians and civilian objects, and on the other combatants and 
military objectives, and to direct their attacks only against the latter. It is 
intended to ensure that attacks are directed at military objectives and are 
not of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects 
without distinction.  
Article 51 AP I specifies three types of indiscriminate attacks and gives 
two examples. First, attacks which are not directed at a specific military 
objective; this type of attack does not depend on the weapon used, but on 
the manner in which it is used. Second, attacks which employ method or 
means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; 
this second type prohibits the use of weapons that strike blindly,4 as well as 
weapons that are not accurate enough to attack one specific military 
objective, due to the circumstances and manner in which they are used.5 
Third, attacks which employ a method or means of combat the effects of 
which cannot be limited as required by international humanitarian law 
(hereinafter IHL). As required by IHL refers notably to the prohibition of 
disproportionate attacks and the norms protecting the environment.6 This 
third type of indiscriminate attacks also covers the employment of means 
and methods whose effects cannot be controlled in time and space, such as 
biological agents,7 or water or fire depending on how they are used.8  
Article 51(5) AP I prohibits two specific forms of indiscriminate 
attacks. First, area bombardments which are defined as attacks «which treat 
as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct 
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a 
similar concentration of civilians and civilian objects». Second, 
disproportionate attacks, which are defined as attacks «which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated».  
Since 1977, the prohibition of indiscriminate attack has been included in 
the amended Protocol II to the CCW Convention on the use of mines and 
                                                     
4 Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch and Waldermar A. Solf, New Rules for Victims of 
Armed Conflicts, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1982, p. 305.  
5 See below notes 18 and 19, p. 103. 
6 Bothe, Partsch and Solf, above note 4, p. 305; Stefan Oeter, ‘Methods and means of 
combat’ in Dieter Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 3rd ed., 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 116-230, para. 458.4.  
7 Michael Schmitt, ‘War, Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict’, in A. M. Helm 
(ed.), The Law of War in the 21st Century: Weaponry and the Use of Force, Volume 82, 
International Law Studies (2006), p. 140. 
8 ICRC Commentary on Art. 51(4), above note 3, para. 1963.  
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booby-traps (1996),9 and identified as a customary rule applicable in 
international and non-international armed conflicts in the Customary IHL 
Study of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).10 
Turning to international criminal law, the Statutes of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) do not refer to the 
prohibition of indiscriminate attack or even to the prohibition of direct 
attacks on civilians. However, the ICTY found that direct attacks on 
civilians constituted war crimes,11 and that indiscriminate attacks may 
qualify as direct attacks.12 The Rome Statute does not list expressly the 
prohibition of indiscriminate attack either, but does list the war crime of 
directing attacks against the civilian population.13 Depending on how the 
mental element is considered, this war crime might be understood as 
encompassing notably indiscriminate attacks,14 which would be coherent 
with the ICTY case-law. Furthermore, the Rome Statute made the 
employment of weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare 
which are inherently indiscriminate a war crime in international armed 
conflicts, though they first need to be listed in an annex which is yet to be 
adopted.15 The ICTY case-law and the Rome Statute reflect the 
International Court of Justice Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, which 
held that States must never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing 
between civilian and military targets because of the prohibition to make 
                                                     
9 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons) as amended 
on 3 May 1996, Art. 3(8).  
10 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I: Rules, Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 
(ICRC Customary IHL Study), Rules 11 – 13 on the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks 
and Rule 71 on the prohibition of weapons which are by nature indiscriminate.  
11 Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29, Trial Chamber Judgement, 5 
December 2003 (Galić Trial Judgment), para.s 16-32, confirmed by the Appeal Chamber 
(ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Cerkez, Case No IT-95-14, Appeal Chamber 
Judgement, 17 December 2004, para 54 as corrected on 26 January 2005; ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 30 November 2006 
(Galić Appeals Judgment), para.s 122-125). 
12 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
12 June 2007 (Martić Trial Judgment), para. 69; Galić Trial Judgment, above note 11, para. 
57. In Galić, the Appeal Chamber endorsed the Trial Chamber view that «attacks which 
employ certain means of combat which cannot discriminate between civilians and civilian 
objects and military objectives are tantamount to direct targeting of civilians», Galić 
Appeals Judgment, above note 11, para. 132. 
13 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8(2)(b)(i) and 8(2)(e)(i).  
14 See Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.131f.  
15 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8(2)(b)(xx).  
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civilians the object of attack.16 Finally, the ICTY and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone considered that indiscriminate attacks, or threats thereof, can 
be constitutive of the war crime of terrorizing the civilian population, 
which underlines the importance of the prohibition.17  
Two points need to be underlined with regard to the notion of 
indiscriminate attack.  
First, the travaux préparatoires of the 1977 First Additional Protocol 
and the case-law from the ICTY indicate that the prohibition of 
indiscriminate attacks is not limited to means or methods of warfare that 
are “inherently” indiscriminate. While the use of weapons which are by 
nature indiscriminate is prohibited in all circumstances,18 the prohibition of 
indiscriminate attacks extends to attacks that employ weapons which, «in 
the circumstances ruling at the time of their use, including the manner in 
which they are used», cannot be directed at a specific military objective or 
whose effects cannot be limited as required by IHL.19 Warfare in populated 
areas is certainly a situation which might render indiscriminate particular 
means or methods that could be lawfully used in other situations.20 So 
asserting that an attack with a particular type of weapons risks amounting 
to an indiscriminate attack when it is carried out in densely populated areas 
                                                     
16 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 
1996, para. 78.  
17 Galić Appeal Judgement, 30 November 2006, para. 102; the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone endorsed this position in Prosecutor v. Fofana et al, Appeal Judgement, 28 May 
2008, § 351.  
18 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 10, Rule 71.  
19 See Report of Committee III at CDDH, Official Records Vol. XV, CDDH/215/Rev.1, 
p 274: «Many but not all of those who commented were of the view that the definition [of 
indiscriminate attacks] was not intended to mean that there are means or methods of combat 
whose use would involve an indiscriminate attack in all circumstances. Rather it was 
intended to take account of the fact that means or methods of combat which can be used 
perfectly legitimately in some situations could, in other circumstances, have effects that 
would be contrary to some limitations contained in the Protocol, in which event their use in 
those circumstances would involve an indiscriminate attack.» See also ICTY, Prosecutor v 
Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 8 October 2008, para. 
247 (Martić Appeal Judgment) that recalled the Trial Chamber’s finding that the M-87 
Orkan “was used as an indiscriminate weapon” and that “by virtue of its characteristics and 
the firing range in the specific instant”' it was “incapable of hitting specific targets” 
(emphasis added); J. Weiner, Discrimination, Indiscriminate Attacks, and the Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, 19 December 2011, p. 18 (available at www.lcnp.org/pubs/Weiner_ 
Discrimination-Indiscriminate-Attacks.pdf, all references last accessed 13 April 2015). 
20 See Bothe, Partsch and Solf, above note 4, p. 306; ICRC, International Humanitarian 
Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (2011) (31IC/11/5.1.2), p. 41 
(ICRC IHL Challenges Report 2011, available at www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/ 
report/31-international-conference-ihl-challenges-report-2011-10-31.htm).  
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does not mean that the same weapon cannot be lawfully used in other 
circumstances, in open battlefield in particular.21 
Second, some aspects of the way in which the prohibition of 
indiscriminate attack is interpreted and applied might evolve with advances 
in precision weaponry. For example, looking at weapons’ circular error 
probability in the past and today, it has been argued that as precision 
increases, the interpretation of some aspects of the notion of indiscriminate 
attacks «will become ever more demanding».22 The same argument can be 
made with regard to the prohibition of area bombardments, which is an 
example of indiscriminate attack according to AP I. As already mentioned, 
area bombardment are attacks which treat as a single military objective a 
number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a 
populated area. What is meant by “clearly separated and distinct” leaves, 
however, some degree of latitude to those mounting an attack.23 During the 
Diplomatic Conference leading to the adoption of the 1977 Additional 
Protocols, some States asserted that this required a distance at least 
sufficiently large to permit the individual military objectives to be attacked 
separately, and the ICRC commentary reflects this by recalling the need to 
«tak[e] into account the means available».24 While this understanding was 
not expressly included in the treaty text, it implies that the practical 
application of the notion is evolutional thanks to the advances in weapon’s 
precision. Military objectives that might not have been considered clearly 
separated and distinct yesterday may be considered so today or tomorrow.25 
To be noted that even when the objectives are not clearly separated and 
distinct, the attack remains governed by the rule of proportionality.  
Let us now turn to the effects of the use of explosive weapons in 
populated areas, in light of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks that we 
have just discussed.  
                                                     
21 See e.g. United Kingdom, The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, 
JSP 383, 2004 (U.K. 2004 LOAC Manual): «If the military objective consists of scattered 
enemy tank formations in an unpopulated desert, it would be permissible to use weapons 
having a wider area of effect than would be possible if the target were a single 
communications site in the middle of a heavily populated area» (para. 5.23.3).  
22 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Precision attack and international humanitarian law’, in 
International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 87 Number 859 September 2005, pp 445-
466, p. 456; Christopher Markham, and Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Precision Air Warfare and the 
Law of Armed Conflict’, in 89 International Law Studies 669 (2013), p. 682; See also : 
Harvard University Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Commentary 
on the HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (2010), 
p. 64, para. 3 (available at http://ihlresearch.org/amw/Commentary%20on%20the%20HPCR 
%20Manual.pdf).  
23 ICRC Commentary on Art. 51(5) AP I, above note 3, para. 1972.  
24 Ibid., para. 1975.  
25 Hans Blix, ‘Area Bombardments, rules and reasons’, in British Yearbook of 
International Law 49, 1978, pp 31-69, p. 66. 
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There are many types of explosive weapons, ranging from grenades to 
aerial bombs weighing hundreds of kilos. Some legal instruments define 
explosive devices, but the definitions are tailored to the purposes of the 
relevant treaty.26 A recurring element is that such weapons are activated by 
the detonation of a high explosive substance creating a blast and 
fragmentation effect. Obviously, the employment of explosive weapons is 
not prohibited by IHL in a general manner. The lawfulness of their use 
must, therefore, be determined on a case-by-case basis. Two strands of 
norms are relevant: first, the general rules governing the conduct of 
hostilities, such as the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, as well as the 
prohibition of direct attacks against civilians and civilian objects and the 
requirements of the principle of precautions, both outside the scope of this 
presentation; second, the weapons’ treaties covering explosive weapons, 
such as the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons), the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention and the Cluster Munitions Convention.  
The main feature of current conflicts is that they are fought in populated 
areas, where military objectives and protected persons and objects are 
intermingled. In such situations, the use of explosive weapons exposes the 
civilian population to heightened – and even extreme - risks of incidental or 
indiscriminate death and injury.27 As important are the effects of explosive 
weapons on infrastructure. When civilian buildings are reduced to rubble, 
civilians lose their homes and livelihoods, which often leads to long-lasting 
displacement. When exploding on or in the ground, explosive weapons 
damage water and sewage systems, or underground electricity networks. 
                                                     
26 The most generic definition is found in Art. 2(1) of the Protocol on Explosive 
Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 CCW Convention): «Explosive ordnance 
means conventional munitions containing explosives, with the exception of mines, booby 
traps and other devices as defined in Protocol II of this Convention as amended on 3 May 
1996». See also Art. 2(1) of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons) «"Mine" means a munition placed under, on or near the ground or 
other surface area and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a 
person or vehicle.»; Art. 2(2) of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 
18 September 1997: «"Mine" means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the 
ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a 
person or a vehicle»; Art. 2(2 and 3) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions «2. “Cluster 
munition” means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive 
submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive 
submunitions. (…) 3. “Explosive submunition” means a conventional munition that in order 
to perform its task is dispersed or released by a cluster munition and is designed to function 
by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact». 
27 ICRC IHL Challenges Report, above note 20, p. 41.  
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While the news often show blown out windows and damaged buildings, 
these less visible destruction of such essential infrastructure has ripple 
effects, from the malfunctioning of heath care structures to the spread of 
diseases.  
It is interesting to look at a few analysis and pronouncements by States, 
the ICTY and various International Inquiry Commissions on instances of 
use of explosive weapons in populated areas that have been considered to 
run afoul of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks.  
The paradigmatic example of such indiscriminate attack are those 
carried out with the V1 and V2 rockets by Germany during the Second 
World War.28 Furthermore, several military manuals mention the Scud 
missiles attacks by Iraq against Saudi Arabia and Israel during the Persian 
Gulf War.29 Various States also identified a number of other weapons as 
indiscriminate in certain or all contexts, including notably: anti-personnel 
landmines; mines; booby-traps; explosives discharged from balloons; 
Katyusha rockets; and cluster bombs.30  
Cluster Munitions are an interesting case in point. They are prohibited 
by the Convention on Cluster Munitions, for the 91 States party to it at the 
time of writing, notably because of their indiscriminate area effects.31 
Beyond the Convention, several courts and international commissions 
analysed specific instances of use of cluster munitions in populated areas. 
The ICTY in Martić,32 the Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry 
on Lebanon33 and the International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
                                                     
28 ICRC Commentary on API Article 51(4)(b), para. 1958. See also Ecuador, Aspectos 
Importantes del Derecho Internacional Marítimo que Deben Tener Presente los 
Comandantes de los Buques, Academia de Guerra Naval, 1989, para. 9.1.2; U.K. 2004 
LOAC Manual (above note 21), para. 6.4.1; United States, Commander’s Handbook on the 
Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M, July 2007, para. 9.1.2.  
29 See practice of Canada, Côte d’Ivoire, Israel, United Kingdom and United States 
quoted in ICRC Customary IHL Study (above note 10), State practice related to Rule 71, 
available at: www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/print/v2_rul_rule71. 
30 ICRC Customary IHL Study (above note 10), p. 249f.  
31 See Art. 2(2)(c) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions: «[Cluster munition] does not 
mean the following:(… ) (c) A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects 
and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics 
(…)» (emphasis added).  
32 Martić Trial Judgment (above note 11), para. 463. Martić Appeal Judgment (above 
note 19), para.s 247-252. The Appeal Chamber notably recalled that «The Witness was 
explicit in stating that “the Orkan is not principally suitable for use in populated areas” and 
because of its characteristics “is not intended for deployment in populated areas.” (…) 
Consequently, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the Trial Chamber, given its findings 
on the nature of the M-87 Orkan, could disregard the presence of military targets in Zagreb» 
(para. 251).  
33 Human Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 
March 2006 entitled “Human Rights Council”, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston; the Special Rapporteur on the 
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Georgia34 concluded that the use of such weapons was illegal in the case 
under review because it was indiscriminate, while the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights35 and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission36 found it 
illegal under the principle of precautions in attack. Despite the Final Report 
to the ICTY Prosecutor, which recommended not to commence an 
investigation on NATO use of cluster bombs against the former 
Yugoslavia,37 it can be argued that a compelling trend points to the 
unlawfulness of the use of cluster munitions in populated areas. It is indeed 
                                                                                                                          
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health, Paul Hunt; the Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights of internally 
displaced persons, Walter Kälin; and the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a 
component of the right to an adequate standard of living, Miloon Kothari, Mission to 
Lebanon and Israel (7-14 September 2006), A/HRC/2/7, «In effect, then, the decision was 
taken to blanket an area occupied by large numbers of civilians with small and volatile 
explosives. The impact of these bomblets would obviously be indiscriminate and the 
incidental effects on civilians would almost certainly be disproportionate.» (para. 56). For 
the Human Rights Council Commissions of Inquiry on Libya, see A/HRC/17/44, para. 175 
(which express concern about reports of the use of cluster munitions in highly populated 
areas) as well as A/HRC/19/68 paras 72 and 90.  
34 International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, Volume I: 
«This would indicate that during the Georgian offensive on Tskhinvali cluster munitions on 
whatever scale and GRAD MLRS were both used, amounting to indiscriminate attacks by 
Georgian forces, owing to the uncontrollable effects of such weaponry and its use in a 
populated area. There are also some indications and consequently concerns regarding 
Russian use of cluster munitions in military attacks on Gori and possibly elsewhere» (p. 28). 
See also Volume II, pp. 340-343 (in particular «The use of artillery and cluster munitions by 
Russian forces in populated areas also led to indiscriminate attacks and the violation of rules 
on precautions» p. 343). 
35 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. 
Colombia, Judgement of 30 November 2012, para. 211-230. The Court started by taking 
note that «the domestic judicial and administrative organs have considered that the State 
failed to comply with the principle of distinction when conducting the said airborne 
operation» (para. 213). The Court then focused its analysis on the principle of precautions; 
among various issues it noted that «manuals and regulations were in force at the time of the 
events indicating that weapons such as the one used could not be used in populated areas or 
near villages with civilian population» (para. 227).  
36 Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, partial award, Central Front Ethiopia’s Claim 2 
28 April 2004, para.s 101-113. The Commission found the operation that targeted Mekele 
airport as a violation of the principle of precautions in attack, because of «a lack of essential 
care in conducting»the operation (para. 110). However, the Commission mentioned that it 
did not question the choice of the weapon (ibid.). For a critical assessment of this decision, 
Virgil O. Wiebe ‘For Whom the Little Bells Toll: Recent Judgments by International 
Tribunals on the Legality of Cluster Munitions’, in 35 Pepp. L. Rev. 4 (2008), pp. 895-965, 
pp. 908ff.  
37 ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the 
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, para. 27.  
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«more than questionable» whether in such area cluster munitions can be 
directed at a specific military objective as required by IHL.38 
Multiple Rocket Launching Systems – or MRLS - are another type of 
area weapon that has raised concern when used in densely populated areas. 
While the ICTY in Gotovina considered that the use by the Croatian forces 
in Knin of the BM-21 «was not inherently indiscriminate»,39 the 
International Fact-Finding mission on the Conflict in Georgia described 
another MRLS, the GRAD system, as particularly dangerous for non-
combatants because of their indiscriminate deadly effects.40 Recent use of 
MRLS in Eastern Ukraine has again ignited the debate on the legality of 
these weapons when used in populated areas.41 
Finally, in analysing the use of various rockets and mortars fired from 
Gaza against Israel,42 the UN Fact-finding Mission on the Gaza conflict 
recalled that «there is no justification in international law for the launching 
of rockets and mortars that cannot be directed at specific military targets 
into areas where civilian populations are located».43 The UN Human Right 
Council Commission of Inquiry in Libya similarly expressed its concern 
that «the Libyan authorities have not been undertaking appropriate and 
precautionary assessments which would, in the Commission’s view, 
                                                     
38 Knut Dörmann, ‘The Principle of Distinction in Modern Warfare: Targeting, Weapons 
and Precautions in Attack’, in Larry Maybee and K.C. Sowmya (eds), 30 Years of the 1977 
Additional Protocols to Geneva Conventions of 1949, ICRC, New Delhi, pp 59-76, p. 66.  
39 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markac, Case no IT-06-90-T, 
Trial Chamber Judgement, 15 April 2011 (Gotovina Trial Judgement), para. 1897. 
40 International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, Volume I, p. 
28. The Report, Volume II indicates that «The Fact-Finding Mission concludes that during 
the offensive on Tskhinvali the shelling in general, and the use of GRAD MLRS as an area 
weapon in particular, amount to indiscriminate attacks by Georgian forces, owing to the 
characteristics of the weaponry and its use in a populated area.» p. 340. 
41 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, ‘Ukraine: Unguided Rockets Killing Civilians, Stop 
Use of Grads in Populated Areas’, 24 July 2014, available at: www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/ 
24/ukraine-unguided-rockets-killing-civilians. 
42 Al-Qassams rockets, anti-armour rockets, and mortars manufactured in Gaza, and 
122mm Grad and WeiShei-1E rockets, 220mm Fadjr-3 rockets and possibly also mortars 
industrially produced and smuggled into Gaza as weapons 
43 Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and other Occupied Arab 
Territories, Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 25 
September 2009, A/HRC/12/48, para. 1687. The report was discussing the use of Al-
Qassams rockets, anti-armour rockets, and mortars manufactured in Gaza, and 122mm Grad 
and WeiShei-1E rockets, 220mm Fadjr-3 rockets and possibly also mortars industrially 
produced and smuggled into Gaza, see para.s 1617-1623. The report also considered that the 
deployment of mortar weapons in a busy street with around 150 civilians in it cannot be 
justified (para. 700).  
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militate against the use of weapons, such as mortars, in densely urban 
areas.»44 
Beyond these few pronouncements on specific weapons or weapons 
systems, what can be drawn from the ICTY case-law with regard to the 
accuracy that is required for the use of weapons in populated areas to be 
lawful? The legality of the use of a weapon, like all the rules on the conduct 
of hostilities, must not be based on hindsight, but must be assessed from the 
perspective of the commander at the time of the attack, based on the 
information from all sources which is available to them at the relevant 
time,45 which include the foreseeable effects of the various means and 
methods at his disposal in view of the weapons’ technical and other 
characteristics. An accuracy standard based on the actual impact is difficult 
to reconcile with this, a criticism that many raised against the Gotovina 
Trial Judgement.46 But this leaves open the question of what are the 
requirements in terms of “expected” accuracy and “foreseeable” effects of 
the weapons when used in populated areas?  
In Martić and Dragomir Milosevic, the ICTY considered the one-km 
dispersion error of the M-87 Orkan and of the modified air bombs when 
describing their use as indiscriminate. But this cannot be interpreted a 
contrario that the use of any weapon that has a smaller dispersion error is 
not indiscriminate! This cannot be an appropriate standard, and this was 
confirmed by the Appeal Chamber in Martić which stated that «a 
dispersion pattern of such proportion [180m x 165m as claimed by Martić 
in his appeal] would hardy make the finding of the Trial Chamber that the 
                                                     
44 Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to 
investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, 12 January 2012, A/HRC/17/44, para. 179.  
45 See the declarations made by many States upon ratification of AP I, as well as United 
States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf 
War, 10 April 1992, Appendix O, The Role of the Law of War, ILM, Vol. 31, 1992, p. 626 
(all quoted in Customary IHL Study, above note 10, practice related to Rule 15 available at 
www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule15). Specifically with regard to 
indiscriminate attacks, see Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of 
International Armed Conflict, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, para. 
315.  
46 ‘Application and Proposed Amicus Curiae Brief Concerning The 15 April 2011 Trial 
Chamber Judgment and Requesting that the Appeals Chamber Reconsider the Findings of 
Unlawful Artillery Attacks during Operation Storm’ in the case The Prosecutor v. Ante 
Gotovina and Mladen Markac, IT-06-90-A, para. 8 p. 15f (the Application was denied by 
the Appeal Chamber, Decision, 14 February 2012); International Humanitarian Law Clinic 
Emory University School of Law, ‘Operational law experts roundtable on the Gotovina 
judgment: Military operations, Battlefield Reality and the Judgment's Impact on Effective 
Implementation and Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law,’ p. 5f; Walter B. 
Huffman, ‘Margin of error: potential pitfalls of the ruling in the prosecutor v. Ante 
Gotovina’, Military law review, Vol. 211, Spring 2012, pp.1-56, pp. 4f and 24ff. 
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M-87 Orkan was incapable of hitting specific targets unreasonable».47 
During the Gotovina trial, the issue was discussed at length. Many experts 
were heard, and they expressed many diverging views.48 In its judgement, 
the Gotovina Trial Chamber suggested a 200 meters standard based on the 
impacts locations: shells which had landed at more than 200 meters from a 
military objective were considered as evidence of an indiscriminate 
attack.49 When turning down the Gotovina Trial Judgement and in 
particular its 200 meters standard,50 the Appeal Chamber, however, failed 
to offer another standard. This is - to say the least - a missed opportunity to 
clarify how the law should be interpreted and applied.51  
So what could be the way forward?  
We believe that every effort should be made to reduce the human cost of 
the use of explosive weapons in densely populated areas in current 
conflicts.  
Compliance with the prohibition of directing attacks against civilians 
and civilian objects needs to be strengthened, notably with regard to attacks 
carried out with explosive weapons in populated areas. The need to 
strengthen compliance with IHL is, however, a much broader issue, on 
which the ICRC and the Swiss Government are currently undertaking a 
major consultation process,52 and it is outside the scope of the issue 
discussed in this presentation.  
Beyond this prohibition, the ICRC considers that explosive weapons 
with a wide impact area should be avoided in densely populated areas due 
to the significant likelihood of indiscriminate effects and despite the 
absence of an express legal prohibition against specific types of weapons.53 
Weapons with wide impact area include those that have a wide destructive 
radius, such as big bombs and missiles; those with an inaccurate delivery 
system, such as unguided bombs and indirect-fire weapons like mortars or 
artillery; and weapons systems designed to deliver multiple munitions, such 
                                                     
47 Martić Appeal Judgement (above note 19), para. 250.  
48 For a summary and analysis of the experts’ testimony, see e.g. PAX, Unacceptable 
Risk, Use of explosive weapons in populated areas through the lens of three cases before the 
ICTY, Maya Brehm, 2014, pp. 60ff.  
49 Gotovina Trial Judgement (above note 39), para.s 1893-1945.  
50 ICTY, the Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markac, Case no IT-06-90-A, 
Appeal Chamber Judgement, 16 November 2012 (Gotovina Appeal Judgement), para. 64.  
51 See Gotovina Appeal Judgment, Dissenting opinion of Judge Fausto Pocar, para. 13-
14; Darren Valletgoed, ‘The Last Round? A post-Gotovina Reassessment of the Legality of 
Using Artillery Against Built-up Areas,’ Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2013), Vol. 
18 no. 1, pp. 25-57, pp. 47ff. 
52 See www.icrc.org/eng/what-we-do/other-activities/development-ihl/strengthening-legal- 
protection-compliance.htm. 
53 ICRC IHL Challenges Report, above note 20, p. 42.  
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as MRLS or cluster munitions.54 Let us recall that many of these weapons 
were not developed for urban warfare but rather for being used in the open 
battlefield, where most of them do not create the same concerns.  
A number of States have expressed the view that explosive weapons 
with a wide impact area should be avoided in densely populated areas, as 
evident from their statements in Security Council debates on the protection 
of civilians as well as other fora.55 Other States remain at this stage hesitant 
to articulate specific limits on the use of explosive weapons in populated 
areas. Some have stated that current law sufficiently addresses the issue and 
that better respect for the law needs to be ensured to limit the human cost of 
the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Still other States have not 
articulated specific views.  
At this juncture, an informed discussion seems necessary and should 
contribute to States forming a more elaborate policy position as a response 
to the humanitarian concerns. Such discussion would benefit from a good 
and shared understanding notably of what the general rules of IHL on the 
conduct of hostilities more specifically impose in terms of restrictions and 
prohibitions when it comes to applying them in populated areas.  
It is submitted that, notably, an effort should be made to further explore 
the meaning of and limits posed by the prohibition of indiscriminate attack 
when belligerents are fighting in urban warfare. Indeed, whether or not 
States decide to avoid using explosive weapons with a wide impact area in 
densely populated areas, any attack which actually amounts to an 
indiscriminate attack is forbidden under the lex lata. Furthermore, it would 
be useful to have a more precise mapping of the weapons whose use in 
populated areas is likely to have indiscriminate effects – along the line of 
the three categories of concern mentioned above. More clarity on the 
restrictions that States already put in place with regard to the use of specific 
weapons or weapon systems in densely populated areas could also inform 
discussions in a useful way. Finally, it is important to identify the most 
appropriate precautionary measures to be taken even when using 
discriminate weapons in such environments, a topic for the next panel on 
precautions in attack. 
                                                     
54 ICRC, General debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items, 
United Nations, General Assembly, 69th session, First Committee, statement by the ICRC, 
New York, 14 October 2014. 
55 See for example the statement by Slovenia on behalf of the States members of the 
Human Security Network (Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, 
Norway, Panama, Slovenia, Switzerland and Thailand, and the Republic of South Africa as 
an observer) at the Security Council Open Debate on the Protection of civilians in armed 
conflicts, 12 February 2014, S/PV.7109, p. 74: ”The Network reiterates its call on all parties 
to an armed conflict to refrain from using explosive weapons with a wide area impact in 
populated areas.” 
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A better knowledge of State policies and practices and a growing 
international consensus on the notion of indiscriminate attack, in particular 
when fighting in densely populated areas, will support parties to armed 
conflicts which endeavour in good faith to comply with the law, and will 
also help identify instances of violations of the law. This will help protect 
civilians from indiscriminate attacks, but also allow a more informed 
assessment on whether the law is sufficient to achieve its goal of protecting 
civilians and civilian objects from the effects of hostilities, or whether some 
form of strengthening would be warranted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. Precautions in attacks 
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The obligation to give effective warnings: 
lessons learned from recent conflicts 
Pnina Sharvit Baruch 
Senior Research Fellow, Head of the Program on Law and National 
Security, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv 
Minimizing harm to civilians during armed conflict situations is one of 
the most important objectives of the laws of armed conflict. This has also 
become one of the main and most complex challenges facing fighting 
forces today, at least for Western countries.  
Attacks leading to civilian casualties draw immediate criticism and 
accusations, ranging from allegations of disregard to human life to claims 
of war crimes. They also draw negative public opinion and instigate 
diplomatic pressure, which leads to less freedom of action. The result is 
that actions which can assist to minimize civilian casualties are based on 
legal as well as on moral and operational rationales. Precautions in general 
and warning prior to attacks in particular, therefore, serve all these logics. 
The basic rule regarding warnings is addressed in Article 57(2)(c) of 
Additional Protocol I (API): “Effective advance warning shall be given of 
attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do 
not permit.” 
 
 
1. The aim of the warning 
 
Warning prior to attack is aimed to enhance the protection of civilians 
from the harmful consequences of hostilities. More concretely the aim of 
the warning is to provide civilians with the opportunity to protect 
themselves from impending attacks. Accordingly, warnings are only 
relevant when civilians might be physically harmed by the ensuing attack.  
There are different kinds of warnings. One main distinction is between 
general and specific warnings. General warnings are warnings given to the 
general public, or parts thereof, warning them in general terms. They may 
consist, for example, of a blanket alert delivered by leaflets or by 
broadcasts advising the civilian population to stay away from certain 
military objectives, such as sites used by enemy forces. General warnings 
may call on civilians to evacuate certain areas. For example, in the Second 
Lebanon War in 2006 civilians were asked to move from the southern part 
of Lebanon to areas north of the Litani River. 
Specific warnings are aimed at civilians present in a more concrete 
target (such as a certain building) and would usually involve providing 
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more details regarding the geographical boundaries of the area to be 
affected and a description of the time of the expected attack in order to 
enable the civilians to leave or seek shelter. 
There are also different kinds of attacks to warn against – aerial attacks 
are the most common. But warnings are also relevant before ground 
operations – usually these are general warnings to evacuate the area. 
Warnings are usually worded in a threatening way – (“Those who fail to 
comply with the instructions will endanger their lives and the lives of their 
families. Beware.” And so forth.) This raises the question of distinguishing 
between lawful warnings and unlawful threats that are intended to terrorize 
the civilian population.  
Article 51(2) of API prohibits “acts or threats of violence the primary 
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population”.  
The defining element in differentiating between lawful warnings and 
unlawful threats is the intention. Article 51(2)’s prohibition on terrorizing 
civilians refers to threats “the primary purpose of which is to spread terror.” 
Therefore, it does not include genuine warnings, even when worded in a 
frightening way, since their “primary purpose” is to get civilians out of the 
area for their protection and the principal aim of the action is not to cause 
terror. 
 
 
2. Warnings must be effective 
  
In order to achieve the aim of the warnings, warnings must be effective. 
Effectiveness must be viewed in light of its evaluated effect at the time of 
issuance of the warning – based on available information at the time. The 
inherent uncertainty and changing circumstances must be taken into 
account.  
Thus, for example, in some cases there may be uncertainty with regard 
to the manner in which military operations and attacks are going to 
proceed. Accordingly, it is not always clear where the fighting will take 
place, what targets will be attacked and which areas will be safer than 
others. Much depends, of course, on the actions of the enemy forces.  
Timing is also very important. Warnings should be given enough time in 
advance in order to allow civilians to safely evacuate the area or reach 
shelters. The larger the area the more time is required. However, warnings 
shouldn’t be given too early – or civilians might think the threat is over and 
return. An example is the case of the NATO attack on the Belgrade 
television and radio station. Eleven days passed between the warning 
received by Yugoslav authorities and the execution of the attack. By the 
time of the attack, civilian employees, who had emptied the building at an 
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earlier point in time, had returned to the building believing the threat had 
passed. 
The question of timing is also linked to the issue of uncertainty. There is 
a dilemma whether it is preferable to issue warnings sooner, despite the 
vagueness of the situation, or to wait until the situation is clearer. In some 
cases, giving warnings too soon could actually reduce the protection of 
civilians. As an example, civilians are requested to evacuate an area and 
proceed toward a certain location; however, the fighting does not reach the 
places from which they have evacuated or, even worse, reaches the 
destination to which they have been directed.  
So giving a warning too early might be problematic. On the other hand, 
postponing the warning might lead to it being given at a time when it has 
become impossible for civilians to evacuate in an orderly manner. Similar 
dilemmas might exist with regard to the level of specificity of the warnings. 
The content of the warning must be as clear as possible. However, due 
to the uncertainties I have already mentioned, warnings will sometimes be 
vague. There is a dilemma as to when the vagueness becomes such that the 
warning is only confusing the civilians and making things worse and 
should, therefore, be abandoned.  
I mentioned that warnings can be general or specific. There is a question 
regarding the scope of the legal obligation in this regard. In its operations in 
the Gaza Strip, Israel developed a practice of giving specific and precise 
warnings by phone to the inhabitants of a potential target immediately prior 
to the attack. The aim was to enable the civilians to leave before the 
planned attack. In some cases this was followed by firing warning shots 
using small munitions aimed at the roofs of the designated targets. These 
warnings were accompanied by real-time surveillance in order to assess the 
presence of civilians in the designated military target. When I presented 
this practice to colleagues in other militaries they asked me to emphasize 
that this is not a legal requirement since they do not apply or intend to 
apply such a detailed warning system. 
One must bear in mind that in order to give such specific warnings, as 
telephone calls to the inhabitants of houses planned to be attacked, one has 
to have very good and detailed intelligence. It would seem wrong, 
therefore, to deduce from the Israeli practice in Gaza that the various 
methods of providing warnings and their specificity represent an 
implementation of a legal obligation.  
However, I do not think that general warnings are always enough. If 
they are too general to be considered “effective”, then more specific 
warnings are required by law. Relevant factors to determine the required 
level of specificity are, inter alia: timing, modes of issuing the warning, 
objective of the mission, level of control over the area, operational 
considerations, etc. 
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In order to be effective it may sometimes be required to repeat 
warnings, for example, a first general warning to leave the area; a second 
warning prior to the attack to those remaining to take shelter. 
Another question is whether warnings need to include precise 
instructions to civilians, how to act in order to protect themselves? Some 
claim that in order for a warning to civilians to be considered effective, “it 
must clearly explain what they should do to avoid harm and state the 
location to be affected and where the civilians should seek safety.” This 
seems to go much beyond the legal requirements or current State practice. 
The law of armed conflict puts the party subject to attack under the 
responsibility for taking precautions against the effects of the attack. This is 
reflected in Article 58 of Additional Protocol I, which provides, “The 
Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible… take the 
other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual 
civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers 
resulting from military operations.” The purpose of Article 58 is to place on 
the defending party the main responsibility of taking the defensive 
measures necessary to protect its civilians against attacks. The law does not 
impose an obligation on the attacking side to deal with this aspect of the 
safety of civilians of the opposing party. This also comports with practical 
considerations – the attacking party usually does not have adequate 
knowledge of the relevant services and infrastructure to issue detailed 
instructions to the civilians of the opposing party. 
There are various methods of issuing warnings, including by radio and 
television broadcasts; telephone calls; leaflets etc. Legal questions arise 
sometimes with regard to the use of “warning shots” (“knock on the roof”). 
Some have even termed them “a method of attack”. I think that using this 
kind of warning shots is a lawful measure, which can be analogized to 
warning shots used in law enforcement operations. They are a very 
effective tool in getting civilians out of harm’s way and sometimes there 
are no other alternatives. Of course, they must be carried out with care. I do 
not know of any case where this kind of “warning shots” led to civilian 
deaths or even serious injuries. 
 
 
3. Exceptions 
 
According to Article 57(2) (c) of API warning is not required when 
«circumstances do not permit». This exception reflects the understanding 
that sometimes the existing circumstances preclude giving a warning prior 
to attack. 
The clearest exception regards attacks which require surprise in order to 
accomplish the mission. The fact that warnings are not required with regard 
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to surprise attacks was recognized in the earliest articulations of the rules 
addressing warnings already in the 19th century.  
The exception covers cases where the success of the military operation 
is contingent on the element of surprise, such as in instances when the 
target is transportable and might move (such as a person), or be moved 
away (such as military equipment and weapons), if a warning is issued in 
advance. 
The focus of this exception is on the effect giving an advance warning 
will have on the chances of success of the military operation. A question 
may arise whether the exception applies when surprise is essential for the 
success of the operation or whether it also applies when surprise only 
contributes to fulfillment of the mission. There are different formulations in 
military manuals and other sources. I think the appropriate standard is to 
apply the exception if warning would “seriously compromise” the success 
of the attack - the Australian Manual formulation. Another case where 
warning is not required is where warning would compromise the safety of 
the forces. 
As with mission accomplishment, it would seem correct to conclude that 
not every remote risk to forces would justify not giving a warning. 
However, the level of risk to the safety of forces that would justify not 
giving a warning might arguably be less than the level of risk to mission 
accomplishment required in order to refrain from giving a warning. This 
can be exemplified in the wording of the UK Manual dealing with the 
applicability of the exception, which uses the term “crucial” with regard to 
the effect a warning might have on the success of the mission, and the 
much more lenient standard of “be compromised” with regard to safety of 
the forces. 
Warnings may also not be given when one is dealing with time sensitive 
targets or counter fire situations, namely when there is no time to give such 
a warning prior to the attack. Additionally, sometimes there is no practical 
way to issue a warning, for example, due to a lack of means of 
communication. 
 
 
4. Ramification of issuing warnings 
 
It is incontrovertible that following warnings civilians remaining in the 
zone of operation retain their civilian status. Accordingly, civilians not 
heeding warnings to evacuate an area must be taken into account in the 
proportionality analysis.  
Nevertheless, on a practical level, if, following warnings, civilians 
evacuate a given area then most of those remaining are fighting elements. 
This allows the attacker more freedom of action since, as already 
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mentioned, this influences the implementation of the principle of 
proportionality, namely, the balance between the military advantage to be 
gained and the collateral damage anticipated from the attack. 
One interesting point is that sometimes giving a warning might not lead 
to civilians evacuating the area, but rather to civilians gathering on, or in 
proximity to the intended target in order to shield it. This raises 
controversial questions on the issue of voluntary human shields and also 
raises the question whether a commander might refrain from giving a 
warning when it is reasonably believed that such a warning would lead to 
civilians gathering in the planned target and hence would increase the 
danger to civilians instead of mitigating such peril. I will leave these 
questions open. 
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Precautions with regard to indirect fire 
in populated areas 
 
Omari Begoidze 
Ministry of Defence, Tbilisi 
Let me underline that it is not an easy task to elaborate on precautions 
with regard to indirect fire in populated area. Though, if we take a quick 
glance at recent past and current developments, we’ll be able to identify 
major directions and recommendations we all need to focus on. I will talk 
about some measures generally and how we, in the Georgian Armed 
Forces, try to address these issues. 
The Georgian Armed Forces, as an Army of a young State, inherited the 
Soviet Army procedures, which mostly neglected the principles of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Transformation of the Georgian 
Army to western standards resulted in the implementation of IHL 
requirements in doctrines, training and operational planning procedures. 
The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with the ICRC several 
years ago has significantly contributed to this process. 
The security environment of the 21st century remains unstable. In this 
rapidly evolving world, countries face different security challenges 
depending on their geopolitical status. However, the post Cold War era has 
decreased the major conventional warfare threats. The nature of modern 
armed conflicts is more asymmetric and hostilities increasingly take place 
in urban areas. These factors expose the civilian population to high risks. It 
is most worrying that many parties to conflicts, especially non-state actors, 
show no respect for International Humanitarian Law. 
Shift of focus from conventional to unconventional warfare has also 
impacted the approach to development of war fighting functions. Fire 
support, as one of integrated parts of mentioned functions, is defined as the 
use of weapon systems to create specific lethal or non-lethal effects on a 
target. Effective indirect fire inflicts maximum damage to adversary forces, 
avoiding direct contact with them and saving one’s own forces. However, it 
can significantly harm the civilian population and cause collateral damage. 
In order to avoid casualties among the civilian population caused by 
indirect fire, different measures can be taken in consideration. 
First of all, the norms of International Humanitarian Law should be 
translated in clear Rules of Engagement and planning guidance. For 
example, the rule “Use of indirect fire is authorized” should presuppose 
several warnings. In particular, the authorization implies the obligation to 
refrain, to the possible extent, from harming civilians. It includes the 
absolute prohibition to shoot on civilian gatherings, even if there are armed 
122 
elements among them, if they do not pose an immediate danger to life. It 
considers the operational environment, for example, a situation of active 
warfare and danger to troops in an area densely populated with civilians, 
where the combatants do not differentiate themselves from the civilian 
population. Georgian military personnel, including artillerists, are 
periodically briefed about the norms of International Humanitarian Law 
and officers take in consideration those norms during the planning process. 
It is highly important to take all necessary measures during the fire 
support and targeting planning. All military personnel should take 
reasonable precautions to ensure that only military objectives are targeted 
and to ensure that civilian or noncombatant objects are not made the object 
of attack. Under the law of armed conflict, the principle of proportionality 
requires that the anticipated loss of civilian life and damage to civilian 
property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. Commander, 
therefore, are responsible to evaluate and balance mission requirements and 
threat to friendly forces while taking all reasonable steps to minimize 
collateral damage to the greatest extent practicable.  
By ensuring fire is observed when accuracy cannot be guaranteed, the 
most effective use of indirect-fire weapons is attained and collateral 
damages are minimized. Observed fire results in Target Damage 
Assessment (TDA) reports. Use of unobserved fire requires follow-up 
activity to assess effectiveness and to avoid the impact on civilian 
population. In order to mitigate collateral damages from indirect fire, the 
Georgian Armed Forces uses the procedures prescribed in the Doctrine 
“Fire Support and Targeting”. Artillery reconnaissance personnel are 
trained during the national exercises to identify non-combatant objectives 
and estimate collateral damages. Special attention is paid to the training of 
Forward Observers who are responsible for bringing all means of indirect 
fire in support of the Manoeuver Commander. 
Collateral damage may be minimized through many different methods, 
such as choosing an appropriate weapons system, munitions warheads, or 
others. High precision munitions should be used to strike the targets in 
urban areas with no or less impact on civilian population. The role of 
intelligence is dramatically increasing to accurately identify the adversary 
location in populated areas. Non-lethal weapons can be used to achieve 
desirable impact on the enemy. The development of non-lethal weapons has 
recently drawn greater interest due to the restraints imposed on using lethal 
weapons and greater public sensitivity to military and civilian casualties. 
For example, smoke and illumination munitions can be used for indirect 
fire to deceive the enemy. Use of an artillery munitions round as a carrier 
could be possible with ejected cartridges containing various non-lethal 
payloads.  
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Conceptually, the cartridges could contain malodorant pellets for crowd 
control and/or thermobaric or high-power microwave payloads for more 
specialized mission scenarios. Planners should seek fire support options 
that mitigate collateral damage and minimize non-combatant and/or civilian 
casualties, particularly in heavily populated areas. Unfortunately, the 
Georgian Army does not possess these high precision munitions. This 
factor is obviously increasing the risk of collateral damages in the case of 
indirect fire in populated areas.  
One of the important precaution measures is the warning of population 
close to the potential targets for the fire. Different tools of informing the 
population can be used, such as voice signals or printed materials. 
In conclusion, I would like to underline, that despite of development of 
highly sophisticated weapon systems, we still face challenges in protecting 
civilian populations affected by armed conflicts. States and other relevant 
actors should seek to identify practical measures, which may be taken 
before, during and after operations, to reduce and minimise incidental 
civilian harm. Such measures may include particular restrictions on the use 
of indirect fire or other methods or means of warfare in areas where there is 
a risk of incidental harm to civilians. In particular, the use of explosive 
weapons with a wide area effect, such as Multiple Rocket Launchers, 
should be avoided. To be effective, these measures should be properly 
incorporated into the relevant doctrinal documents, rules of engagement 
and planning directives, as well as into the training of relevant personnel. 
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Precautions in attacks and remotely controlled 
weapon systems 
Gabriella Venturini 
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of the International Law Association, Milan; Member IIHL  
 
 
1. Introductory remarks 
 
In this presentation I will focus on precautions in the use of remotely 
controlled weapon systems in armed conflict and in law enforcement 
operations. I will also briefly touch on a few more points that are related to 
precautions in attacks, although not directly implied in the notion. 
There exist several types of remotely controlled weapon systems1 
operating in diverse environments (such as unmanned aerial vehicles, 
unmanned ground vehicles and unmanned water vehicles, either surface or 
underwater), that play significant roles in contemporary armed conflict. 
Among such weapons unmanned combat aerial vehicles, commonly 
referred to as drones, have become prominent leading to heated debates 
over their legal and ethical justifications. I will not repeat the many 
arguments for and against the use of drones in armed conflict. Suffice it to 
mention here that there is a general sense that remotely controlled weapon 
systems are not prohibited by international law, but their use must be 
scrutinized for compatibility as regards ius ad bellum, ius in bello and 
Human Rights Law (HRL). 
 
 
2. Remotely controlled weapon systems and the legal review of new 
weapons 
 
The first point I would like to mention relates to the requirement to 
review the legality of new weapons. A binding obligation for States parties 
to the 1977 Additional Protocol I (API), it arguably applies to all States, as 
                                                     
1 Remotely-controlled weapon systems may be defined as machines operated at a 
distance by humans from which weapons are deployed. They include the physical structure, 
digital network and personnel on the ground and they remain constantly under control of a 
human operator to one degree or another (‘human in the loop’). The intermediary function 
of these machines is also reflected in the expression ‘unmanned (or uninhabited) combat 
vehicles’ (UCVs) that is widely used to describe the platforms from which weapons are 
deployed. 
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a prerequisite for respect of international humanitarian law (IHL), 
particularly the law of weaponry, and is supported by State practice. It 
implies that legal advice is sought not only when a State develops, 
manufactures, buys or otherwise acquires a new weapon or system, but also 
when new weapons-related technology is developed, or existing technology 
is adapted to military uses, or an existing weapon or system is upgraded or 
otherwise changed. It is assumed that all remotely controlled weapons and 
systems must pass legal review before they are deployed. A State, however, 
needs only to determine (ICRC Commentary) «whether the employment of 
a weapon for its normal or expected use would be prohibited», because «A 
State is not required to foresee or analyse all possible misuses of a weapon, 
for almost any weapon can be misused in a way that would be prohibited.». 
The unilateral procedure under Art. 36 API neither requires a State to make 
its findings public nor to share information about new weapons being 
developed or manufactured. 
 
 
3. IHL on precautions in attacks 
 
I will first address the rules applying in International Armed Conflict 
(IAC), then how they reverberate into the law of Non-International Armed 
Conflict (NIAC). 
 
 
3.1. International armed conflict 
 
API distinguishes between precautions “in attacks” (Art. 57) and 
precautions “against the effects” of attacks (Art. 58). The former lie on the 
attacker, the latter must be taken by the defender. These provisions are 
generally recognized to reflect customary International Law applicable in 
IAC and as such they are reformulated in Rules 14 to 24 of the ICRC Study 
on Customary IHL. 
The attacker must take precautions in determining whether the 
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are 
not subject to special protection (such as hors de combat or medical 
personnel) (Article 57.2.a.i). As far as targeted individuals the issue of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH) is brought up. While a discussion 
of DPH is way beyond the scope of this presentation, it is important to 
stress that the decision to use a remotely controlled weapon system to target 
an individual will be made in light of the interpretation of that concept by 
the attacking State. On the other hand, the protection of civilians not 
specifically targeted and of civilian objects takes up the key theme of 
proportionality calculations weighing collateral damage against the 
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anticipated military advantage that was discussed in the preceding session 
of this Round Table. 
The obligation to determinethat the targets are neither civilians nor 
civilian objects (resulting from Art. 57.2.a.i) and to take precautions to 
avoid or to minimize collateral damages (established by Article 57.2.a.ii), 
are limited to what is “feasible”. It has been pointed out that the capacity of 
remotely controlled weapon systems enables more accurate information 
gathering as well as more precise targeting. As a consequence, precautions 
in attacks should achieve greater feasibility and effectively minimise 
collateral damage. Also the obligation to select the objective of attack so as 
to cause the least danger to civilians and civilian objects (Article 57.3) is 
subject to the condition of feasibility, to the extent that it applies only 
«when a choice is possible». Lastly, obligations to give advance warnings 
depend on the factual circumstances of each case. 
“Passive” precautions to protect the civilian population against the 
effects of attacks, that is, to remove civilians and civilian objects from the 
vicinity of military objectives and to avoid locating military objectives 
within or near densely populated areas (Art. 58 API), are also submitted to 
the condition of feasibility.2 
On the contrary, the obligations to refrain from deciding to launch, to 
cancel, or to suspend an attack that may be expected to cause excessive 
collateral damage (set out in Article 57.2.a.ii and 57.2.b), are laid down in 
strong imperative terms. This imposes a heavy burden of responsibility on 
ground operators and commanders or civilian supervisors who order an 
attack using remotely controlled weapon systems. On the one hand, an 
attack that may be expected to cause excessive collateral damage must not 
be launched. On the other hand, as N. Melzer writes, operators ‘must 
constantly re-evaluate the necessity and proportionality of the planned 
attack in light of the evolving circumstances and make the adjustments 
necessary to avoid or minimize the expected infliction of death, injury and 
destruction.’ This includes precautions to avoid attacks against persons, 
hors de combat, or medical personnel engaged in their rescue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 For example, during the 1974/1977 Diplomatic Conference it was made clear that they 
could not restrict the freedom of a State to decide where military facilities should be located 
in its territory. 
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3.2. Non-international armed conflict 
 
The 1977 Additional Protocol II (APII) does not contain provisions on 
precautions in attacks.3 Therefore, we must refer to customary law, where it 
is recognized that the greatest part of the precautionary rules in IAC also 
apply in NIAC. The ICRC Study on Customary IHL, however, considers 
some of them only ‘arguably’ applicable in NIAC. As a matter of fact, in 
asymmetric conflicts the burden of taking precautions in the use of 
remotely controlled weapon systems lies mainly with the government side. 
It is not, however, unlikely that rebel armed forces, insurgents or terrorist 
groups, keep or take control over such systems. This raises the general 
question as to whether armed groups are required to respect IHL in its 
entirety, which will be dealt with in Session VIII of this Round Table. Here 
it is worth insisting that basic IHL obligations (including precautionary 
rules) must be respected by all parties to an armed conflict, be it an IAC or 
a NIAC. Significantly, the Annual Report 2013 of the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) says that civilian casualties 
from remotely operated explosive devices could be minimized based on 
factors such as proper operation of the device and the taking of all feasible 
precautions to avoid civilian loss of life’. The Report also mentions that 
«civilian casualties from offensive UCAV strikes suggest the need for 
further review of pre-engagement considerations and precautionary 
measures by international military forces». 
 
 
3.3. The role of human rights law in armed conflict 
 
In the conduct of hostilities precautions in attacks are governed by IHL 
as lex specialis in relation to HRL. Even during armed conflict, however, 
situations unrelated to the hostilities may occur where arms are used against 
individuals in order to maintain public security, law and order. In these 
cases law enforcement standards apply. 
 
 
4. Precautions in the use of force outside armed conflict 
 
As a matter of policy, presently, UVs are used in civilian affairs in the 
areas of border security, patrolling and inspection, reconnaissance and 
surveying, usually not involving the use of arms. There is, however, a 
tendency of law enforcement agencies towards the use of UVs armed with 
                                                     
3 Nevertheless, some precautions concerning objects have been included in subsequent 
treaty law applicable in NIAC, namely the 2nd Protocol to the Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property. 
128 
non-lethal or even lethal weapons. Therefore, it is advisable to consider 
whether and how force may be used outside armed conflict by law 
enforcement authorities. 
 
 
4.1. Human rights standards in the use of force 
 
Law enforcement rules provide that force may be used only as a last 
resort in order to protect life, when other available means remain 
ineffective or would not make the intended result possible.4 Thus, in law 
enforcement all precautions must be taken to avoid, as far as possible, the 
use of force as such, and not merely incidental civilian death or injury or 
damage to civilian objects; State agents must endeavour, to the greatest 
extent possible, to minimize injury and to respect and preserve human life. 
There is no doubt that any possible use of remotely controlled weapon 
systems for law enforcement purposes within the jurisdiction of a State 
must abide by these standards, as well as by domestic law incorporating 
international legal obligations. 
 
 
4.2. Extraterritorial applicability of human rights obligations 
 
The situation is not different with regard to the use of remotely 
controlled weapons by a State outside armed conflict and beyond the limits 
of its national jurisdiction, as is often the case with drone operations. 
Presently, it is recognized that States must respect the rights of all 
individuals within the authority, power and control of their organs or 
agents. Customary International Law that all States are bound to observe 
indeed prohibits human rights violations such as murder and extrajudicial 
killings. Therefore, in any operation in foreign territory not amounting to 
(or below the threshold of) an armed conflict States must fully abide by the 
law enforcement/human rights standards. Hence the paramount importance 
of legally qualifying the situation as either armed conflict or law 
enforcement (again, a topic that is beyond the scope if this presentation). In 
the former case the precautions in attacks will be those prescribed by 
LOAC, while in the latter enforcement officials must act either in self-
defense or in defense of a third party and use the minimum amount of force 
which is necessary and proportionate to the threat. While remotely 
controlled weapon systems, when appropriately operated, are (at least in 
                                                     
4 Human rights jurisprudence has consistently held that force must pursue a legitimate 
aim, not exceed what is strictly or absolutely necessary to protect life, be proportionate to 
this purpose and strictly interpreted. Non-binding instruments have been further elaborated 
in order to guide the action of law enforcement officials according to these standards. 
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theory) able to comply with precautions in attacks under LOAC, it seems 
questionable whether they can ever conform to the stricter requirements of 
law enforcement. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The increasing use of remotely controlled weapon systems in armed 
conflict, and the tendency to extend their role to domestic and 
extraterritorial law enforcement, calls for more precautions against possible 
misuse of these systems. In this perspective, besides reinforcing effective 
weapons review procedures, the appropriate training of operators 
depending on their functions is essential. This means giving an adequate 
preparation to military personnel and to law enforcement officers, in 
accordance with the different roles they play. 
Equally important is the proper exercise of the responsibility of 
command and the continued supervision of the hierarchical superiors over 
the procedures and requirements of military or law enforcement operations. 
Increased transparency, especially of criteria for targeting in armed conflict, 
may also help to regulate the planning and conduct of all operations 
involving the use of remotely controlled weapon systems. 
Several ex post measures are also needed in order to detect and correct 
errors and abuses and to prevent them occurring in future. Firstly, States 
should record and make publicly available the combatant and civilian 
casualty figures resulting from attacks using remotely controlled weapon 
systems. Then, the conduct of post-operation reviews and investigations as 
appropriate shall promote a balanced assessment of the conduct and ensure 
accountability of State agents. Last, but not least, prosecution of those 
responsible of violations will act as a disincentive against future 
misbehaving, abuses or crimes. 
It hardly needs adding that it seems difficult to require the adoption of 
these measures by non-State armed groups in NIACs. Asymmetry will 
mostly preclude a balanced comparison of the conduct of the parties to a 
NIAC in taking precautions in and against the effects of attacks, as well as 
adopting corrective measures. Nevertheless, the principle of equal 
application of IHL in the context of NIACs drives towards a unitary vision 
of both precautionary and remedial measures, in the interest of individuals 
affected by the effects of armed conflict. 
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casualties and its implementation in practice 
Christopher Penny 
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In this presentation I will give some general comments on the topic of 
the standard of ‘zero expectation’ of civilian casualties, along with its 
implications and its implementation. 
Overall, I will be arguing that this absolute standard is problematic and 
potentially counter-productive, at least to the extent that it goes beyond 
existing requirements of the law of armed conflict with respect to targeting. 
I’ll be blunt: at present, the idea of a zero civilian casualty military 
campaign is a dangerous political fantasy.  
Discussion of the standard is most likely to arise in the context of 
expeditionary warfare, particularly conflicts with little direct national 
security implications, rather than existential conflicts. In particular, you see 
the standard discussed and advocated in the context of humanitarian 
intervention and related humanitarian operations. It tends to look bad if one 
acknowledges having to kill civilians in order to save them. Although you 
do see it arise in other contexts as well, indeed, that is one of my concerns. 
I think it is fair to say it is not yet a legal standard in any context. There 
is a growing political restriction of this nature in many types of conflicts, 
though, for many States.  
Obviously, there is already a legal obligation to mitigate harm to 
civilians not participating directly in hostilities, to the extent feasible in 
light of operational circumstances. My presentation should not at all be 
taken as a criticism of this existing standard. It is an important humanitarian 
core of the law of armed conflict and there can even be legitimate 
arguments to go well beyond it at times. 
However, expecting zero civilian casualties is not necessarily a law of 
armed conflict requirement. Indeed, the regime is premised on this ‘not 
always’ or even ‘not usually’ being feasible. 
 An absolute zero civilian casualty standard goes far beyond the law of 
armed conflict and could, and often would, restrict otherwise lawful 
attacks. That is: it doesn’t matter if the target is a valid military objective, 
that it is contributing to enemy military operations and that its destruction 
would offer an advantage to the attacking force. It doesn’t matter if there 
are no further feasible precautions available to the commander on the 
ground. It doesn’t matter that the casualties would not be excessive in light 
of the projected military gain. If expected civilian casualties cannot be 
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reduced to zero, the attack should not occur. And that is problematic for a 
variety of reasons.  
I think, first, that it masks the current and I believe foreseeable reality of 
war, even in the context of humanitarian intervention. There is nothing 
humanitarian about the conduct of a humanitarian intervention. It is about 
blowing things up and killing people, albeit for a good reason. A zero 
civilian casualty standard may make justifying such interventions easier for 
politicians in some cases, but it is premised on a fantasy that would then 
constrain the potential success of those operations. In some respects, the 
corollary is that they may be less likely to intervene in conflicts where the 
standard is clearly not achievable, even if there is substantial net civilian 
gain that can be reasonably anticipated. 
More generally, it raises unmanageable expectations that may serve to 
undermine domestic and international support for operations if, and 
generally when, they are not achieved and this certainly affects the 
reputation of States, of their militaries and the reputations and psyche of 
individual military personnel. You see this standard contributing to a 
growing trend of reporting and discussing civilian casualties as wrong or 
even criminal. This, I believe, undermines the law and reduces the benefits 
of compliance with the law of armed conflict - one of the only ones 
considered to be complying with the law of armed conflict (it is one of 
many I suppose) - and it leads to a false equivalence of belligerents. 
This, in turn, can contribute to problematic responses for interveners: 
classifying, for example, all fighting-age males in a target area as 
participating in hostilities and therefore lawful targets; or, denying 
casualties or responsibility at all. There are various reasons for those 
actions by attacking States, but much of it is reputational.  
Beyond that, I think there are significant moral hazards that one needs to 
be aware of. Such a standard can encourage deliberate enemy placement of 
potential targets near civilians, or potential placement of civilians near 
targets, thereby insulating key assets and operations. This is always a risk, 
but adoption, particularly public adoption, of a zero civilian casualty 
standard exacerbates and even invites that sort of behaviour. 
Most importantly, one might argue that it may simply shift civilian 
casualties elsewhere when targets are not attacked because of their 
collateral implications. It is important to stress that I am talking here about 
lawful attacks against valid military objectives, where the destruction 
would provide an advantage to the attacking force and where the 
destruction would also reduce the enemy’s capacity to continue operations. 
Failure to address these targets leaves them free to operate. That may, and 
often will, lead to a corresponding increase of the threats to civilians on the 
ground, particularly in humanitarian operations, the very type of operations 
where the standard tends to be advocated.  
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This is nonetheless attractive politically, as the harm and the resulting 
civilian casualties are caused by someone else. That is, the standard shifts 
responsibility for civilian casualties, it does not necessarily reduce actual 
civilian harm. As a result, its principal effect may be to help the intervening 
State - rather than the civilians of the targeted State - who are increasingly 
constraining themselves and being constrained in a way I believe they 
shouldn’t be. 
That said, having advocated against the standard - particularly against a 
public proclamation of such an absolute standard - if that is the direction 
from State Governments, how can that standard be implemented, or at least 
how might one move towards a more effective implementation? In short, I 
would suggest that rather than paying lip service to a problematic concept, 
States should be increasing the feasible precautions available to 
commanders on the ground, thereby, in essence, bringing the law of 
conflict standard itself closer to zero civilian casualties in practice.  
That can be accomplished in a variety of ways: through the use of 
particular weapons or provision of particular weapons (precision-guided 
munitions, concrete bombs, low yield missile strikes) and understanding, 
for example, the mitigation options with respect to all of those as well, 
understanding fragmentation and blast effects of weapons or understanding 
the impact of delayed fusing. But none of those are risk-free options and, 
importantly, none of those are cost-free options and that is a factor that 
needs to be taken into account. Tactics as well; there is a variety that a State 
might consider and commanders might consider. In particular, taking or 
requiring increased risks to personnel - flying lower or from less 
advantageous angles of attack. 
Obviously, all of these need to be considered in the context of initial 
feasible precautionary assessments. However, not all precautions are 
feasible within the meaning of the law of armed conflict, as they must be 
assessed and weighed against other operational requirements. There is a 
range of views here, where the views of a reasonable military commander 
will likely differ from a reasonable humanitarian activist.  
There are other options available, some of which we’ve heard discussed 
already, like warnings or leaflets, although there is a risk here too that those 
may invite the use of human shields as well in some circumstances. 
There a couple of general practical challenges I would like to mention. 
The first is the targeting cycle in operations. Obviously, there are in all 
operations layers of operational review for planned targets and that is 
compounded in many respects in multinational operations. Clearly, 
effective target review is important, but unnecessary delay in that process 
can be extremely problematic. There is a precarious balance between 
timeliness, on the one hand, and thoroughness on the other.  
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In dynamic conflicts, with shifting frontlines fought in civilian areas, 
which is often the case in humanitarian operations, the headquarters and 
staging areas aren’t going to be military bases or even military camps. They 
are going to be civilian - or otherwise civilian - buildings, often schools and 
other public infrastructure. The consequences of a delayed attack as a result 
of an extended targeting cycle can be quite different in that context. A 
military base will still be a military base the next day, but attacking a house 
a day too late is very different. It may not be a military objective at all, and 
it may even have reverted to actual civilian use. 
A related issue as well is the timely removal of targets from target lists 
that have been previously authorised. Obviously, there is a responsibility at 
the time of the attack to ensure the continued viability as a military 
objective, but removal from a list - that is timely, regular review of target 
lists - can avoid some problems in that area as well. 
A more significant factor I would like to flag is accurate, 
comprehensive, timely intelligence. A zero civilian casualty campaign 
requires extraordinarily detailed information, in particular the establishment 
of a pattern of life in target areas. That may not be feasible within the 
meaning of the law of armed conflict, that is, in light of competing 
operational circumstances. For example, it may require long-term, hours-
long deployment of limited intelligence resources like unmanned aerial 
vehicles. Even if that is possible, it may come at a significant operational 
cost from taking those assets away from other elements of the operation. As 
a result, providing adequate intelligence capacity at the outset and 
throughout operations becomes an essential pre-requisite for anything close 
to a zero civilian casualty campaign.  
It is a state and organisational responsibility not to engage in operations 
without sufficient intelligence assets if they are going to be advocating a 
zero civilian casualty campaign, and I would suggest this in all 
circumstances. That would include unmanned aerial vehicles, satellites, 
Special Forces or others on the ground providing targeting assistance - 
particularly unmanned aerial vehicles, as they are able to remain on target 
long-term and develop patterns of life.  
There are few States with military assets capable of consistent zero 
civilian casualty attacks, although it is these States that are generally the 
ones that would be proponents of the standard, not as a legal standard per 
se but as a moral standard perhaps. There are fewer States even then with 
sufficient military intelligence resources to support those activities: the 
United States and most others are a distant second. This is a particular 
problem with multinational operations that one needs to be aware of, where 
various States are providing various capacities and the missions are cobbled 
together in a sense. But it is also an issue for all States supporting this 
134 
standard. It requires investment and it requires resource commitment to 
specific operations. 
In conclusion, I would flag that, obviously, I think this is a problematic 
standard, but if States are going to support it, it does require both 
possession and dedication of sufficient resources, particularly intelligence 
resources, at which point it begins to fit well within the existing law of 
armed conflict framework. Otherwise, States do themselves, their 
militaries, their citizens, the citizens of the targeted State and the law of 
armed conflict itself an incredible disservice by pretending that war is 
something that it’s not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. Capture or kill? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
137 
Does a least harmful means rule govern 
the use of force under IHL?1 
Ryan Goodman 
“Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law”, 
New York University School of Law 
To motivate the discussion, I would start first with the classical 
statement by Jean Pictet, which is in some sense the focal point around 
which debate upon this subject gravitates. Jean Pictet published in 1985, 
and even earlier if one looks at the dissertation he wrote as a grad student, 
these remarks: «if we can put a soldier out of action by capturing him we 
should not wound him, if we can obtain the same result by wounding him, 
we must not kill him, if there are two means to achieve the same military 
advantage we must choose the one which causes the lesser evil». So that, in 
a sense, embodies the “least restrictive means” test and is applied to the kill 
or capture debate. Another way to motivate the discussion is to just 
highlight two hypothetical scenarios. I actually present a number of 
hypothetical scenarios at the beginning of the article that I published, but let 
me just use two of them here. First is an example in which it is not a 
question of any military advantage, there is no military disadvantage to 
capture versus killing, so the example is a person down a well.  
After clearing a town, a platoon of soldiers discovers that an enemy 
fighter has tried to hide down a well, where he is now sitting at the bottom. 
He is armed with a handgun, but has no provisions and no rope to get 
himself out. The platoon is not pressed for time. However, it does not try to 
wait to coax him out. Instead, the commanding officer instructs his soldiers 
to drop three grenades down the well.  
The second hypothetical scenario is one in which it is actually militarily 
advantageous to capture rather than kill, and I think this is a good thought 
experiment to try to understand whether or not there is actually a kill or 
capture rule in the law of armed conflict. So a scenario in which it is 
actually military advantageous to capture, here is the scenario that I tried to 
utilise to motivate this. 
High-level civilian leaders and military commanders meet to plan a kill 
or capture operation that will take place in a few weeks time. They 
conclude that it will be more militarily feasible to capture the target than to 
kill him. That is, from a military standpoint, the attempt to capture is 
superior to the attempt to kill. They decide, however, to try to kill the 
individual. Their decisions is due to information from their Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs that holding the individual in captivity would harm 
diplomatic relations, and it would be better to present the death of the 
individual as a ‘fait accompli’ to the international community. 
The question is whether or not the law of armed conflict prohibits the 
decision to kill versus capture in those scenarios. I think there are three 
alternative paths to get to the conclusion that the law of armed conflict in 
fact does have a regulatory rule that would regulate that practice or prohibit 
that practice. The three ways are, first, the ICRC’s interpretative guidance 
section nine, which uses the principles of necessity and humanity and then 
arrives to the idea that there are such things as restraints on the use of force 
that would apply in these kinds of scenarios. I go a different route. There 
are two other routes, one is the hors de combat rule, so where you define an 
individual is no longer participating in the conflict might already get to the 
same result. In those two scenarios you could potentially say that the person 
down the well is an hors de combat, and therefore reaches the same result 
as if the rule had been “you have to capture them rather than kill them”. 
The second scenario is not an hors de combat scenario. So the first way to 
get there is the ICRC’s interpretative guidance section nine, the second is 
hors de combat and the third is superfluous injury and unnecessary 
suffering, an actual textual hook in Additional Protocol of 1977.  
Let me say a few words about hors de combat, there is also a part in 
which I write that as well in the law review article. So the argument they 
were trying to analyse, I think, in this panel is whether or not there is a least 
restrictive means test. One thing to consider is that the hors de combat rule 
might actually end up in the exact same result. So, for operational purposes, 
for a military, it also means that a person can’t be killed but rather he has to 
be captured if defined as an hors de combat. The idea here is that the text of 
the Additional Protocol article 41 does in fact encapsulate a pretty broad 
scope for hors de combat. I’ve actually been, to use the term, flabbergasted 
to read some treatises and books that say that they are only two ways to 
meet the hors de combat test: one if an individual surrenders and two if 
they are wounded or sick. The plain text of article 41 says that there is a 
third category which is if the person is “in the power of an adverse party”. 
Then we have to determine what to be “in the power of an adverse party” 
means . The deep travaux and the ICRC commentaries I believe suggest 
that it would apply, in many instances, to the very same text that the ICRC 
uses in section nine, which is if the person is rendered defenceless or 
incapable of resistance. So, just to give you a flavour of the deep travaux, in 
1970, the Secretary General of the United Nations issued a report which 
called for the development of new law which ended up being the 1977 
Protocol. The Secretary General’s report read: «It should be prohibited to 
kill or harm a combatant who has obviously laid down his arms or who has 
obviously no longer any weapons, without need for any expression of 
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surrender on his part. Only such force as is strictly necessary in the 
circumstances to capture him should be applied». The 1973 ICRC draft 
protocol, which serves the base line for the treaty discussions in Geneva 
also included that as a category of hors de combat, and included an 
individual who «no longer has any means of defence». The ICRC’s 
commentary, if you look inside article 41, also suggests that individuals 
who are defenceless or incapable of resistance should be considered hors de 
combat. The commentary, just by way of example, says that this category 
includes «cases [in which] land forces might have the adversary at their 
mercy by means of overwhelmingly superior firing power to the point 
where they can force the adversary to cease combat». That commentary 
also says that «a defenceless adversary is hors de combat whether or not he 
has laid down arms». The leading treatise on Protocol I by Bothe, Partsch 
and Solf says the same thing, and in fact says that it was part of customary 
law, not just the Protocol. There are three implications to that type of 
analysis: first, as I have already suggested, it gets you to the very same 
point as Pictet’s least restrictive means test; second, it means that, for 
questions of administrability, it is already a part of the rules that militaries 
should be applying; and third, it says something about how we try to 
interpret subsequent State practice, and I only mean subsequent State 
practice for the purpose of interpreting the treaty, I don’t mean subsequent 
State practice as an element of customary international law. In that, States 
have in fact trained their forces up to that standard. By way of example, the 
U.S. Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations in 1970 said 
that «combatants cease to be subject to attack when they have individually 
laid down their arms to surrender» and then, the important part, «when they 
are no longer capable of resistance or when the unit in which they are 
serving or embarked has surrendered or has been captured». Michael 
Schmitt, in his reply to my piece, actually says that he changes his opinion 
on the basis of that analysis, which is remarkable. I need my evidence to 
evidence that, so the quote from Michael is: «on reflection on Professor 
Goodman’s analysis regarding the prohibition on attacking those who are 
hors de combat has caused me to refine my position by re-examining that 
concept», which is an unusual move as I mention in my rejoinder to his 
reply, just once again demonstrates his power of intellect and his honesty 
when he approaches the subject. The other important implication is that 
Michael also says in his piece, and I agree with him, that his understanding 
of the approach, and my understanding, «reaches the same result in most 
cases». So, in other words, it reaches the same result in most cases, and that 
is also the same result that, I would submit, is reached if you apply Pictet’s 
least restrictive means test. 
Just to say a few words then about the least restrictive means test 
through Pictet. A couple of caveats. First, I do recognise there is a 
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weakness in the argument. Michael also mentions, that there is no 
equivalent explicit textual provision for the least restrictive means test, that 
just has to be admitted. Article 57 of the Additional Protocol, for example, 
is a very explicit text that looks like a least restrictive means for civilians. 
The question is, where is it in the Protocol for combatants? Another 
weakness is State practice. The question is whether there is any explicit 
State practice training troops up to the question of a least restrictive means 
test in particular, not just an hors de combat test, and I recognise that in the 
article and in our discussions. That said, I do believe that there is in the 
Treaty of the Additional Protocol under article 35 the prohibition on 
“methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering”. My contention is that superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering includes manifestly excessive force, in other words, unnecessary 
force to subdue an individual the purpose for which the use of force must 
be to remove them from the battlefield. So, if the person is down the well, 
and they can be removed from the battle just as easily by capture versus 
killing, the rule applies. If a person could be captured or killed and it is 
actually militarily advantageous to capture him, then the law of armed 
conflict would say ‘actually, that is not a void, or lacuna, really there is a 
law that does apply’. The way in which I get to that analysis is something 
that surprised me. The deeper I went into the travaux and then the 
negotiating history, the more evidence I found supporting this. Not only did 
Pictet say it, but (and I’ll just highlight a few of these), it was actually said 
in the 1973 meeting in Geneva, in which the majority of the participants 
were Governmental officials, the meeting was called by an 
intergovernmental meeting, and the final report from the 1973 Geneva. The 
meeting served as the base line for intergovernmental meetings, in fact, 
Hans Blix refers to the document as a “confirmation an endorsement of the 
existing law”. 
A couple of things before I read the quote from the Geneva report, and 
there are other quotes just like this in the negotiating history of the 1970s. I 
want to say something about one of the strongest critics of the ICRC’s 
report. One of the strongest critics of the ICRC’s report is Hay Parks’ deep 
analysis of section nine. But Hay misattributes a quote to Pictet which was 
actually not said by Pictet in 1974 at Lucerne, but instead was said by the 
group as a whole in 1973, and I’m not sure Pictet was present at the 
meeting. So it was said by a group of a majority of Governmental experts. 
Here is the quote: 
«What suffering must be deemed “unnecessary” or what injury must be 
deemed ‘superfluous’ is not easy to define. The concepts discussed must be 
taken to cover at any rate all weapons that do not offer greater military 
advantages than other available weapons while causing greater suffering. 
This interpretation is in line with the philosophy that if a combatant can be 
141 
put out of action by taking him prisoner, he should not be injured; if he can 
be put out of action by injury, he should not be killed; and if he can be put 
out of action by light injury, grave injury should be avoided». 
There are multiple other instances of this. Just to give another example, 
the ICRC’s 1971 Report which was submitted to the intergovernmental 
meeting negotiating the text for the protocol also said: 
«[R]ecourse to force must never be an end in itself. It will consist in 
employing the constraint necessary to obtain that result. Any violence 
reaching beyond this aim would prove useless and cruel. The principle of 
humanity enjoins that capture is to be preferred to wounding, and wounding 
to killing; that the wounding should be effectuated in the least serious 
manner». 
Then, what took place at Lucerne? At Lucerne, just to give by way of 
example, several of the experts that had participated in 1973 also 
participated in 1974 at Lucerne. As everybody mentioned, the background 
documents that were prepared for them by 1973 were thought as the base 
line and confirming existing law. The Australian delegation referred very 
favourably to Jean Pictet. At one point they said they wanted to make «[a]n 
attempt to do Dr. Pictet’s idea maximum justice while at the same time 
putting it in its proper perspective ... suggesting a formulation which 
closely followed the idea expressed by Dr Pictet». Again, the Australian 
ambassador seemed to suggest that Dr. Pictet’s analysis had received a 
majority or consensus of opinion, at least an emerging consensus. Frederick 
Blakeney, the ambassador, said that any formulation of this idea «obviously 
needs to be looked at in respect of the enemy as an individual, and as a 
group. There already seems a wide measure of agreement that as few as 
possible should be killed, no more than necessary should be wounded and 
those lightly rather gravely». 
In conclusion, I just want to say that one can also look to the ICRC’s 
commentary. In the article that I wrote about this, which is obviously a 
much longer analysis, I look at the commentary both on article 35 itself, 
which seems to have a very supportive language, and I also look at the 
ICRC’s commentary in a bunch of other articles that are related in kind, 
like the denial of quarter or the definition of hors de combat, which also 
seemed to suggest that there is this kind of least restrictive means test. I 
didn’t mention those in my remarks here because they are much more 
easily accessible, while the materials I have discussed here are not. 
Lastly, there is the “Geoff Corn et al.” critique of my position. It is 
several pages long, I think it might be over a hundred, I’m not sure, so it is 
hard for me to summarise it and they certainly disagree with my view. Just 
to say a couple of points of agreement, they say that the purpose for the use 
of force must be the prompt submission of an enemy and lethal force as a 
first resort. I accept that. In fact, I articulate other ways which would shift 
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the burden of proof so that you’d have to prove that the force was 
unnecessary, and manifestly unnecessary in a particular circumstance. And 
second, something that I think shouldn’t be last in this debate, “Geoff Corn 
et al.” agreed with a least restrictive means test as applied to DPH. So, their 
argument is that the Pictet rule should not apply to members of armed 
forces. But, as far as I can tell, it is a major concession on their part in 
which they say «it does apply to civilians who directly participate in 
hostilities». Their argument against my position, just to foreground it, is 
that it is hard to administer as an operational matter and as a policy matter. 
I think their test is a bifurcated test, and even harder. I’ll leave it at that and 
look forward to your comments and questions. 
 
143 
Capture rather than kill in armed conflict 
as a matter of policy: when, why and how?1 
Darren Stewart 
Chief of Staff, Directorate of Army Legal Services, 
Ministry of Defence, London; Member IIHL 
I am appearing here in my personal capacity and the views that I express 
are those of my own and do not reflect either Her Majesty’s Government or 
the views of the Armed Forces. Having said that, I will refer to policy 
documents that the United Kingdom has and which are in the public 
domain. 
When I was asked to speak on this particular topic and, in essence, the 
component of which I was given was capture rather than kill in armed 
conflict as a matter of policy, when, why and how; my initial thought was 
‘well, that is not so difficult’. When? As often as possible. Why? Because it 
is a good idea. And how? With the minimum amount of damage to one’s 
own forces. But, of course, as the good Professor Goodman has just 
articulated, perhaps it isn’t quite so lineal in analysis in terms of 
considering all of the issues associated with the capture or kill debate. I was 
drawn to the particular word that is in the topic I was given, and that is the 
question of policy and whether or not as a matter of policy the emphasis 
has now turned to an obligation or an encouragement, an imperative, 
whichever adjective or adverb you want to use to describe it, in terms of 
capturing as opposed to kill. Now, in addressing that, I think it is important 
for me to say from the outset that there is considerable debate, as Professor 
Goodman has articulated, in relation to the law. And, in that sense, I have 
to say I have a different view as to the position of the law that Professor 
Goodman has just outlined. I will touch upon that briefly, but, given that 
I’m looking more at the question of the use of that tactic in terms of 
capturing or emphasis in terms of military operations of capturing during 
operations as a matter of policy, I will only simply say that I am 
unconvinced by Professor Goodman’s argument and on the three grounds. 
Whilst I accept that by applying, should we say the more ‘black letter’ rules 
articulated within international humanitarian law (IHL), within the text, as 
opposed to his reference to the travaux and the ICRC’s interpretative 
guidance. It is the case that, from a practitioner’s perspective, it is hard to 
see how there is State practice that would in fact support the contentions 
Professor Goodman is saying as a unilateral rule. Certainly, it is the case, 
and I will articulate that in a moment, that nations will prefer to capture as 
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opposed to kill in operations for a number of very good reasons I’ll touch 
upon in a moment. However, to say that is the primary rule that one has to 
apply in all circumstances, and with implications in terms of resources and 
acceptance of casualties or risk to casualties in his own forces, I don’t 
accept that that has evolved as a rule to the level that Professor Goodman is 
articulating. I am also actually quite sceptical as to whether it constitutes a 
binding policy requirement either. And the reason I say that is because, in 
many respects, when nations provide guidelines and rules to its armed 
forces, the broad rules, and I refer here for example to the joint Defence 
publication the United Kingdom has produced on captured personnel (this 
document is available on the internet so, if you go to our search engine and 
dial in United Kingdom captured persons and JDP 1-10 you’ll get a copy of 
that couple of megabytes-long document), even that document which deals 
with the treatment and handling of captured personnel, there is absolutely 
no way it says that you must capture as opposed to kill when it comes to a 
decision in relation to military operations. It deals more with the benefits 
that are derived from capturing, and the very detailed rules in terms of how 
you actually handle captured personnel, but it doesn’t conceive that 
particular point. And if the rule that Professor Goodman was suggesting has 
developed in such a way, then, clearly, that would be one of the very first 
documents that certainly my country would turn to and update in order to 
be able to say “this is the way ahead in the future”. So, as a consequence, I 
am unconvinced in relation to that first reason why it is not necessarily 
reflective of policy. Secondly, I would also say it is not necessarily a 
binding policy principle, in that you would be required to give effect to that 
sort of a rule.  
From a practitioner’s perspective, to use commander’s directions and 
orders to say to forces on the ground that in all circumstances you have to 
capture or make every effort to capture an enemy or a combatant first 
before you could then possibly kill them and that is simply impracticable, it 
doesn’t reflect the realities on the ground and it would also be incredibly 
difficult to control from a commander’s perspective, because he is not there 
standing over the shoulder of every soldier to say “yes or no”, this is a 
situation where you have to capture first’ and the activities the soldier has 
to go through in order to achieve that. So, the practical delivery of that sort 
of a policy rule is as problematic as if you were to say it is as a matter of 
law. That is not to say that we don’t do so. In fact, as I have indicated, as a 
matter of good military practice, there are a number of very good reasons 
why we would seek to capture combatants, and I’ll turn specifically to 
those in a moment. What I would say is that, at the moment, I am 
unconvinced that it is certainly a requirement as a matter of law, and I’m 
also very wary to use the phrase that as a matter of policy you would 
always carry out that activity, for the reasons I’ve just mentioned. 
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I was actually going to exclude the question of hors de combat from the 
comments I was making because I was going to argue that in fact it is very 
straightforward that, indeed, wounded soldiers in the battlefields or a 
soldier who is incapacitated or a prisoner of war are clearly circumstances 
where the law requires you to capture them. I’ve listened with interest to 
Professor Goodman’s arguments in relation to the possibility of interpreting 
the phrase “in the power of the opposing force” as a means by seeking to 
conduct limitations in respect of what seemed to me, and I may have 
misunderstood the argument, to be an analysis of the capability of those 
individuals and their ability to influence or harm your military operation as 
a nexus to say “well, they are within your power because whatever they 
could do is frankly not going to affect your wider mission which, in 
essence, you’ve won in those circumstances and therefore you should use 
every single means possible as a matter of law to capture them”. I’m not 
convinced, again from a practical perspective, that it is as easy as that to 
find those circumstances. I note your example in relation to the soldier 
down the well, and I would think in those circumstances that there would 
be some significant difficulties defending a course of conduct which 
resulted in throwing a couple of grenades down that well in circumstances 
where the individual was clearly not engaging your own forces. I think in 
those circumstances, without having to rely upon an obligation under the 
law to capture them, that there are other ways that those circumstances 
could have come about probably with the capture but without having to use 
lethal force and without that obligation to capture under those 
circumstances. 
I’ll turn very briefly then to the three questions I have been posed. The 
first one is when should capture rather than kill as a matter of policy be a 
preferred course. And here there are obviously two types of armed 
conflicts, one can consider that you may have a requirement or that there 
may be circumstances where you would look at capture as opposed to kill: 
international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. Some 
might say that it is quite straightforward in an international armed conflict 
in that the normal conduct of military activity is such that it is certainly the 
case that combat operations will produce the use of lethal force and that the 
completion of that or at some stages through that individuals will be found 
to be hors de combat either through incapacitation, injury or wound or 
alternatively by being made prisoners of war. In those circumstances one 
would argue that the identities of the individuals are clearly known, it’s 
easier to distinguish between civilians and the opposing forces you are 
fighting in an international armed conflict and therefore the ability to target 
combatants and accept surrender, in circumstances where it is offered, are 
more straightforward. But, of course, it is certainly the case that even in 
conventional international armed conflicts you will have circumstances 
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which will arise where individuals may be captured as a by-product of 
military operations. For example, the case where a patrol comes across 
enemy soldiers, surprises them and captures and seizes them in those 
circumstances. The question of course is whether or not there is an 
obligation on them to capture those enemy forces in those circumstances 
before considering options including the use of lethal force towards them. 
In a non-international armed conflict, it is perhaps a little less straight 
forward, although I wouldn’t say that non-international armed conflict is 
less straightforward as a broader principle than international armed conflict, 
they are both very complex environments under the current construct of 
military operations. But, in terms of the identification of combatants, then 
clearly here a greater effort needs to be placed on the question of being able 
to identify those individuals as combatants. In that sense, targeted detention 
operations are more likely to be a more common course of operations in a 
non-international armed conflict than in an international armed conflict. Of 
course, there are occasions in international armed conflicts where one 
might wish to capture an enemy’s commander and send off a number of 
brave men, Special Forces, to facilitate that particular objective, examples 
of that have been seen in previous conflicts. But more likely during a non-
international armed conflict you would take much greater care in the 
conduct of targeted detention operations, hence the word “targeted”, in 
order to be able to go through the process necessary to identify individuals 
as combatants and therefore people you’d wish to capture. But even in 
those circumstances one can anticipate that a very carefully planned 
operation may go awry at some juncture and as a result of that, whether it 
be lost or lack of the element of surprise or any other circumstances, 
civilians happening upon a particular location which were not expected. It 
may result then in the requirement to use lethal force between combatants 
which would result in the death of combatants on either side. In those 
circumstances I would argue that it may well be the case that at some point 
during a targeted detention operation a decision is made to “go hot” as the 
operators might say and engage in a combat operation. 
I have already alluded to the question “why”, and I think probably the 
best exposition as to why we engage in capturing or seeking to capture an 
enemy as opposed to killing them is articulated in the UK’s policy 
concerning captured personnel. And I read briefly from paragraph 104 of 
that document, it says that «during international armed conflicts, the taking 
of prisoners of war brings many practical advantages; it reduces the 
enemy’s strength and fighting capacity; lowers the enemy’s morale; and 
may constrain the tactics of enemy commanders. Similarly, capture may 
bring advantages such as the stabilisation of the situation on the ground and 
the enhancement of force protection. Captured personnel may also provide 
an important potential source of intelligence, and when specifically 
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authorised, UK forces will engage in the exploitation of that intelligence, 
including questioning of captured personnel». So, in many respects, there 
are a number of good reasons why armed forces would seek to capture their 
opposing forces. Those reasons I have just articulated, and also, when one 
thinks of the wider construct of an operation, commanders and their 
political masters are very much aware of public attention that is paid to the 
levels of loss, not only civilians, but also military personnel, involved in 
operations. To conduct oneself as a military commander without any regard 
to casualty levels, including casualty levels on the opposing side as we saw 
during the First Gulf War with the high rate of death from Kuwait back into 
Iraq in the amount of attention which was paid to that particular event, and 
I make absolutely no suggestion there that that operation or aspects of that 
operation in relation to the engagement of those Iraqi convoys were in any 
way unlawful. But it is certainly something that fits into the minds of 
commanders now in terms of the overall campaign they are conducting and 
the objectives they are seeking to achieve. 
That leaves me then to the question of how, briefly. First and foremost, 
as I have just indicated, commanders would consider the aspect of 
operations which lead to the capture of the enemy as part of the general 
operational design. Indeed, within our doctrine, we require commanders to 
do so, and the joint doctrine publication on captured personnel of the 
United Kingdom actually requires in chapter six commanders to consider 
and take into account the aspects of operations which result in the capture 
of individuals into their broad operational planning. And, as a result of that, 
you’ll find that commanders will therefore have regard specifically to the 
guidelines, the mission commands, they will give to their soldiers with 
respect to how they may give effect to a desire to reduce casualties, 
certainly civilian casualties, casualties inside their own forces and perhaps, 
in some limited circumstances, the casualties of the opposing forces. This is 
certainly the case in a non-international armed conflict, for example, 
Afghanistan at the moment where, when one considers what the ultimate 
objective and outcome of the particular conflict is, and that is the return to 
normality in Governance within Afghanistan, one has to have regard to the 
impact of operations that would kill large numbers of insurgents might have 
on future reconciliation requirements in order to achieve that within that 
particular environment. Commanders will factor this into their operations 
and give guidance to their subordinates in relation to that. One of the 
examples we have seen in relation to that is the example that General 
McChrystal provided in Afghanistan during his tenure there as the 
commander, when the phrase ‘courageous restraint’ came to the fore, where 
forces were required as a matter of command, or direction or orders from 
the commander to accept greater risk in order to reduce the levels of 
civilian casualties, although, interestingly, it didn’t, in General 
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McChrystal’s articulation, extend to reducing the level of casualties to the 
enemy forces. Of course, for the reasons I have just mentioned, it was 
certainly desirable in a NIAC context to try and keep even those to the 
minimum possible, in order to achieve the longer-term goal. 
I simply conclude by saying that the construct of capture or kill is one 
which brings about a number of pejorative connotations associated with 
military’s desire to use an unlimited level of force in an almost capricious 
manner. And that is just simply not the case. The levels of control that are 
placed on armed forces nowadays by both the commanders and also the 
political masters and wider public expectations are such that, to suggest that 
is a gratuitous exercise in killing, is absolutely far from the truth, certainly 
from western NATO armies, and I would suggest many other armies 
around the world as well. In some senses, this seems to taint very much the 
debate relating to whether or not there is a legal obligation to capture 
instead of using lethal force otherwise within a combat environment. As a 
practitioner, I find this a concerning development and I pose the question: if 
you were to introduce that sort of a rule, presumably with the objective of 
minimising harm to civilians and introducing, or reinforcing I should say, 
the principle of humanity that exists under IHL, what are the second and 
third order effects that you anticipate will flow from that? How would you 
see that being implemented? Because from where I sit as an advisor to 
commanders, I struggle to see how I can give that detailed effect in its 
manner. 
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Can human rights requirements limit the right 
to use force against legitimate targets 
under IHL? 
Françoise Hampson 
Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Essex; Member IIHL 
As the one dealing with Human Rights Law, it is obviously my task to 
sow the seed of discord into the harmony and complete agreement of those 
addressing International Humanitarian Law (IHL). I have interpreted the 
title ‘can human rights requirements limit the right to use force against 
legitimate targets under IHL?’ as giving rise to two separate questions: the 
second is about detention, the first is not. 
The first area where Human Rights Law requirements may give rise to 
challenges is where you are relying on status-based targeting. Let me 
explain what I mean by status-based targeting. Human Rights Law is 
comfortable with targeting based on the behaviour of the individual at the 
time they are targeted. But when the armed forces rely on an ability to 
target people by virtue of the group of which they are a member, 
irrespective of their behaviour at the time they were targeted, that’s what I 
mean by status-based targeting. In so far as it exists under IHL that could 
pose a challenge in relation to Human Rights Law. 
The second issue is very much the one of this panel. Given that Human 
Rights Law is preoccupied with the right to life, does this mean that Human 
Rights Law would seek to impose an obligation to detain rather than kill 
where the opportunity arises, or even an obligation to injure rather than 
kill? 
In order to say anything at all in the time limits of this presentation, I am 
going to have to make a range of assumptions. They vary in the confidence 
with which I make them. I am completely confident about the first 
assumption, for which there is overwhelming evidence in State practice, 
judicial decisions, etc. That is that there are situations in which both Human 
Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law are applicable. The second 
assumption is one that I think is not as safe as the first, but I think it is 
certainly a reasonable assumption. The case law hasn’t quite got there but 
it’s where it is heading. It is the issue of the scope of extraterritorial 
applicability of Human Rights Law. It is clearly settled in the case law that 
Human Rights Law applies in occupation, although what the meaning of 
occupation is under Human Rights Law is not clear. It is also clear that it 
applies to anybody you are detaining but in a broader context, for example 
the conduct of military operations, it is not as yet clear but it looks as 
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though human rights bodies will end up saying that wherever a State agent 
acting outside national territory does something or doesn’t do it, then the 
individual foreseeably affected is within the jurisdiction. That doesn’t mean 
there is a violation, it simply means it is an issue that a human rights 
tribunal can address. A completely separate question is the scope of that 
jurisdiction, how much do you have to do, and it is very clearly not going to 
be the same as in peacetime within national territory. So the question isn’t 
whether there is extraterritorial applicability, but rather what is the scope of 
extraterritorial applicability. The third assumption concerns the relationship 
between human rights and IHL, and here, let me make it clear from the 
start, this is very tentative: of course I am assuming throughout this 
presentation that IHL is applicable. If a State claims that it is applicable, 
when as a matter of law it isn’t, then the situation will fall to be judged 
solely by the law and order paradigm and human rights law. So I am 
assuming IHL is applicable. But sorting out how human rights bodies are 
going to operationalize the relationship is a bit more confusing. I think 
there will be situations in which human rights bodies indicate that there is 
only a violation of Human Rights Law if there is a violation of IHL. I think 
that is how we will operationalize the concept of lex specialis. In other 
cases where IHL is applicable, I think human rights bodies will apply a 
mixture of Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law, as the 
ICJ indicated might happen, that might be termed ‘human rights light’, 
which is likely to be anathema to human rights activists. I think it is likely 
to dilute the way in which ordinary Human Rights Law would apply, but it 
won’t be a straightforward application of IHL. 
I think that distinction between only a violation of Human Rights Law if 
it is a violation of IHL and the mixture is not going to be a straightforward 
one. I think that, in practice, most of the activities in an IAC will be 
covered by the ‘only a violation if it is a violation of IHL’. Not everything, 
because, as Professor Venturini said earlier this morning, even in situations 
of international armed conflict, some of what happens is not in fact part of 
the hostilities or combat operations. In Non-International Armed Conflicts, 
I don’t think that human rights bodies will necessarily say that there is no 
case where there is only a violation of Human Rights Law if there is a 
violation of IHL. I think at the top end, in high-intensity Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, when dealing with combat operations or hostilities, not 
dealing with other issues, I think they might well say there is only a 
violation of Human Rights Law if there is a violation of IHL. In other 
situations, I think it will be a mixture. 
One area where I didn’t even make an assumption, because I am 
completely unclear as to how human rights bodies will react, is how they 
will reach this conclusion. There are some significant procedural issues that 
arise regarding how they get there. One possibility would be their deciding 
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that, because IHL is applicable, proprio motu they can consider its impact 
and relevance. The alternative is that they are going to require a State in 
front of them to invoke it and that, if the State doesn’t invoke it, they might 
say ‘we are entitled to assume you want to be judged by a higher standard’, 
if they are assuming that human rights standard is higher than IHL. Another 
practical query is whether they are going to require a State to derogate in 
order to be able to invoke IHL. I can’t answer those questions. I think I 
know where they will end up, but I’m not very sure how they are going to 
get there. 
It is important at this stage to remember certain key features of Human 
Rights Law that are different from the way in which IHL works. First of all, 
most of IHL is addressed to the mind of the commander at the time the 
action is being taken, particularly that part of IHL that deals with means 
and methods. Human rights bodies, for the most part, are determining 
whether a violation of Human Rights Law has occurred after the event. 
They are conscious of the fact that they are doing it after the event, with the 
benefit of hindsight. Decisions of human rights bodies are very context-
specific, that can’t be emphasised enough. Whilst it was clear from the 
earlier presentation in the first panel this morning that even IHL is very 
context-specific, it is very difficult to predict simply by coming up with the 
legal formula what the result of a case will be in a human rights body, 
particularly in this kind of area. It is going to depend on all the 
circumstances as they are put before the human rights body. One feature 
that certainly at first sight is very different from IHL is that there are two 
dividing lines: there is a minimum threshold below which you can never 
justify going, but if in these particular circumstances it was practically 
possible, not theoretically possible, but if it was practically possible to do 
more, you would be required to do more. And that second threshold is a 
legal threshold, not a policy threshold. There are analogies here with IHL. 
You not only have the legal requirement not to breach the principle of 
proportionality, you actually have an additional legal requirement to 
minimise civilian casualties. I have always been puzzled at that provision in 
API, it looks like a human rights provision. In addition, you are used to 
using two thresholds, even if they are not both legal. You are used to what 
the law would allow and further restrictions imposed by the ROE. So the 
sense of there being two dividing lines shouldn’t be completely novel, but it 
is important to remember that that is how a human rights body is actually 
handling something. Human Rights Law is not going to say what the rule 
is, for example as to whether you detain or kill, or whether you can use 
status-based targeting, they won’t address it like that. The point about 
Human Rights Law is actually not that it is a whole load of rules, it’s a way 
of reasoning, it’s a way of analysing situations. So, at the end of the day, 
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Human Rights Law will answer those questions, but you won’t find it 
contained in a treaty. 
The first of my two questions, ‘can human rights requirements limit the 
right to use force against legitimate targets under IHL?’ raises the question 
of status-based killings. The starting point of human rights bodies is the 
prohibition of arbitrary killing, even though it is formulated differently in 
the European Convention. That assumes the minimum use of force, which 
is a law and order paradigm, unless that assumption is displaced. It can be 
displaced by the situation. There is case law where they have applied that 
principle with some flexibility, notably the Isayeva case against Russia 
regarding the targeting of a convoy, but it could also be displaced by the 
applicability of IHL. Applying what I suggest would be the way in which 
they would approach the interrelationship, in international armed conflicts, 
when considering hostilities, and I don’t mean all military operations, I 
think it is likely to be the case that the human rights body would only find a 
violation of Human Rights Law if there is a violation of IHL. That does 
assume they can get the answer to the question ‘is there a violation of 
IHL?’. That assumes there will be agreement. That assumes there is no 
dispute over direct participation in hostilities (DPH) etc. So one of the 
messages I think the prospect of litigation before human rights bodies 
carries for the IHL community is ‘get your act together’. If you don’t 
actually know what the IHL rule is, you can hardly blame a human rights 
court for saying ‘well, if they can’t agree we’ll apply our rule’. I think one 
of the lessons for this conference is that of course we focus on areas of 
disagreement, but let’s remember we actually agree about approximately 95 
per cent of the issues under IHL, and, in some fora, that needs to be the 
message that’s got across, because it is going to affect the attitude of human 
rights bodies. Where you are not dealing with hostilities, but it’s an 
International Armed Conflict, I think they are more likely to apply human 
rights light. That is to say: not accepting status-based targeting, expecting 
there to be something about the behaviour of the individual that justifies the 
targeting. In other words, it looks like actual DPH. But don’t try and use 
DPH before a human rights body, because I think their way of reasoning is 
going to be different. The key issue for them will be the nature of the threat. 
In high-intensity Non-International Armed Conflicts, or at least where 
hostilities break out in a particular place at a particular time (it doesn’t need 
to be permanent), I think they would apply the same test but possibly with a 
slightly stricter test for what constitutes hostilities. In the case of Common 
Article 3, Non-International Armed Conflicts, I think there is no way that a 
human rights body will say there is only a violation of Human Rights Law 
if there is a violation of IHL, because in many situations where many 
people would have argued that Common Article 3 was applicable but where 
the State didn’t, they have applied Human Rights Law with flexibility. So it 
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is not standard Human Rights Law. Just look at the case of Isayeva if you 
want an example. But that would preclude status-based targeting. 
What about the second example, the obligation to detain? Again, where 
you are dealing with hostilities in an International Armed Conflict or high-
intensity Non-International Armed Conflict, I think they will say whether 
you are entitled to start out with the assumption of killing depends on the 
content of IHL. There will only be a violation of Human Rights Law if 
there is a violation of IHL and, as we have just seen, there is complete 
‘agreement’ as to the content of IHL. I think there may be a formula. I am 
not certain that Prof. Goodman and Col. Stewart could agree to this, but let 
me just try: there may be a formula which, if it could be adopted might be 
helpful. Col. Stewart is nervous about something being a legal obligation to 
detain and I think part of the reason for that is that if you send people out 
with that mission then their starting point is not going to be the use of force. 
Provided Col. Stewart can swallow something being legal and not policy, 
would it be acceptable to say “no obligation to detain unless”? And would 
Prof. Goodman be prepared to accept not “an obligation to detain unless” 
but “no obligation to detain unless”? Because if it were possible to frame 
something in those terms, I think we might be able to get something that the 
human rights community or the human rights courts can then use in order to 
determine in what circumstances there is no requirement to attempt to 
detain. My own view is that there is no legal requirement to attempt to 
detain, but wherever in the circumstances detention is feasible, then there 
may be a legal requirement, but the starting point is not the obligation to 
detain. 
In all other situations, away from hostilities in an International Armed 
Conflict, away from hostilities in a high-intensity Non-International Armed 
Conflict and in all Common Article 3 situations, I think human rights 
bodies are going to be of the view that the starting point is that there is an 
obligation to attempt to detain. They will understand that very readily the 
situation may change and you may need to use lethal force, but their 
starting point in that second set I’m convinced will be an obligation to 
attempt to detain, not an obligation to detain. 
As a word of warning, these conclusions are dependent on certain 
elements. I am of course assuming that human rights bodies will 
operationalize the relationship between Human Rights Law and IHL in the 
way I have suggested. I am also assuming, and this I am much more 
nervous about, those human rights bodies, when interpreting and applying 
IHL, will do it in an IHL kind of way. Many of you must have encountered 
human rights types who think are talking IHL but it’s human rights with a 
funny accent. It is really important that human rights courts, if they are only 
finding a violation if there is a violation of IHL, actually do IHL in an IHL 
way. And they are going to need assistance with that. Personally, I regret 
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the fact that when the European Court of Human Rights earlier this year 
invited States to comment on the relationship between Human Rights Law 
and IHL in the context of Georgia v Russia (II), as far as I am aware, no 
State has taken up the invitation to submit a third party intervention. 
Certainly, the ones I know about haven’t, I do not have a comprehensive 
response about all other States. It also assumes respondent States will plead 
the cases properly, and I come from a State that appears to be incapable of 
pleading human rights cases sensibly because they refuse, at the national 
level, to adopt a concept as to how to operationalize the relationship 
between Human Rights Law and IHL. They want to be free to fight each 
case on its own, which means they have no coherent view of the issue. For 
example, in Al-Jedda, they didn’t use IHL except in the context of the 
Security Council resolution. Even in Hassan, if you listen carefully with the 
sound turned up to the oral hearing, you can hear sotto voce «oh, by the 
way, there is IHL». Domestically, they are getting better about invoking 
IHL, but these cases do need to be pleaded properly, and that also means 
not claiming human rights bodies don’t have jurisdiction when they do 
have it. I think one’s got to recognise legal issues that you may need to win 
and, most of the time, you can get what you want by relying on the facts. If 
you show something wasn’t feasible, human rights bodies are not going to 
require you to deliver it. So how the cases are handled is going to be 
absolutely vital, and this may not be a problem in other jurisdictions, but in 
the UK it does mean actually allowing the military lawyers to have some 
input into the defence cases, not leaving it to civilian lawyers. 
Cases to keep an eye on Jaloud v. The Netherlands, may be the first one 
out. I don’t think that is going to say anything new, it is basically a sort of 
Al-Skeini number two. Hassan, on the face of it, should be a very clear win 
on the facts, but there is reason to believe the European Court of Human 
Rights may use that as laying the foundation for explaining its view of the 
relationship between human rights and IHL, because I think they are trying 
to create a precedent before they have to address the issue in Georgia v 
Russia (II). The parties in Georgia v Russia (II) have been told they have 
got until the beginning of October to comment on one another’s 
submissions, so possibly by the second half of 2015 there may be a 
decision from the Grand Chamber. The case has got everything: it’s got an 
IAC, it’s got what’s a NIAC unless you can show the relationship between 
the Russian forces and the South Ossetian forces meant it was an IAC, 
which raises the question of what the test is. It’s got protection of civilians, 
it’s got targeting, it’s got forced displacement, it’s got protection of civilian 
property. That is the sexiest case out there and Strasbourg has been left 
having to deal with it on its own, apart from a third party intervention by 
the Human Rights Centre of the University of Essex. 
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The feasibility to take precautions against 
the effects of attacks in urban warfare 
Juan Carlos Gómez Ramírez 
Colombian Air Force, Bogotá 
I will address the applicability of International Humanitarian Law 
offensively by the State. I consider this a useful tool to protect the 
population and to bring security to our population. I will start with a short 
video that shows the reality and how the enemy behaves, still today in 
Colombia. The Guerrilla is attacking a town using non-conventional arms 
that we call gas cylinders as a tool to launch rockets without precision. This 
is a video that we caught to the Guerrilla recently. It is exactly the topic that 
we will talk about, but this is the only part I will show in relation to the 
illegal groups, I want to talk from the side of the State. These are Guerrilla 
members inside a civilian house that they destroyed before, and they are 
using this house to launch another attack. 
I think, as a practitioner, that it is absolutely possible to perform an 
offensive operation under IHL in urban areas and that those attacks are 
legal and legitimate. But, in order to do that, you have to take into account 
some points. First, intelligence. We have heard here that intelligence is very 
important, and I can assure you that it is the most important thing to have, 
both human intelligence and technical intelligence. Advance technology 
plays a key role and something that is happening in Colombia is the 
interaction, the interoperability among the Military Forces. We work 
together with the Army, the Navy and the Air Force and we coordinate the 
operations with the Police and also with other agencies of the State very 
well which is very important. There are a few inevitable considerations that 
we have to take into account. One, the legal aspect. You have to analyse, 
before any military action, if you are in the area of International 
Humanitarian Law. And you get this information by analysing objectively 
the features to use force offensively like, for example, the line of command, 
the level of violence and certain territorial control. Something that is very 
important for us in Colombia, and I know that maybe some scholars here 
will disagree with me, but in the case of Colombia is very important: the 
political will, the Government’s guidance. Even if we have the legal 
possibility to use International Humanitarian Law offensively, even if the 
conditions on the terrain allow me to use International Humanitarian Law; 
if the Government does not allow me to use these rules, I can’t, as a State, 
use these tools. We use in Colombia this consideration, that is from General 
Rupert Smith, and I think most of you have read his book, where he says 
that today’s wars take place in the middle of the population and the State 
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and the enemy are fighting among the population and all of them want to 
gain the favour of the population. So the position here is that we do not 
want the ‘bad guys’, we don’t want these illegal groups, but if the State and 
the Security Forces while trying to neutralise this enemy, or terrorists, 
however you want to call it, they commit too many mistakes, for sure, you 
will have the population against the State and against the Military Forces 
and the police. And I can say that collateral damage is less and less 
acceptable and accepted in the case of Colombia. We face a very difficult 
situation. Colombia is a State of social right with more or less strong 
institutions, so we apply human rights, but also, because of the hostilities 
and the illegal armed groups, we apply International Humanitarian Law. 
But today these guys are in the middle. Sometimes they are on the side of 
International Humanitarian Law, sometimes they are on the human rights 
side. I want to show these pictures because they reflect what is happening 
in Colombia. On the right you see a policeman, like the two here, and if 
you look at them, they look like soldiers, and look at the soldiers, on the 
other side, patrolling neighbourhoods in Colombia. The reason why this is 
happening is because, in our Constitution, the Police and the Military 
Forces have the mission to protect and to bring security to the whole 
population. So it is our responsibility, as militaries, to take care of what is 
happening also in the streets of Colombia. This is not literal, but almost. In 
2002, in almost 50 per cent of Colombia, we were applying International 
Humanitarian Law, because the war was that large. But, today, the situation 
is this one: we apply International Humanitarian Law not in the whole 
country, but just in some places, but if the enemy moves to another place, 
we can go there and apply International Humanitarian Law without any 
problem. This is the reality, this is the map today. On the left side, we have 
the Guerrillas, this is the place where they still are. In the centre, we have 
the ‘bacrims’ or criminal bands. And, on the right, there’s common 
criminality. As you can see, they share the same spot, so we have to take 
care where we apply International Humanitarian Law and where we apply 
human rights, and this is how it works. I want to emphasise this because it 
is very important for me to tell you that, in Colombia, Military Forces and 
the Police act in law enforcement operations and in hostility operations. To 
do that, we have to take into account these three important aspects: the 
operational, that is very important; as well as the legal and the third, which 
is not less important, the political. In order to do that, we apply our Rules of 
Engagement and they have been very useful. So soldiers know pretty well 
when they are involved in a law enforcement operation and they know the 
only possibility for them to use force in that kind of operations is in self-
defence. If they are involved in International Humanitarian Law operations, 
hostilities, they can use force offensively. 
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This is a short video which shows what is happening right now in 
Colombia. In this video, there is a military operation against a criminal 
band, so the Rule of Engagement for them is to apply human rights. You 
can see what the soldiers do. It takes place in the jungle under heavy rain. 
They found various rifles, one of them with a telescopic sight, and a 
motorcycle. Twenty minutes later, the soldiers found a wounded member of 
the criminal band who surrendered, and the soldier read him his rights. At 
the beginning, that was unbelievable for us, but because of the real situation 
for our soldiers and our policemen, we are doing this right now. As I told 
you at the beginning, Colombia is a State of social rights, so right now we 
have got 1500 soldiers and policemen under criminal investigation due to 
the possible commission of war crimes or human rights violations. Right 
now we have 600 military members who have been sentenced to 20-60 
years of prison because of these kinds of situations. That is why for us it is 
very important to be clear on what environment we are involved in.  
We apply this analysis that I want to share with you. In our intelligence, 
in our documents, we put exactly this. When we perform any operation the 
commander already has in his operation, in his papers, the military 
necessity, what his military necessity is, how this military necessity is 
related to his mission, what the military objective will be, and he has to 
think in advance about the possible military advantage of attacking this 
military objective. And to attack the military objective is not always the 
best decision. I want to share with you a situation that happened to me a 
few years ago. I was going back to my home, driving my car in the middle 
of a traffic jam and I received a phone call. I answered the phone and it was 
a General who said ‘Colonel Gómez, this is General Pérez, I am in the 
middle of a military operation and I need your legal advice’, so I said ‘yes, 
Sir, what can I do for you?’. He also said ‘I am in the command and control 
centre and I’m taking this conversation’. So I said ‘ok, Sir, what is the 
situation?’. And he explained to me that in El Cauca, a place of Colombia, 
the Guerrilla was launching an attack with cylinders in the middle of the 
houses, wearing civilian clothes, and they were placed in front of a house 
that had a white flag. The pilot who could see this from an AC-47 plane 
informed the General that he could neutralise the military objective. The 
General wanted to know if he could allow him to shoot. I asked him several 
questions, among them I asked him if he had the possibility to consolidate 
the place after the military operation, after neutralising the military 
objective. The General said ‘no, I can’t because it is very dangerous, the 
troop can’t arrive because the Guerrilla has mined the place, so I think I 
have to wait until tomorrow’. So at that moment I thought: ‘Sir, if you can’t 
do that, for sure, they will remove the non-conventional arms and then you 
will have two civilians killed in front of a house that has a white flag, and 
then you will be in trouble’. He answered: ‘ok, then what is your advice?’. 
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So I told him: ‘Sir, I think that if that pilot is recording that, please call that 
pilot to land and call for a press conference and show this to the Colombian 
population’. And that is exactly what he did, and I will show a little bit 
about that. I knew at that time that the plane that was flying over the place 
had machine guns, and that those machine guns were not precise weapons, 
but saturation weapons. So, to hit the target, you have to shoot many times 
and then you will be targeting the centre of your military objective. Imagine 
using this plane in this place with houses. That was the decision we made 
that day and I want to share with you that if we have ten military objectives 
we attack no more than four, and the reason why is trying to avoid 
collateral damage, because it is very costly for us to have collateral 
damage, in all senses. 
What can the State do? I think legal advisors are a key solution for this. 
I heard that in the United States they have 1600, we don’t have that many, 
but we have almost 200 and they are very important to us. The after-action 
review, and I want here to acknowledge the ICRC, each year we perform 
more than ten workshops with them talking about after-action reviews and 
they are very good, and we know that there is no unique solution. There is 
the need to take many actions by many State and society actors. Right now, 
the criminals or the terrorists or insurgents, call them however you want, 
have little to lose. They move from one side to another, they apply the 
balloon effect, so if you attack them here, they will move to another place, 
they do not have the right to territory to defend right now, they survive in 
the middle of the population and use them and, as a State, I think that it is 
not possible to negotiate with them, you can only confront, weaken and 
prosecute them. 
Last remarks, I think that, being a State, legitimacy is the centre of 
gravity. Intelligence, as I told you at the beginning, is a key factor to avoid 
negative effects of the military attack. And, in the case of Colombia, joint, 
coordinated and interagency operations have been very important to 
improve the effectiveness. If I can reduce to two questions the advice to a 
commander, I would use these two questions: first, “Sir, will this operation 
improve or worsen the current situation on the ground?” and, depending on 
his answer, he will make the decision; and second, and this is a bit 
sarcastic, but it is true too, “does this attack end the world?”, because it 
could injure or end your career, it could put you in jail, it could end the life 
of many people, and cause many other problems. 
I want to end by saying that the State has the responsibility to protect its 
population, and that is the responsibility of the Military Forces and the 
Police in the case of Colombia. We have to keep the monopoly of force and 
we have the responsibility to keep security. But, the problem that I am 
seeing, and this is something I want to share with the scholars and all legal 
advisors present here, is that you have to balance between rights and 
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obligations. I do not know what will happen in the future if we do not do 
that, it would be a chaos because we need the rule of law. This is very 
important. And coming back to the question of this panel, I think 
International Humantarian Law is effective and legitimate in certain violent 
conditions. And I will end with this phrase, I think it is possible to use 
International Humanitarian Law offensively. It is legal and legitimate, but 
not at any cost. If there are abuses or excesses somebody has to pay for 
them. 
162 
When locating military objectives within 
populated areas becomes using human shields 
Robin Geiss 
Professor of International Law and Security, School of Law, 
University of Glasgow 
In this presentation I will pursue the question: When does the location of 
military objectives within populated areas become a (prohibited) use of 
human shields?  
Human shielding is not a new battlefield phenomenon, it was prevalent 
in the American civil war as well as in the Franco-Prussian war, it was 
relatively widespread in World War II, but as we are all aware, and you just 
need to turn on the news and think of recent hostilities in Gaza, it is 
tragically prevalent in contemporary warfare, and Gaza certainly is just one 
example. Human shielding occurs across the board of armed conflicts, in 
both international and non-international armed conflicts. We had examples 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia, to name just a few situations. In 
particular, human shielding appears to be an endemic feature of asymmetric 
armed conflicts. It seems to be, unfortunately, an almost “logical” strategy 
for a militarily inferior enemy to try to stave off attacks from a superior 
party to an armed conflict.  
Human shielding is particularly problematic obviously because it 
endangers and puts at risk civilians. It is also problematic because it 
turns on its head the very rationale of the humanitarian legal order 
because it uses humanitarian legal protection in order to achieve a 
military goal. The United Nations Security Council has therefore 
repeatedly condemned human shielding as a blatant violation of 
international law. And it is beyond any controversy that human 
shielding is prohibited in all types of armed conflicts under treaty law 
and under customary international law. It is less clear however, what 
precisely human shielding entails. When does the (often unavoidable) 
collocation of military and civilian “things”, turn into prohibited human 
shielding? More importantly still, what are the legal consequences if one 
party decides to unlawfully engage in this practice? The greatest 
challenges in this regard arise in the scenario the organizers have asked 
me to focus on, i.e. when military objects are located within a civilian 
environment (as opposed to civilians being moved towards a military 
installation). This is particularly the scenario I will focus on today, and I 
will do so in two steps. 
First of all, I argue that human shielding is a particular form of 
prohibited collocation. Collocation (of civilian and military objects and 
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persons) is a regular and often unavoidable occurrence of any armed 
conflict. As a consequence, not all forms of collocation are unlawful. 
Therefore, I would like to start out by exploring what international 
humanitarian law (IHL) has to say on collocation generally. Which forms 
of collocation are permissible, which are prohibited and when – at the 
extreme end of this spectrum – does collocation amount to the war crime of 
human shielding?  
In a second step, I consider the legal consequences that human shielding 
brings about. After all, human shielding is just a label. What really matters 
is whether and if so how, this practice affects the obligations of the attacker 
and the (legal) protection of the civilian population. Who, at the end of the 
day bears the risk of this unlawful practice?  
In my presentation I will be broadly distinguishing two scenarios. 
Type A scenarios are those in which civilians are being moved into the 
vicinity of military objectives. Conversely, type B scenarios are 
situations in which military equipment is brought into a civilian 
environment. From a purely legal perspective, there is no significant 
distinction between the two scenarios. Obviously, the practice at issue in 
either scenario can amount to prohibited human shielding. The point 
however is how do you prove that human shielding has in fact occurred? 
In the B type scenario it will typically be far more difficult to establish 
the facts to prove that this is indeed a situation of prohibited human 
shielding. This is problematic because, as you are of course all aware, in 
the course of an armed conflict some form of collocation between 
military and civilian objects is at times simply inevitable. The laws of 
armed conflict take this battlefield reality into account. Accordingly, 
there is no absolute prohibition regarding the collocation of military 
equipment and personnel with civilian equipment and personnel. Rather, 
IHL imposes some important legal constraints when it comes to 
different forms of collocation. Thus, Article 58 of Additional Protocol I 
as well as the corresponding customary law provision tells us that 
parties to an armed conflict must avoid locating military objectives 
within or near densely populated areas. Article 58 also tells us that 
civilian persons are to be removed from the vicinity of military 
objectives. But there are of course some important caveats and 
exceptions to these stipulations. You only have to do this to the extent 
that it is feasible. You only have to do this in a densely populated area, 
i.e. not just a populated area, but a densely populated area. And you 
only have to do this if the persons in question are under your control. 
Obviously, you do not need a lawyer to tell you that if you are under an 
obligation to endeavour to do something to the extent feasible there are 
many ways how you could argue your way out of this obligation. These 
various exceptions are perhaps deplorable, but they do reflect a 
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(perceived) need for flexibility that States are not ready to give up in 
battlefield scenarios. Civilian and military objects cannot be kept 
separate at all times. This reality creates a grey zone and is the reason 
why proving that human shielding has indeed occurred will often be 
difficult.  
The only absolute prohibition that we find, and when I say absolute I 
mean a prohibition that allows for no exception whatsoever, applies to the 
practice of locating military objects in the vicinity of civilian installations 
with the specific intent to shield these military objects against attack. 
Specific intent to shield, in my opinion and in the opinion of most writers, 
is the distinguishing criterion that separates absolutely prohibited human 
shielding (that is also sanctioned as a war crime) from other forms of 
collocation that may or may not be illegal. That brings us to the crux of the 
matter: how do we, in a battlefield situation, infer the specific intent to 
shield? How do we establish on the basis of the facts on the ground that 
collocation occurred with the specific intent to shield? Of course, in some 
instances inferring specific intent circumstantially will be a straightforward 
matter. If civilians are visibly and forcibly moved towards a military base, 
establishing specific intent to shield should be quite easy, especially if there 
simply is no other explanation for a certain movement of civilians other 
than the intention to use their presence to stave off an attack. For example, 
if one hundred civilians have been moved into the dessert to surround an 
ammunition depot, at least prima facie there simply is no other plausible 
explanation as to why civilians should be there other than an intention to 
shield. I believe this is a situation in which specific intent could be inferred 
circumstantially. Unsurprisingly, it is exactly these (A-type) scenarios that 
are typically discussed in military manuals, that are condemned by the 
Security Council and that have been the subject of international criminal 
proceedings. 
The B-type scenario, the one at issue here, in which military equipment 
is brought into a civilian environment, has received much less attention. 
What makes these scenarios so problematic to deal with in practice, is that 
military equipment may be found in a civilian neighbourhood for an x 
number of reasons. The mere fact that it is there does not provide us with 
sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer a specific intent to shield. There 
may have been a compelling reason why military equipment was moved 
into a civilian neighbourhood. Maybe the only water source within two 
hundred miles is located in the village and the military intended to use that 
source. 
In light of these evidentiary problems, the requirements for what 
amounts to a specific intent to shield should not be set too high. An 
intention to render a military object (legally) immune from attack is not 
required. An intention to discourage (i.e. without necessarily intending to 
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render the target immune in a legal sense) an attack by increasing the 
civilian costs is sufficient to meet the requirements of specific intent. 
Moreover, outside a criminal court it is not necessary to establish specific 
intent to shield beyond any reasonable doubt. Rather, clear and 
convincing evidence of this specific intention will suffice to prove that a 
party to an armed conflict has engaged in the prohibited practice of 
human shielding. 
In summing up my first step, I would argue that from a legal perspective 
it does not make any difference whether we are dealing with an A-type or a 
B-type scenario. However, factually it will often be much more difficult to 
establish and prove specific intent in B-type scenarios. That being said, one 
could think of circumstances where it might be possible to infer a specific 
intent to shield circumstantially even in B-type scenarios. For example, and 
obviously Gaza is the elephant in the room in this regard, if you find that 
hostilities are occurring in a densely populated area, and then that military 
equipment is being moved closer to those areas that are most densely 
populated, or military equipment is being moved in the proximity of a 
civilian installation where you know that the negative publicity of a future 
attack would be the highest, then it might be possible to infer specific intent 
to shield from these particular circumstances. Clearly, this is a case-by-case 
assessment.  
Let me now turn to my second point: What are the legal consequences if 
human shielding occurs? When we speak of legal consequences, we should 
distinguish different layers: legal consequences for the party engaging in 
human shielding, legal consequences for the individual ordering human 
shielding, legal consequences for the other side, and most importantly, legal 
consequences for the civilians involved. The party to an armed conflict that 
engages in human shielding will be violating international law. The 
individual commander may be committing a war crime. In an international 
armed conflict this violation of LOAC rules may allow the other party to 
engage in belligerent reprisals but only under very narrow constraints and 
under no circumstances against protected persons.  
Much more important, however, is the question regarding the legal 
consequences for the attacker if the other side engages in prohibited 
human shielding. Obviously, the legal consequences for the attacker go 
hand in hand with the legal consequences for the civilian population. If 
the obligations of the attacker were somehow mitigated, the legal 
protection of the civilian population would likewise be diminished. This 
question really is the crux of the matter here. Treaty law is silent in this 
regard. Personally, I do not believe that the practice of human shielding in 
and of itself has any direct impact on the attacker’s obligations. To the 
contrary, article 51 paragraph 8, tells us that the protections of the civilian 
population are not to be lowered because one side is violating its LOAC 
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obligations. So the mere fact that one party to the conflict is “utilising” 
human shields does not change anything for the attacker. However, there 
is, and this is well-known to the experts in the room, a more indirect way 
in which the attacker’s obligations could be affected, namely if we shift 
our focus from the party that is utilizing human shields to the individual 
civilians involved in this practice. Indeed, if the civilians who are 
engaging in human shielding are thereby directly participating in the 
hostilities they would (temporarily) be losing their protection from attack. 
In this context it is somewhat confusing if human shielding is per se 
equated with such a loss of protection from direct attack because what 
matters from a legal perspective is merely whether the activity amounts to 
a direct participation in hostilities. There is widespread agreement that 
shielding activities can, in principle, amount to direct participation in 
hostilities leading to a loss of protection. The devil, as always, is in the 
details. It is highly controversial under which particular conditions 
shielding activities would amount to a direct participation in hostilities. 
This is a well-known debate to most of the lawyers in the room and I do 
not intend to rehash it once again. Just briefly, there is one position, not 
uncontroversial but widespread, that distinguishes whether human 
shielding is occurring voluntarily or involuntarily. It is argued that if there 
is a voluntary engagement in shielding activities such voluntary 
engagement leads to a loss of protection. While this is a defendable 
position under the law as it stands, I believe that it is too sweeping and 
impracticable under battlefield conditions since the distinction hinges 
exclusively on a mental element (voluntary/involuntary human shielding) 
that would need to be established individually for each and every of the 
civilians involved.  
Moreover, in the B-type scenario that I am considering here today, 
my hesitations regarding the distinction between voluntary/involuntary 
human shielding are brought to the floor. Because, if we consider the 
situation in which military equipment is moved into a civilian 
neighbourhood, quite frankly, I believe that under these circumstances 
the voluntary/involuntary distinction cannot be of any practical 
relevance whatsoever. Civilian protection will remain fully intact in this 
situation, irrespective of whether the (in any case passive) civilian 
involvement is to be qualified as voluntary or involuntary. First of all, 
the civilian population may not even be aware of the fact that military 
equipment is being moved into the neighbourhood. And even if the 
civilian population in the vicinity knows, what could they possibly do 
about it? They may be passively tolerating this activity and they may 
refuse to leave their homes but they are under no obligation to leave 
their homes. It seems inconceivable that such a passive activity could 
ever be equated with a direct participation in hostilities leading to a loss 
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of (legal) protection. Even in the absurd and entirely unlikely scenario 
that someone would step out on his balcony and say «I welcome the 
arrival of weapons in my neighbourhood», thereby voluntarily endorsing 
the presence of military equipment in a civilian area, this would not 
reach the threshold of a direct participation in hostilities. Therefore, in a 
B-type scenario it does not matter whether civilian involvement is 
voluntary or involuntary. Civilian (legal) protections remain fully intact. 
 
VIII. Conduct of hostilities 
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Challenges faced by non-state armed groups 
as regards the respect of the law governing 
the conduct of hostilities 
Marco Sassòli 
Professor of International Law, University of Geneva; Member IIHL 
Discussing armed groups is similar to discussing armed conflict in 
general: one does not need to be in favour of armed groups – or in favour of 
war – to recognize their existence and hence the need to deal with the 
ensuing humanitarian challenges, in order to meet them with legal rules and 
mechanisms. Following Professor Dinstein’s presentation, we will be 
discussing the other side of the coin: the various problems faced by non-
State armed groups when it comes to their respect for international 
humanitarian law (IHL) on the conduct of hostilities. As is the case for 
States, this discussion must equally be had regardless of the groups’ 
willingness to respect IHL: understanding the challenges is necessary 
before engaging with them and an attempt to engage with them must be 
made even when we have legitimate doubts over whether they are actually 
willing to respect the rules. Engagement based on realistic rules may be the 
starting point for a minimum of willingness to respect rules. Finally, one 
should keep in mind that while most of the problems mentioned here are 
genuine ones, some others are not; but because they are often invoked by 
armed groups, they are included in this presentation.  
 
 
1. General problems 
 
The first problem – and one of the most important ones when it comes 
to the willingness to respect IHL – is that non-State armed groups often 
regard IHL as a set of rules made by others and, more specifically, by 
States that often interpret them liberally in their favour. As a consequence, 
the groups will usually see such rules as irrelevant or not binding on them. 
This is reinforced by the perceived double standards in some rules, the best 
example of which being the legal framework protecting children during 
armed conflict and, in particular, the age below which children cannot be 
recruited into armed forces. Most armed groups know that the rule 
applicable to them differs from that applicable to States. Such a manifest 
discrepancy does not increase the group’s willingness to respect the law. 
In addition, compliance is also limited by the frequent lack of 
knowledge and training. Even when the rules are known, non-State armed 
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groups feel that respecting IHL has no advantage for them. Their conduct 
remains illegal under domestic law; they are considered criminals, if not 
terrorists. In that sense, a first step for States to encourage respect of IHL 
by their enemies would be to refrain from calling attacks terrorist when 
they are directed at a military objective or combatants. 
Another challenge faced by non-State armed groups, and in particular 
by those willing to respect IHL, is lack of command and control. While an 
efficient command and control structure is essential for the respect of IHL, 
it is often the first aim of States to destroy that of an armed group (and this 
is not contrary to IHL). At any rate, illegality generally leads to the 
compartmentalization of the group’s structure into small cells, rendering 
the individual fighter much more independent than a soldier in regular 
armed forces would be. A fighter in an illegal armed group often does not 
even know who the commander of his or her command is, or what the 
overall plan is. 
Their technological inferiority is also a factor: they either have limited, 
old or self-made technology, or when they possess more sophisticated 
technology, they do not have the capacity to use it responsibly.  
When it comes to the law itself and its adaptation to non-State armed 
groups, several problems must be mentioned. First, while the IHL 
applicable to Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) was developed for 
situations similar to that of the Spanish Civil War, today’s non-State armed 
groups do not always aim to control territory. This can of course never be 
seen as an argument to disregard common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions in all NIACs, even when an armed group does not control 
territory. However, it makes the principle that the only legitimate aim of 
warfare is to weaken the military potential of the adversary appear to be 
beside the point. Several contemporary non-State armed groups will never 
have the military capacity to defeat the States they are fighting against, 
inter alia because of efficient measures of force protection on the opposing 
side. In addition, weakening the military potential of the enemy may 
sometimes not even be the aim of the group; or rather, they may have a 
wide variety of end goals, such as hindering the State’s construction of a 
dam in the area where the population they are defending lives. Finally, the 
rules of IHL have been made neither by nor for armed groups, and this fact 
is worsened by the tendency to draw analogies between NIACs and the IHL 
of International Armed Conflict (IAC), in particular through alleged 
customary rules. This trend voluntarily ignores that the IHL of IAC was 
made for States and cannot necessarily be applied in the same way by 
armed groups. 
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2. Specific problems raised by IHL on the conduct of hostilities 
 
In addition to the general problems mentioned above, non-State armed 
groups also face problems specific to the rules governing the conduct of 
hostilities.  
The first question is how to define legitimate targets for their attacks. 
With respect to persons who may be attacked, the ICRC developed and 
published its approach in its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities,1 but this Guidance does not answer all 
operational questions and it remains subject to controversy. An important 
issue for every armed group is the status of police forces. In IAC, they are 
considered civilians, while in NIAC they are usually involved, as law 
enforcement officials, in the search for and arrest of armed group members: 
in that sense, the rule cannot be the same in NIACs, because it must be 
legitimate (from an IHL point of view) to attack those who try to arrest its 
members. A similar challenge arises when we consider government 
officials: just as States often consider the political leadership of armed 
groups as legitimate targets without making the distinction between them 
and the armed wing, armed groups tend to reciprocate and to consider that 
government officials are always legitimate targets. As this is obviously not 
the case, IHL is perceived as protecting “kings” but not “pawns”. 
Furthermore, what about those who finance the conflict, or those who 
collaborate with the government, e.g. by providing information? In law, 
they are not legitimate targets, but many groups consider it more legitimate 
to attack them than simple government soldiers. How should we respond to 
the claim made by armed groups that civilians have to defend themselves if 
governmental forces attack them? Where do we draw the line between self-
defence and direct participation in hostilities? May an armed group train 
civilians in self-defence and even form self-defence groups, without 
making their members legitimate targets? Ultimately, the principle of 
distinction will be the first victim. 
IHL also protects those who are hors-de-combat, who shall no longer be 
seen as legitimate targets. But how can an armed group realistically accept 
the surrender and intern a government soldier? This is not only a factual 
problem but also a legal one: such captured soldiers will generally be 
referred to as hostages – and the taking of hostages is a war crime – leaving 
armed groups with no alternative but to kill their prisoners, which is 
evidently also a war crime. 
As for objects which may be attacked, the notion of military objective 
poses similar questions. The concept of “military” itself is often lacking in 
                                                     
1 ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
(Geneva: ICRC, 2009), 85 p. 
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the strategies of non-State armed groups: they often proceed with 
destructions out of political – rather than military – necessity. The example 
of destroying a dam under construction is again telling. 
Furthermore, the application of the principle of proportionality entails 
additional considerations when applied by non-State armed groups: one 
should balance the risks to civilians with the expected military advantage, 
but how may the latter be evaluated when those who launch the attack are 
unaware of the overall plan? Or when the advantage to be gained is not a 
military one, or is not to weaken the military potential of the enemy, but 
instead follows a political or propaganda agenda? The military advantage 
of capturing one government soldier or of destroying one tank in terms of 
reducing the military potential of the State may be minimal, but both have a 
a significant impact for propaganda purposes, by promoting the cause and 
the visibility of the group. Can this absence of a real military advantage 
mean that IHL prohibits the capture of government soldiers and the 
destruction of tanks as soon as the slightest risk of incidental effects for 
civilians exists? 
Turning to precautionary measures, non-State armed groups will face 
greater difficulties of collecting information, of verifying its veracity when 
they do and of verifying the legality of their targets. Even if willing to 
respect IHL, the range of feasible measures is relatively limited. For 
instance, how can they choose the means causing the least damage when 
they have only one weapon capable of reaching the enemy at their 
disposal? Respecting passive precautionary measures is another challenge: 
the obligation to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely 
populated areas is often equated, in the case of armed groups, with the 
prohibition to use human shields, which is wrong. At the same time it is 
rare to see States themselves implementing the separation of civilian 
objects and military objectives.  
Other traditional provisions of IHL are respected with difficulty: for 
instance, IHL prohibits perfidy, while it is the essence of guerrilla fighting.  
Finally, humanitarian action also suffers from the specificities of 
NIACs: it is often not only perceived but also openly declared by the 
government and third States supporting it as an inherent part of peace-
building efforts. Hence it is not perceived as neutral by armed groups. 
Sometimes it is even used as a cover by States to defeat armed groups. 
All this having being said, one should keep in mind that the rules 
regulating the conduct of hostilities are flexible and most obligations are 
situation-dependent. 
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3. The existing IHL rules are, may and must to a certain extent be 
adapted to the realities of armed groups 
 
First of all, the treaty rules are rare but clear: it is true that only common 
Article 3 and Article 13 of Additional Protocol I (when applicable) apply, 
but both are unambiguous: civilians may not be attacked. The only problem 
is that the definition of civilians is controversial, in particular in NIACs, 
both among States and among armed groups. Customary law also applies; 
and because it is derived from practice, it should by definition be realistic. 
Nowadays, there is however an increasing tendency to derive it from lofty 
statements and from treaty rules applicable in IAC. Another problem, 
which necessarily has an impact on the respect for IHL by armed groups, is 
that such practice creating customary law unfortunately is not considered as 
including that of armed groups.  
Moreover, most obligations other than the prohibition to target civilians 
are obligations of means, not of result. Anyway, only intentional violations 
are prohibited by IHL, but unintentional violations of the prohibition to 
attack civilians may reveal an intentional disregard of the proportionality 
principle and of the obligation to take precautions in attack.  
In general, IHL concepts must be interpreted by adapting them mutatis 
mutandis to the realities of an armed group. For instance, looking at our 
preceding remarks, the concept of “military” can be understood as 
including all that enables a party to harm the enemy through acts of 
violence. The problem however becomes one of defining “violent”: for 
instance, is the construction of a dam an act of violence? Other concepts 
can be interpreted taking into account the specificities of armed groups. 
When it comes to precautionary measures for instance, one should keep in 
mind the key concept of feasibility. The obligation to take passive 
precautionary measures is also a soft one. As for the possibility to capture 
and to intern, it must be made realistic for armed groups if we want them to 
respect those who surrender.  
All these considerations lead us to one essential question: does the 
existing law already provide for a sliding scale or should it be introduced? 
In other words, should the applicable law depend on the capacity of the 
armed group, in the sense that the more organized it is, the more rules it 
shall be bound to respect? This would certainly make the law more realistic 
for - and therefore core prohibitions more often respected by - armed 
groups. However, there are risks of fragmentation of the law and endless 
controversies over which rules are realistic in a given case. In addition, 
with such a sliding scale, the question arises of whether the resulting rules 
apply equally to both sides. Are well-organized governmental armed forces 
fighting against a poorly organized armed group only bound by 
rudimentary IHL rules (but, contrary to the armed group, also by Human 
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Rights), or should the principle that both sides of an armed conflict are 
always equal before IHL be abandoned? If the law is not the same for both 
parties, will governmental forces nevertheless respect rules which are not 
only – as currently – not respected by the enemy but not even binding upon 
the enemy? 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
There remains an inevitable tension between the need to have rules 
preserving a minimum of humanity in war and the desire to have rules that 
allow belligerents to overcome the enemy. Indeed, only few groups will 
respect rules under which they have no chance to win. Unrealistic rules 
don’t protect anyone and undermine the willingness to respect even those 
rules of IHL which are realistic. However, where do the limits to realism 
and flexibility lie? To answer that question, I would refer to a remark made 
by a former assistant of mine: if one pushes the logic of the sliding scales to 
the extreme, what would happen if the group is so weak that it can only 
attack civilians? Of course, as is true of all proposals, that of introducing a 
sliding scale has its limits, but where those limits should be drawn is 
precisely the question that we should discuss more thoroughly, instead of 
ignoring the differences between States and armed groups, which is also 
inherent in the tendency to apply the same law to IAC and to NIAC. 
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Naval Warfare 
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg 
Professor of International Law, Viadrina European University, 
Frankfurt/Oder; Council member, IIHL 
This panel deals with the conduct of hostilities and, in particular, with 
challenges and new developments. I was assigned the task to talk about 
naval warfare, which is not necessarily a subject that raises the interest of 
too many people, but I will try to be as interesting as possible. 
There are certain points I would like to cover. The first concerns the 
distinction between international armed conflicts on the one hand and 
incidents at sea on the other hand. While this may seem surprising, you will 
see that this has quite an impact on contemporary naval operations. The 
other is: what about employing other than warships in the conduct of 
hostilities and the exercise of belligerent rights? What are lawful military 
objectives? Again, you may say ‘but we have the definition’. Yes, we do, 
but naval warfare has changed considerably, in particular with regard to the 
issues which qualify as protected objects. And, finally: naval mines and 
torpedoes. 
First of all, you may ask «why is he asking the question of whether and 
to what extent a naval operation may trigger the existence of an 
international armed conflict at sea?». Of course, the old battles at sea, like 
the battle of Trafalgar, belong to the past, so we are not talking about those 
classical exchanges of fire at sea. But we must be aware that the oceans of 
the world belong to the region of warfare and that, in some regions the 
oceans play a very important role, not only with regard to natural resources, 
but also with regard to sovereignty. It is a highly volatile area and that is 
why we need to be abundantly clear of whether and to what extent a certain 
naval operation triggers an international armed conflict or not. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) have more or less 
joined the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its 
determination that whenever there is a resort to armed force by one State 
against another State this is an international armed conflict. The prosecutor 
of the ICC just recently has given an opinion with regard to the sinking of 
the South Korean warship Cheonan in 2010, and has come to the 
conclusion that the sinking triggered an international armed conflict 
between North and South Korea. Irrespective of the question whether it is 
one State or whether there are two States, this is the conclusion of the 
ICC’s Prosecutor. What we have to be aware of, however, is that incidents 
at sea involving the use of force take place on an almost every day basis, 
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not only by Government vessels vis-à-vis merchant vessels or fishing 
vessels, which is of course very common, in particular in the South China 
Sea or even the East China sea, and in other regions by the way. But there 
are also incidents between Government ships, in particular between 
warships. The famous ‘bumping incident’ of the Black Sea between the 
U.S.A. on the one hand and the former U.S.S.R. on the other hand is just 
one example, and there are warning shots being fired, etc. In view of that, 
we have to be very cautious not to too easily draw the conclusion that an 
incident at sea that involves a certain degree of the use of force 
immediately triggers an armed conflict between two or more States that 
may be involved. So far, at least, those incidents at sea have not been 
considered international armed conflicts. That does not mean that the 
sinking of the Cheonan was not an international armed conflict. That is 
obvious. But I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the 
exchange of force at sea is a common exercise in certain regions of the 
world, and we should be very cautious not to easily entitle the parties to 
those incidents not only to use force for a limited purpose, but maybe to 
resort to the exercise of belligerent rights within a very short period of time. 
I understand the position of the ICRC, I understand the position taken by 
the ICC and the ICTY, but the fact that it is here not only about protecting 
victims, but that the applicability of all the other rules of the law of naval 
warfare could come into operation, should make us a little bit more 
cautious and not to easily draw the conclusion that an international armed 
conflict exists between the respective States. 
The next question is: if there are hostilities at sea either in support of 
land and air operations or at sea as such, are the respective parties limited to 
using only warships for those purposes? You may recall that the very first 
multinational treaty of the modern law of armed conflict is not the Geneva 
Convention of 1864 but the Paris Declaration of 1856, which prohibits 
privateering. This means that a Government has entitled private vessels to 
resort to the exercise of belligerent rights. Since 1856, the exercise of 
belligerent rights has been limited by many States to warships that qualify 
according to the respective definition under the Law of the Sea Convention 
of 1982, and the corresponding rules of customary international law. That 
would mean that not only the right of visit, search and capture would be 
limited to warships, but also attacks against lawful enemy targets. It may be 
emphasized in this context that we are focusing on international armed 
conflicts, because that issue does not arise in the context of a non-
international armed conflict, which will regularly not be conducted in high 
sea areas anyhow. The question is where do we stand with regard to the 
rather formal approach dating back to the middle of the XIX century, or do 
we take today’s more liberal approach that at least in the relation between 
the parties to the conflict we would allow all vessels, whether 
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Governmental or Non-governmental in character, whether military or non-
military in character, to be entitled to attack lawful targets of the respective 
enemy. Again, there is no clear answer and there is a division of opinions 
between States. The United States, for example, takes the more liberal 
approach, the Germans take a rather formalistic view. But, again, in the 
relation between belligerents, that formalistic approach does indeed not 
make much sense. Why? Because it is all about transparency in the exercise 
of belligerent rights affecting neutrals, rather than those affecting the 
respective enemy. 
We have to be aware, moreover, that all the issues we will be talking 
about today, unmanned systems, semi-autonomous systems etc., which 
have been settled in the aerial domain, have not yet been settled in the naval 
or maritime domain. It all starts with the question of whether an unmanned 
maritime vehicle qualifies as a ship at all and there is a dispute about 
whether it can ever qualify as a warship proper. This does not mean that the 
use of such unmanned systems would be prohibited or would be clearly in 
violation of the law of armed conflict, because at sea it is much easier to 
clearly discriminate between lawful targets on the one hand and innocent 
shipping on the other hand than it is either in land warfare or in air warfare. 
In naval warfare, you can even identify an individual ship and then you 
could send out your autonomous systems and do whatever the system 
considers necessary, without a violation of the law of armed conflict, 
without a man in or a man on the loop. However, the legal situation is far 
from being clear, because this issue has not raised too much attention, 
maybe fortunately so. Maritime issues are not as attractive as aerial 
incidents, of course. So a flying drone is always more interesting than a 
swimming or a diving device because you cannot see them and the sea is so 
far away. Still, this is an issue that will keep accompanying us for quite a 
while and it will have an impact on the conduct of hostilities at sea, whether 
near the littoral or whether in high seas areas, in deep blue sea areas. 
The next question is: what are lawful targets at sea? Of course, it goes 
without saying that enemy warships are of course always lawful targets. 
The definition that is laid down in article 52 paragraph 2 of the Additional 
Protocol and customary international law also applies to the naval domain. 
There is, of course, the problem we have between the United States of 
America and the rest of the world with regard to the war-sustaining effort 
which, at least according to the Commander’s Handbook of the U.S. Navy, 
is still considered as constitutive for an object to qualify as a lawful target. 
Hence, ships exporting oil, if the revenue of the oil helps the enemy in 
sustaining in prolonging its war effort would constitute lawful targets. 
Apart from that, however, there is general consensus that those attacks at 
sea must be limited at objects that qualify under the respective definition. 
However, the problem now is that the sea is used for many other purposes, 
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not just for shipping and for fishing or for the transport of goods and 
people. There are some rules that have also been laid down in the San Remo 
Manual on the law of naval warfare, namely, that merchant vessels, unless 
they take part in the hostilities or otherwise contribute to the enemy’s 
military effort, qualify as lawful targets. There are specially protected 
vessels, like hospital ships, a rule that dates back to the XIX century. That 
is common ground. But what about submarine cables and pipelines? Why 
should we care? First of all, the problem is that they are of high importance. 
Submarine pipelines obviously transport oil, gas and other important 
energy resources. Submarine cables carry nearly 98% of the international 
data traffic and the rest are transmitted via satellites. Is there a rule under 
IHL addressing submarine cables? The only rule with regard to submarine 
cables can be found in article 54 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. It only 
regulates those submarine cables that connect occupied territory with 
neutral territory. The general conclusion that is drawn from that rule is that 
submarine cables connecting enemy territory that is not occupied or even 
other territories with neutral territories, will not necessarily be protected 
under the law of armed conflict. It must be borne in mind that submarine 
cables may be a very important target, be it only for information gathering 
or for destructing or disrupting information exchange between the 
belligerent and its forces, because many of the new assets, like for example 
unmanned vehicles, can only be controlled remotely if there is data traffic 
almost in real time and much of the data traffic goes via submarine cables. 
Hence, it is obvious that destroying submarine cables may be an option at 
least for weaker enemies or those enemies that do not have the respective 
high-tech equipment. In view of that, it is rather dissatisfactory that, in spite 
of the high importance of such underwater installations, and despite certain 
plans in many naval forces in the world to also interfere with submarine 
cables or other infrastructure on the seabed or in the seabed, it is necessary 
that something will be done, because even the peace-time rules applying to 
those underwater installations are not sufficiently developed, to say the 
least. The Sanremo Manual contains a paragraph on submarine cables and 
pipelines, but according to its wording - ‘shall take care to avoid’ – the 
protection accorded is not sufficient. But don’t forget the time the Sanremo 
Manual was published, that is almost twenty years ago - maybe another 
thing we could celebrate. In those days the importance, in particular, of 
submarine cables was simply not understood. Probably today the experts 
who drafted the Sanremo Manual would come to different conclusions than 
they did back then. With regard to those underwater installations, I at least 
would take the position that they may only be attacked, that means 
physically damaged or even destroyed, if they qualify as lawful targets. The 
fact that the 1907 rule is rather meagre and the Sanremo Manual has not 
added too much clarity to it, may leave open questions and may make 
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belligerents believe that they are free to act at will, even though those 
installations are of high importance to virtually each State. Of course, 
submarine cables will always be exploited, but exploitation is nothing that 
would interfere with the integrity of such cables. For instance, you may 
have listening devices, you may have devices that would also lead the data 
to sources that are not necessarily those that are the addressees. That is an 
issue of espionage or information gathering or reconnaissance and not an 
issue of the conduct of hostilities. 
Many may think of a naval mine as an automatic contact mine, which on 
physical contact explodes - and in many cases it does not even explode 
because it is pushed away by the bow wave. These contact mines are still in 
use. The mines that are employed today are highly sophisticated weapons. 
They react to electromagnetic or acoustic signatues or to changes in water 
pressure. They can be programmed in a way to only attack a certain type or 
even an individual ship if sufficient data is being loaded into the respective 
device. In 1907, States could only agree on submarine automatic contact 
mines.Today we are talking about highly discriminating and very 
sophisticated weaponry that does not necessarily pose a danger to innocent 
shipping at sea. Hague Convention VIII is limited to submarine automatic 
contact mines and that it contains a number of obligations of the parties to 
the conflict, which are not necessarily applicable to modern mines. The 
question is whether and to what extent those rules do apply to modern naval 
mines. First of all, many States still have submarine automatic contact 
mines. Maybe even the majority of the mines in the arsenals today are still 
of the old type. However, they are increasingly replaced by modern mines. 
Then the question is how far does Hague Convention VIII, which is now 
more than one hundred years old, contain customary principles that can be 
adapted and applied to modern naval mines. It is important to note that, in 
any event, the scope of applicability is limited to naval mines. Beach 
interdiction mines are covered by Protocol II of the 1980 Conventional 
Weapons Convention. That is rather a land warfare issue than a naval 
warfare issue. It may be added that nuclear mines are governed by the 
Seabed Treaty, which is rather an arms control instrument than an 
instrument on the conduct of hostilities. If it comes to modern naval mines, 
we must be very cautious not to adapt or apply too easily the Hague Rules 
of 1907 to them, because the danger posed are quite different compared to 
that posed by submarine automatic contact mines. 
Just a short word about torpedoes which, like modern naval mines, are 
highly discriminating weapons. They also react to acoustic, electromagnetic 
signatures, etc. They are wire-guided for the most part of their journey. The 
problem today is that the technology in use has blurred the dividing line 
between a torpedo on the one hand and a mine on the other hand. There are 
devices that can move on the seabed, that can release a device that looks 
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more like a torpedo or even a missile. Hence, there is no real definitional 
clarity of how to distinguish a naval mine from a torpedo. Probably, the 
best way is to apply the NATO definition, which I think is the best 
definition of a naval mine we have so far. Still, there are certain issues 
which make it difficult to distinguish. Another aspect that must be borne in 
mind is that mines are not only designed and used in order to sink ships, but 
also in order to change geography. It is about denying certain sea areas to 
the enemy, which is a very important aspect of naval warfare which had 
always had a certain economic strategic element that many people have 
forgotten about. Naval mining is different than mining in land warfare, 
although land mines are also used for modifying geography. Moreover, it 
may not be forgotten that there are also controlled mines that can be 
controlled remotely. They can be sleeping and you can arm them at will. 
Do they pose a risk to innocent shipping as long as they are not armed? Can 
you deploy them, for example, in an international strait, even though the 
international strait may be of overall importance for the economy of the 
world, like the Strait of Hormuz or the Strait of Malacca? They are the two 
most important straits of the world, be it only for the supply of energy of all 
the regions of the world. We have to be aware that technology in the 
context of naval warfare with regard to naval mines and torpedoes has 
developed significantly, and we should not be too bold to just say ‘this is 
the old Hague Convention VIII of 1907 and we can apply those rules one 
by one to those modern devices’. It is not that simple, I am afraid to say. 
The same holds true with regard to torpedoes, which, according to the rules 
of 1907, must become harmless after they have missed their target. This, 
however, is not an issue today because torpedoes are much more 
sophisticated and much more discriminating than they were back then. 
In conclusion, I think there are certain issues that need to be clarified. 
First of all, incidents at sea must clearly be distinguished from international 
armed conflicts at sea. The mere reference to a use of force by one State 
against another at sea is, in my view, not sufficient to state or to allege that 
an international armed conflict exists as such. Secondly, the legal status of 
unmanned maritime or sea-going vehicles must be settled, because it is not 
only an issue of sovereign immunity that would of course apply to such 
unmanned vehicles. It is about whether such vehicles or systems may be 
employed during armed conflict, and, if so, for which purposes. Finally, the 
status and the protection of submarine cables and pipelines must be 
improved. Submarine cables are much more important than pipelines. The 
destruction of submarine pipelines will always have an environmental 
impact, which might render the attack illegal. That is an aspect you cannot 
fall back to in the case of submarine cables, in particular not in the case of 
submarine communication cables. Finally, there are two last points: (1) Is it 
lawful to lay mines in vast areas of the high seas and, thus, to prevent or 
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impede upon, for example, the sea traffic between Europe and North 
America or between Europe and Southeast Asia for a long period of time, 
with all the huge impacts on the world economy, as was done during the 
World Wars? I have my doubts whether that would still be acceptable 
today. The geographical limitations of minefields are an important issue. 
(2). The old distinction between mines and torpedoes should be abandoned. 
Rather, both should be considered means of naval warfare, which are 
governed by the principles of IHL that apply to the conduct of hostilities as 
they do in other domains. 
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Guerre Aérienne: le cas du conflit colombien 
Arnaud Penent d’Izarn 
Directeur du Programme Présidentiel pour le développement spatial 
colombien, Armée de l’Air colombienne, Bogotá 
Cette présentation portera sur la guerre aérienne en analysant, en 
particulier, le cas du conflit armé en Colombie. La Colombie est un pays au 
cœur d’un conflit armé non-international depuis environ 50 ans. Les 
opérations aériennes dans ce pays ont toujours été très complexes mais 
maintenant on peut considérer ce conflit dans sa phase finale. Le groupe 
armé terroriste des FARC (Forces Armées Révolutionnaires de Colombie - 
Armée du peuple) est en négociation avec le Gouvernement colombien 
pour mettre fin au conflit. 
Toutes les opérations aériennes de la Colombie sont effectuées selon 
une planification initiale. On ne peut sortir en mission aérienne sans savoir 
la mission à accomplir. Elles sont établies conformément à la loi nationale 
et ne visent que des objectifs militaires. En Colombie, toutes les opérations 
militaires sont menées contre des objectifs militaire, si ce n’est pas le cas, la 
loi colombienne ouvre une enquête pénale à l’encontre du commandement 
de l’opération et des pilotes – ils sont également susceptibles d’être 
pénalement sanctionnés. C’est ainsi que fonctionne la loi colombienne. 
Une protection spéciale est assurée contre les attaques dans des zones 
avec une forte concentration de personnes civiles. Les opérations ont lieu 
dans de petites villes et dans la jungle. Il faut éviter des dommages 
collatéraux au cours des opérations contre les objectifs militaires. Les 
règles doivent être claires et toutes les personnes participant à l’opération 
doivent les connaître ; en effet, des simples doutes peuvent mener à des 
tragédies. 
Le renseignement est très important pour les opérations en Colombie. 
On effectue en moyenne une mission par jour -environs 20 opérations par 
mois – opérations d’attaque, bombardements, des tirs au canon avec des 
missiles, surveillance, etc. A présent, presque toutes les opérations sont 
menées selon un cadre d’interarmées, avec la participation des militaires -
Armée de Terre, Armée de l’Air, de la Marine- et de la Police nationale. 
Une bonne préparation est essentielle. Le renseignement y occupe une 
place très importante. Il s’agit, selon moi, de la clef pour mener à bien les 
missions aériennes. Si on dispose de bons renseignements, les dommages 
collatéraux seront réduits au minimum.  
L’utilisation sûre de l’espace aérien répond à une question efficace avec 
la coordination et la régulation des opérations à tous les niveaux en 
optimisant les efficacités au combat. En effet, la préparation opérationnelle 
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se déroule dans la salle de briefing. Il faut avoir une coordination maximale 
entre les moyens aériens (avions de combat, avions de transport, 
hélicoptères, drones, etc.) et également entre les moyens terrestres 
(l’artillerie, les troupes de manouvre, forces spéciales, etc.). On doit avoir 
une coordination maximale entre les armés. 
Le niveau d’autorisation dépend de l’armement utilisé. Chez nous, le 
Commandant de l’Armée de l’Air est le seul à pouvoir autoriser une 
opération de bombardement. Dans le renseignement, le commandant légal 
en coordination avec le commandant de la mission décident des mesures et 
précautions à prendre dans les préparations et les exécutions des attaques 
pour en limiter les effets et pour s’assurer qu’il n’y ait pas d’effets 
indiscriminés. En effet, toutes les opérations doivent respecter les règles du 
Droit International Humanitaire.  
Le renseignement technique et humain doivent faire l’objet d’un 
processus de validation. Le renseignement technique est effectué grâce à 
des avions de l’armée de l’air, de terre ou par la marine. Il importe de 
coordonner le renseignement avec l’information de l’armée de terre. Cette 
tâche n’est pas aisée au vu du nombre de personnes impliquées - l’armée de 
l’air, pilotes, infanterie. Mais effectuer une fusion de ces deux sources est 
essentiel.  
Je vais vous exposer à présent le processus de décision du commandant 
pour attaquer un objectif militaire en Colombie. 
On commence par les buts de l’opération. Pour illustrer, prenons 
l’exemple de la neutralisation d’un bâtiment civil au troisième étage-. Cet 
étage est utilisé pour garder des explosifs, des mines anti-personnelles et 
d’autres armes non-conventionnelles (cette information est donnée par le 
renseignement). Ensuite, on se pose deux questions: 1) l’existence d’une 
nécessité militaire; 2) si la neutralisation de ce bâtiment offrira en 
l’occurrence un avantage militaire. Si on ne conclue pas à l’existence d’une 
nécessité militaire, on cherche un autre objectif et si ce n’est pas possible, 
alors il faudra abandonner l’attaque. S’il y a la nécessité militaire, on va 
chercher quel type d’armement utiliser et le pourcentage de neutralisation 
de ce bâtiment. Peut-être 40%? Après il faut savoir si on dispose d’une 
arme appropriée pour l’opération – peut-être des bombes, des missiles, des 
rockets. Si l’objectif militaire est un bâtiment, je ne peux pas utiliser des 
bombes parce que si je veux neutraliser 40% seulement du troisième étage, 
avec ce type d’armement on va à neutraliser plus de 40%. On devra plutôt 
utiliser un rocket ou bien un missile. Il faut utiliser des armes appropriées 
qui minimisent les dommages collatéraux lors des opérations. Si on ne peut 
pas minimiser les dommages collatéraux pour faire l’opération, on doit 
chercher d’autres moyens afin de minimiser les dommages collatéraux 
(opération de nuit, etc.). 
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Si on décide de mener l’opération, il faut contrôler l’ordre. Si la mission 
est aérienne, en cas de présence d’hélicoptères, il faudra assurer une bonne 
communication avec les avions de combat et chercher une solution s’il y a 
des problèmes de communication telle que avoir recours à un contrôleur 
aérien avancé et ce pilote devra préparer cette mission. Si on peut réaliser 
ce contrôle de la mission, on effectuera la mission, sinon, on reste sur terre.  
Quand on dispose de toute l’information nécessaire pour la planification 
de l’opération, on peut initier la mission aérienne. Cependant, si une 
personne impliquée dans cette mission a reçu des informations différentes 
lors du briefing, il faudra l’annuler et en planifier une autre.  
En Colombie, aucune opération n’est pas la même que la précédente. La 
complexité des opérations en Colombie peut faire que la stratégie qui nous 
a conduits au succès aujourd’hui, nous mène à l’échec demain. 
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Key trends of international law relating 
to the conflicts in cyberspace 
Anatoly Streltsov 
Deputy Director, Information Security Institute, Lomonosov 
Moscow State University 
In this presentation suggestions regarding the potential trends of 
international law for conflicts in cyberspace will be argued.  
This issue appears of current interest and has been pointed out 
repeatedly in resolutions of the UN General Assembly, as well as in 
political documents of the leaders of many States of the world. 
In essence, the issue can be described as follows. On the one hand, 
experts believe that the misuse by countries of modern information and 
communication technologies (ICT) can be considered, in a number of 
instances, as a threat of force or a threat against territorial integrity or 
political independence of countries, or even as a sort of militant action. 
Most experts do not dispute the applicability of rules of international law in 
this situation. 
On the other hand, the international community has not yet built a 
common understanding of how exactly to use these rules of law. 
This report suggests one of the possible approaches to handling the 
issue. The approach is based on assumption that key challenges in defining 
the methods of applying the rules of international law to the situations of 
misuse of ICT for military and political purposes are induced by the 
following circumstances: 
- Novelty of the subject field of power struggle between the countries, 
i.e. cyberspace; 
- The fact that ICT have no signs of “weapons” in the common 
understanding of the term;  
- Inability to directly observe the use of ICT;  
- Unapparent existence of the relationship between the acts of 
malicious use of ICT and the onset of social and political backwash 
effects. 
To define the ways of overriding such circumstances, I shall proceed to 
the current practices of regulatory enforcement that enable us under some 
conditions to determine an act of aggression without the use of weapons in 
the common understanding of the term as an “armed assault”. 
It appears that the precedent for this practice originates from UN 
Security Council Resolution 1368 dated September 12, 2001 and 
Resolution 1373 dated September 28, 2001, which followed up the 
discussions concerning September 11, 2001 tragedy in the USA. As we all 
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know, the tragic events of that day were marked by an attack of 
international terrorists on a number of civil and defense assets using civil 
aircraft as weapons. The UN Security Council did not object to the 
enforcement by the US, in pursuance of Article 51, UN Charter, of the 
“inherent right of the individual and collective self-defense” and the use of 
armed force against Iraq and Afghanistan in the wake of the global war 
announced on international terrorism.  
In fact, the above UN Security Council resolutions introduced the 
concept of unobvious “Intangible Weapon” to international practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The essence of the concept is the following: Any non-military device or 
asset may turn into a weapon if disturbance of its normal operation 
(including through the misuse of ICT) results in extermination of troops 
and destruction of equipment. So, assault with the use of such devices and 
assets may be treated as an “armed assault”.  
Recognition of the “intangible weapon” concept allows us to isolate the 
following development trends in the subject field of international law for 
conflicts in cyberspace: 
- Norms and principles of Jus ad Bellum; 
- Principles of recording legal facts recognized by the rules of 
international law Jus ad Bellum that create legal relationship in the 
field of use of force through the development of a system for 
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objectivizing the facts of misuse of information technologies and 
evaluating the effects of such misuse, as well as attribution of the 
subjects in fault of such acts; 
- Norms and principles of Jus in Bello; 
- Formalisation of the proposed innovations in the international law of 
conflict. 
Norms and principles of international law Jus ad Bellum ultimately 
contained in the UN Charter and UN General Assembly Resolution of 
December 14, 1974. 
 
 
Analysis of the mentioned sources in reliance on the “intangible 
weapon” concept resulted in the following findings. 
Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter describe two basic types of 
“force”: force with the use of arms (weapons), and force without the use of 
arms. 
Force with the use of arms involves coercion of one State to act in 
accordance with the will of another State by creating a deadlock for the 
coerced State under the threat of violence. One of the ways to use force 
may involve malicious use of ICT, which can lead to the death of people 
(attacks on automated control systems of airborne, railway and motor 
transport, power supply management systems, etc.), significant structural 
damages (attacks on automated process control systems of hydro and 
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nuclear power plants), economic and military contraction of a nation and 
disturbance of various vital functions of the society.  
Force without the use of arms may be applied through total or partial 
“containment” of the coerced State, interrupting its communication with 
other countries. Such containment may be implemented in the form of the 
disruption of economic ties, disturbance of rail, sea, air, mail, telegraph, 
radio and other means of communication, as well as severance of 
diplomatic relations. Malicious use of ICT by a country may also aim at 
disrupting the delivery by national service providers of data 
communication, storage, processing, search and distribution services. 
“Forceful” malicious use of ICT may also involve infliction of minor 
damages to economic and defense capabilities of the target country. An 
example of this is the Stuxnet malware attack on the uranium enrichment 
facility in Iran in 2010. According to the media reports, this attack was 
carried out by Israel and the USA. Political effects of the attack included a 
delay in the delivery of Iran’s uranium enrichment program of around 18 
months.  
The term “armed assault”, as defined in Article 51 of the UN Charter in 
the context of Jus ad Bellum, may be interpreted as the “use of force” with 
weapons that must be refrained from subject to Article 2 (4) of the UN 
Charter, or as aggression, that is, use of armed forces against sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of the other State or different 
way, inconsistent with UN Charter. 
Malicious use of ICT in form of “intangible weapon” may lead to the 
extermination of troops and destruction of equipment, and in case of severe 
damage, it will qualify as an “armed assault”, thus engendering the 
country’s inherent right of the individual and collective self-defense.  
Based on the foregoing, the rules and principles of Jus ad Bellum 
basically almost do not require any adaptation to cyberspace. 
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Principles of recording legal facts recognized by the rules of 
international law Jus ad Bellum in cyberspace different from similar actions 
in the material world. As noted above, one of the essential features of 
malicious use of ICT as means of “force” in the meaning defined in Article 
2 (4), Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter, and exercising an “armed 
assault” in the interpretation given in Article 51 of the UN Charter, is 
represented by the inability to directly observe such misuse of ICT. This is 
predicated by the essence of information technologies that basically 
constitute a process of targeted and algorithm-based modification of 
information stored in the electronic memory of computers, means of 
communication, communication devices and other equipment based on 
computer technology.  
National enforcers of international law Jus ad Bellum, i.e. political 
decision-makers, when deciding whether or not the threat to sovereignty 
and territorial independence in cyberspace exists, or an armed assault with 
use of ICT has begun, are forced to rely on information obtained with the 
help of appropriate recording facilities. It is presumed that the information 
on recorded events has adequate reliability. 
At the same time, such national and regional technical registration 
systems are of little use in resolving state-to-state disputes on the matter, as 
they allow States to manipulate collected data. As we know, the only means 
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of proving the parties' positions, which can be taken into consideration by 
the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice, are official 
statements of the authorized persons. Objective political review of most 
such appeals to the UN Security Council is only possible when interests of 
permanent members of the UN Security Council match or are fairly 
equivalent. The possibilities for submitting objective information on 
situations of this sort when appealing to the International Court of Justice 
are rather limited due to lack of international bodies authorized to conduct 
independent operational and investigative activities, as well as the 
appropriate means of technical support for such measures. 
It appears that fair consideration of disputes over the breach of 
international law Jus ad Bellum in cyberspace requires development of a 
system (possibly based on national and regional systems) for recording 
appropriate legal facts of misuse of ICT that pose a threat to international 
peace and security. In the meantime, national and regional elements of the 
recording system must be certified by authorised bodies in accordance with 
unified standards, and maintenance staff that services such equipment must 
obtain a certain status. 
 
 
Norms and principles of international humanitarian law Jus in Bello is 
intended to mitigate the physical suffering of persons directly exposed to 
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the effects of armed conflicts, reduce damages to the property of civilians 
and ensure safety of items of cultural value. 
Evaluation results indicate that most of the provisions contained in Jus 
in Bello sources are either invariant as to the type of weapons employed in 
warfare, or focus on the use of specific types of weapons. As such, the rules 
of warfare and restrictions on the means of executing combat missions 
barely depend on the type of weapon used, and the rules prohibiting the use 
of certain weapons govern relations that involve the use of these specific 
weapons. From this perspective, the adaptation of International 
Humanitarian Law in cyberspace can affect a relatively small part of its 
norms and principles. 
Due to the fact that the malicious use of ICT in conflict as "armed force" 
may, on the one hand, prevent the application of the existing rules and 
principles of law and, on the other, bring such suffering to the sick and 
wounded, the civilian population and cultural values, as well as 
conventional weapons. 
For example, ICT can be used to disrupt the normal operation of 
navigation systems or other important information and communication 
systems of military hospital ships (Art. 14 of the Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea), the process of information systems in 
the Information Bureau for prisoners of war (Section V of the Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949), 
the International Register of Cultural Property under Special Protection 
(Section 6 of Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague, 14 May 1954) and 
other registries and directories, the creation of which is provided by 
international humanitarian law. 
As noted earlier, ICT can be used in the form of "intangible weapons" 
for violations of the automated control systems for hazardous industries, 
and other critical infrastructures of the State, capable of causing 
unnecessary suffering (Article 23 of the Annex to the Convention 
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, The 
Hague), as well as an extensive, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment (Article 35 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts, 8 June 1977).  
In addition, ICT can be used to carry out espionage, treacherous action, 
i.e. action to try to induce the confidence of an adversary and to defraud 
such trust. ICT provide the opportunity to participate in armed conflict as 
combatants and mercenaries (Part III of the Additional Protocol), as well as 
have a significant impact on the possibility of application of the rules of 
identification (Annex 1 of the Additional Protocol). 
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It appears that the list of Jus in Bello rules that need to be adapted to 
cyberspace should include the rules that govern international relations in 
the slide below. 
 
 
- Prohibition of perfidy (treachery), as well as espionage activity;  
- Protection of critical information infrastructure facilities related to 
the life support of the civilian population;  
- Identification of objects, the attack on which may cause damage to 
persons and objects protected by international humanitarian law;  
- Prohibition in certain cases, the use of ICT as an intangible weapon;  
- Preservation of neutrality of States that are not involved in the armed 
conflict in cyberspace. 
Formalisation of the proposed innovations in the international law of 
conflicts is a key aspect of the adaptation of international law of conflicts to 
cyberspace. Drafting annexes to international treaties that govern relations 
Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello appears to be a reasonable approach to legal 
formalisation of the proposed innovations. It is common knowledge that 
there are not too many references on international law in this field, so 
preparation of Annexes to the relevant international instruments require less 
time than creating a new branch of law governing the relations of the 
conflicts in cyberspace.  
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Such drafting of international treaties could be arranged as processing a 
range of relatively independent material with common terminology and 
carried out with the employment of procedures used in international 
practices, for example, in the Sixth Committee of the UN General 
Assembly. Some of the proposals are shown in the slide below 
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Technological developments: where do 
we stand? What might the future look like? 
Paul Scharre 
Fellow and Project Director for the 20YY Warfare Initiative, 
Center for a New American Security, Washington D.C. 
I will focus really on the technical aspects and, in particular, the idea I 
want to get is: how does it change the decision that a person is making 
when they launch the weapon? Much of the discussion in this area tends to 
focus on the weapon, is the weapon doing this? Is it doing that? That is 
important, but I think it is also important to focus on how it changes the 
decision that the military commander is making when they use the weapon.  
There are three aspects that I want to focus on in particular. The first is 
the role of the human with respect to the weapon. We tend to use words 
like the person being “in the loop” for a machine that performs a function 
and then it stops and waits for further involvement, and that is one aspect of 
autonomy. Another one is the sophistication of the weapon: how complex 
is it? Dr. Boothby talked about the difference between the word 
‘automation’, which is more predictable, and the word ‘autonomy’ to refer 
to things that are more sophisticated and maybe less predictable. And then 
the third aspect refers to the function that it’s actually performing. So these 
are three different concepts that I want to talk about: the type of human 
control, the complexity and the task that is being performed. And the key 
idea here is that in English at least – I know here there are people from 
many different countries and languages – we use the word autonomy to 
refer to all three of these ideas, but they are actually very different 
concepts, which makes it rather confusing. So I just want to walk through 
that. 
The first is that we talk about weapons that are ‘semi-autonomous’ 
where there is a person in the loop: it performs a function and then it stops 
and asks for permission to do the next thing. Then sometimes we talk about 
the concept of ‘supervised autonomy’, so the machine can perform an 
action on its own, but the person can intervene if they choose, but if the 
person does nothing it will continue. Sometimes people use the phrase ‘on 
the loop’ to refer to this. Then sometimes we’ll talk about things being 
‘fully autonomous’ if there is no person involved and that person cannot 
intervene, at least in real-time. We talk about the person being ‘out of the 
loop’. This is one way that we use the word autonomy. And as this changes, 
there is increasing freedom for the machine. 
The second way in which we use the word is we talk about the level of 
complexity of the machine. We use words like ‘automatic’ to refer to things 
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that are very simple, like a mine or a toaster, for example. We use words 
like “automated” to refer to things that are more sophisticated; they are 
rule-based. The pictures on the top there, that is a picture of an old 
mechanical thermostat, and a sort of new digital programmable thermostats, 
with their many different functions you can program, which is more 
complicated. Then sometimes we use the word “autonomous” to refer to 
things that are self-learning or evolving in some way. Here is a picture of a 
robot that taught itself how to walk. They just programmed in some basic 
rules, the robot taught itself how to walk. And this is a picture of the Nest 
learning thermostat that monitors your behavior and then learns on its own 
what temperature to make your house. And then sometimes we use the 
word “intelligent” or “artificial intelligence” to refer to things that are 
sophisticated enough to actually have human-level cognition of a particular 
problem, a very narrow problem. There, of course, is a picture of Garry 
Kasparov losing to the computer Deep Blue and then this is IBM’s most 
recent incarnation, the Jeopardy-playing contestant “Watson”, that beat the 
best human contestants at Jeopardy a couple of years ago.  
Now, why does this matter? This is a spectrum of increasing 
intelligence. It is generally good to have machines that are more 
sophisticated. As Dr Boothby pointed out, they can be used maybe in a 
more discriminate manner. The challenge is if it is then harder to predict 
their specific actions, because it is more complicated. And so, with the 
toaster for example, you have a pretty good handle on what the toaster is 
going to do. With things like a robot that’s teaching itself how to walk or 
something like Deep Blue, the chess playing computer, there are moments 
when the machine might surprise you with what it does. Again, if it is 
performing its function the way you wanted it to, that’s ok, but it does 
change as you start to expand the amount of situations the machine is 
dealing with and then the risk of those situations. 
A third way that we use the word ‘autonomy’ is to refer to the test that’s 
being performed. It is sort of meaningless to talk about something being 
autonomous or not without referring to the type of job it’s doing. There is a 
big difference between a thermostat or a toaster that is performing a 
function that is maybe relatively low-risk, and an autonomous robot that is 
performing medical diagnosis, something that IBM is working on currently, 
or maybe getting the diagnosis wrong could be very high-risk, or decisions 
about the use of force in the military context.  
I want to focus on this concept of some of the decisions about use of 
force. I know some of the follow-on speakers will talk about this also at 
some length, but I just want to point out that within the concept of decisions 
about the use of force there are many different tasks that are encompassed. 
There are different types of force that could be used, lethal or non-lethal 
force. There are different types of targets – there is certainly a difference 
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between targeting people versus material versus objects, different 
environments that could be used. And then within even the idea of the task 
of engagement, there are many different functions. The particular function 
that many looking at this issue have focused on is the act of selecting a 
particular target for engagement and saying “that target there is something 
that is going to be engaged with force”.  
So, there is no agreed upon definition for an autonomous weapon. 
However, most of the people talking about this have focused on this 
particular task, including the U.S. Department of Defense in their policy 
directive, Christof Heyns, the Special Rapporteur for extrajudicial killings 
in his UN report, Human Rights Watch in their report, and then the ICRC 
as they have written on this. They have all focused on this particular task. 
So, what I want to do next is talk about how autonomy is used in 
weapons today with respect to that task. With respect to this idea of 
selecting specific targets for engagement, I want to talk about some 
weapons that have a person in the loop, on the loop and then out of the 
loop. So moving along that spectrum of human control, I am not really 
going to talk about this issue of sophistication, the complexity of the 
weapon, because all of these weapons are relatively simple in their level of 
sophistication. In that sense, we might refer to them as automated, they are 
certainly not learning or evolving in any sense like that. So there are many 
weapons where the human selects the target and then we use homing 
munitions or cruise missiles or other things to carry out the actual act, but 
the person is selecting the target. Dr Boothby alluded to this, so I won’t go 
through all of this in great detail, we can talk about them later in Q&A if 
there are any particular questions. There are some examples of weapon 
systems in existence today where the machine is selecting the target and the 
person is supervising. But once activated, the person no longer has to take 
any actions. There are modes existing in the U.S. Aegis and Patriot missile 
defense systems where this can happen. It is not a day-to-day mode that 
they are using but it is a war-time mode that they can be used in where they 
can be turned on and the machine will engage incoming missiles and a 
person can intervene if necessary. Many countries also had active 
protection systems for ground vehicles to intercept incoming rockets like 
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) because the time of flight is so short that 
if there was a person in the loop it would be impossible for the person to 
make that decision fast enough.  
And there are some examples of out-of-the-loop weapons where the 
machine is selecting the target on its own and a person cannot intervene. 
The United States has a system that does this to jam radars. It is not kinetic; 
it is not lethal; it uses just jamming in the electromagnetic spectrum. But 
there are some examples, very limited in existence, of offensive, of lethal 
weapons, that target materiel – not people, but objects – that do this. They 
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are relatively simple. The Israeli Harpy, for example, flies over a relatively 
wide area and targets enemy radars. When it finds them, the weapon flies 
into the radar destructing it and the person doesn’t need to do any other 
additional action. It doesn’t ask permission from a person to do so once it 
has been launched. A handful of countries have this. The United States has 
developed over the years a couple of systems along these lines. They are 
not currently in the U.S. inventory but they have been developmental 
systems in the past. We normally exclude mines, because mines are 
stationary and they are very simple. Depending on your definition, there is 
a type of weapon called an encapsulated torpedo mine that instead of 
blowing up it releases a torpedo which then homes in on a target that may 
qualify, depending on your definition.  
So, very briefly, I just want to say what is different about autonomous 
weapons. Certainly from a legal perspective we understand the legal 
requirements and from the legal perspective you would say «well, if it 
meets the principles of discrimination and proportionality then fair 
enough». The interesting thing here I think is to talk about how an 
autonomous weapon changes the nature of the decision that a person makes 
when employing the weapon. When using a semi-autonomous weapon 
where the person is selecting the target, the person is able to make all of 
these determinations about distinction and proportionality on their own. 
They are able to say «is this particular use of force against this specific 
target lawful?». Now with an autonomous weapon, that decision changes. 
That is not to suggest that it is inherently unlawful, but the type of decision 
the person is making is a little bit different. Now the person is saying: 
«based on my understanding of the weapon’s functionality and what it will 
do in this environment, and based on my understanding of the environment, 
will the use of force against whatever target the weapon selects, be 
discriminate and be proportionate?» This is a slightly different issue. Now, 
why does that matter? Again, from the legal perspective, if it is 
discriminate and proportionate then it’s not a problem. So questions that 
have been raised, however, that are moral questions or ethical questions 
that I think are pertinent, I am not going to answer them, I just want to raise 
them here. Does this change, reduce the potential for human empathy to act 
as a break on killing? So there are certainly many examples of warfare 
situations where it may be lawful to use force but humans restrain for a 
variety of reasons and they do not actually kill even a lawful target, because 
humans, most people at least, have empathy and for a variety of reasons 
they may choose not to use force in that instance. Is this removed because 
machines do not have that natural brake? Does this lead to an offloading of 
moral responsibility for the actions to the machine? So a person says, 
«well, I am not doing the killing. The machine is doing the killing. I’m 
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simply placing the machine into operation». And does that lead to, 
therefore, more use over time? 
A particularly interesting question is: how does this change the role of 
the military professional in the use of force? Does it change what is human 
judgement by the military professional about whether or not force should 
be used in this situation and replace it with judgement that has been pre-
programmed ahead of time by perhaps lawyers and scientists and engineers 
into an algorithm? Whether or not it is a good thing depends on your point 
of view, I suppose, about how easily some of these ideas can be captured 
into algorithms and whether people get this very well in the first place. 
And the last issue that some have raised, is that if we were to move 
down a path where there were large amounts of autonomous weapons used, 
even if they were used lawfully against lawful targets in a discriminate and 
proportionate manner, does it change how we perceive human life and how 
we value human life? This is very similar to issues that have been raised in 
the context of robotics and other areas, for example, in elderly care or child 
care. Some societies have asked, if we move to an environment where we 
use robots to take care of elderly, does that mean that we no longer value 
older citizens as much? Because humans don’t want to spend time with 
them we say: «well, that is something for the robots to deal with». So there 
is an interesting analogue here in the military space as well. So I am not 
going to answer those questions, I just do want to raise them. I think Peter 
Asaro, who is a professional ethicist, may talk about that in a little bit more 
detail. 
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Automated and autonomous weapons: what 
military utility in which operational scenario? 
William Boothby 
Former Deputy Director of Legal Services, UK Royal Air Force; 
Associate Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP); 
Member IIHL 
I will be focusing on the legal implications of automation and autonomy 
in the use of weapon systems. I will be asking essentially which capabilities 
are really going to cause us concern, and, by extension, which technologies 
either won’t or, in my view, should not do so. Part of the discussion must 
necessarily reflect what capabilities we already have, because when it 
comes to talking about automation, as distinct from autonomy, there are a 
significant number of capabilities that we currently use, that we are 
currently familiar with, and that have a significant degree of automation 
associated with them. I will be taking a very brief look at the adequacy of 
the law but before getting into the law, we should start by considering some 
terminology. What exactly do we mean by automation?  
The UK’s Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 talks of automation in terms of a 
system which, in response to inputs from one or more sensors, is 
programmed logically to follow a predefined set of rules in order to provide 
an outcome. Essentially, the bottom line is that what you are doing is 
putting into a system features which enable the weapon system to operate 
automatically in a predetermined way. And that, I think, is where the 
material distinction lies between automation notions on the one hand and 
autonomy which we’ll talk about in a few moments. The significant point, 
therefore, is that if you know the set of operating rules under which the 
automation process is working, you are going to generally speaking know 
what the outcome is going to be, what it is actually going to be doing. And, 
as I say, we are all already extensively familiar with automation from our 
daily lives, including automation of the operation of our central heating or 
air conditioning systems, automation of the operation of traffic light control 
systems, systems associated with the operation of the family car and 
automation of manufacturing and workplace processes. 
Automated systems are also extensively used today in military 
operations. Examples include ‘fire and forget’ missiles such as PARS 3 LR, 
the Brimstone missile system and the AM39 Exocet, where you fire a 
missile in the air-to-air mode and the missile will then identify the target in 
the direction of which it is being fired, will automatically lock on and will 
then engage that air-borne target. In the maritime context, we have 
numerous examples including the MBDA Milas ship-borne torpedo system, 
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which also incorporate in the anti-submarine mode for example these 
automated facilities. On land, automation is widely employed, for example 
in the Archer FH 77BWL52 automated artillery weapon system; and in the 
air domain contemplate, for example, the use of data fusion systems in 
manned aircraft to present a coherent, fused tactical picture to the pilot by 
co-ordinating inputs from numerous sensors. That is also a feature of 
automation. 
So, it is immediately apparent that different functions of a weapon 
system and/or of a platform can be automated, that there can be differing 
degrees of automation and that some automated systems will be so 
configured that an operator will be permitted to over-ride the automatic 
operation of the system. If you are looking at a description by a 
manufacturer of a weapon system you will quite often see the word 
automation and the word autonomy sprinkled through the description to 
make his or her weapon system seem sexy and, therefore, worthy of 
purchase. Quite clearly, what you are interested in is what exactly has been 
automated and how and what the significance of that is for the way in 
which the system operates. Some systems permit a human over-ride, in the 
sense that yes, this function is automated, it can be undertaken in an 
automated way, but the human being who is there perhaps has the 
capability of waving the red card and stopping this automated machine 
from operating in the automated mode if it becomes clear that the 
prevailing circumstances are such that the automated operation of the 
system should indeed be stopped. But then, when considering the 
possibility of human over-ride of automated functions, we must be careful. 
The critical issue is whether this individual with this degree of over-sight, 
with this red card, with this opportunity to intervene is actually equipped 
with the required degree of information, realistically, to enable him to make 
a sensible decision as to whether to intervene. The second issue is whether 
that individual is tasked in such a way that he or she can exercise proper 
over-sight. And I think those factors are reasonably critical to an evaluation 
of whether human involvement actually enables critical law rules to be 
complied with in relation to particular systems in a particular set of 
circumstances. 
There is no International Humanitarian Law (IHL) instrument that 
addresses automation as such. Fire and forget technology is not, per se, 
prohibited and IHL does not impose restrictions that are stated explicitly 
and specifically to relate to such technology. It is perfectly lawful provided 
that it is suitably controlled. Neither is data fusion prohibited. The issue, 
ultimately, is whether the targeting law requirements as to distinction, 
discrimination, proportionality and precautions can be complied with. In an 
automated context, you can send out a missile or send out a platform on the 
basis that the platform will search and identify areas of search seeking 
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targets which comply with algorithms pre fed into the controlling software. 
That, ultimately, is going to be an automated system as opposed to an 
autonomous system if the system is looking for these targets and is then 
pre-programmed to engage them in a particular way. That can be done 
lawfully. Equally, it can be done, in my view, unlawfully in the sense that 
one can imagine circumstances where the software doesn’t adequately 
discriminate between objects which are legitimate targets for an attack and 
objects which are not, does not, for instance, sufficiently distinguish 
between tanks, on the one hand, and commercial delivery lorries on the 
other. So one is always going to be interested in whether the system can 
adequately distinguish. One is always going to be interested in whether the 
system is going to comply with the rule of discrimination, i.e. whether it is 
possible in using a system of that nature to identify that in that area of 
search, any attack that the machine is going to undertake is going to comply 
with the rule of proportionality. In certain circumstances, desert and remote 
areas of international waters spring to mind, where civilians and civilian 
objects are unlikely to be, it may well be possible to make that 
determination at the planning stage simply because of the isolated nature of 
the location. In other contexts, it may not be possible. Therefore, the 
judgement that you are making isn’t so much whether the weapon system 
as a whole, in theory, is capable of being used discriminately, it is whether 
in the intended circumstances of use it is of a nature to breach the 
discrimination principle. It would also, however, seem to be the case that 
using such systems in the complex, rapidly changing and inherently 
difficult highly populated urban environment is liable to be significantly 
more problematic from a legal perspective.  
But we should now move on to consider autonomy. Autonomous 
weapon systems are described in the UK doctrine note I mentioned earlier 
as being able to understand higher level intent and direction and to perceive 
the environment thus bringing about a desired end state. They can decide a 
course of action from alternatives without human oversight or control, 
although that oversight and/or control may, of course, be present. So they 
differ from automation in the sense that, while their overall activity may 
well be predictable, individual events may not be. We can immediately see 
the distinction between autonomy and automation. So an autonomous 
system is no longer reacting automatically to a stimulus in a manner pre-
determined by the way in which the machine has been set up. So, in the 
situation I have described just now, what you have got basically is the 
machine doing what it has been told to do. With autonomy, the system is 
itself deciding what action to take, what to tell itself to do. That is a gross 
oversimplification, but, for my purposes, that, I think, is what we are 
talking about. 
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And that seems to be where much of the concern with autonomy rests. 
The machine itself has the choice, so it is the machine that makes the 
decision as to what or who is to be attacked, as to how the attack is to be 
conducted, which angle of approach to employ, which weapon to use and, 
in somewhat stark terms, what is to be destroyed and who is to be killed or 
injured. People have justifiable or at least understandable concerns in that 
regard. Not least from an ethical point of view. Is it ethical for machines to 
decide who is to live and who is to die? Those are concerns that need to be 
taken seriously and that need to be addressed. 
I think, from my point of view, that the issue boils down to a distinction 
between autonomy when employed in point defence such as to intercept 
inbound missiles and rockets or to protect a platform such as a warship 
from inbound torpedoes on the one hand and the sorts of automated system 
that are intended to be used for what you might call offensive attack on the 
other. This is not an easy distinction to draw. The definition of attack in 
article 49(1) of API refers, of course, to acts of violence whether ‘in 
offence or defence’. Consequently, all acts of violence, even if you are in a 
defensive mode, even if you are operating in order to prevent attacks on a 
particular point, both point defence and offensive attacks come within the 
overall definition of ‘attacks’, and therefore the precautions in article 57 
apply to all such uses of force. We are all familiar with that idea. It seems 
to me, however, that Iron Dome types of capability, that Phalanx types of 
capability, which are aimed at addressing inbound threats to either civilians 
or a warship or whatever it might be, where those inbound threats are by 
definition going to be military objectives because they are inbound rocket 
systems, they are inbound torpedoes, whatever you might like to call them, 
that sort of capability, provided that the system adequately distinguishes 
between inbound torpedoes or rockets and a civilian airliner that happens to 
be flying in the area, provided that that distinction can be properly made by 
the system, that isn’t causing us excessive concern. I think the focus of 
concern in this area is, if you like, the use of a platform such as Predator, 
such as Reaper, an air-borne UAV, to engage in offensive attack operations 
using this autonomous technology to select the target to be attacked, the 
method of attack and so on and so forth. And the concern, undoubtedly, is 
based on the ability of the system to comply, for example, with the 
evaluative rules set out in article 57, the ability to determine military 
advantage, the ability to determine the degree of civilian loss to be expected 
and the ability to compare the two for the purposes of proportionality, the 
ability to determine whether the target of attack, if it is human beings, 
constitutes able bodied combatants or whether it constitutes people who are 
hors de combat and then there is the additional question of its ability to 
comply with article 51.5.a. as well for that matter. Therefore, I think if that 
is the focus of concern, then what we ought to be doing is recognising that 
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the law actually at the moment has something to say on that subject. This is 
not a blank sheet of paper where there is no law. The law requires all States 
legally to evaluate weapons before fielding them, new weapon systems. 
That’s, as we all know, the legal review requirement in article 36 of 
Protocol I and there is a customary law equivalent rule as well binding all 
States legally to review new weapons. It’s a rule which is all too frequently 
ignored by States. The number of States that are known to have weapon 
review systems is worryingly small but, nevertheless, that is where the legal 
obligation lies. If you are looking at acquiring a weapon system the use of 
which will not comply with article 57 precautions obligations, then it seems 
to me that the obligation is not to acquire the weapon system. There is no 
doubt, in my view, that offensive autonomous weapon systems of the sort 
that I’ve described should be rejected under article 36 weapons review 
processes at the moment. 
What I am not prepared to do is to go along with the Human Rights 
Watch proposal in its Losing Humanity report in 2012, where it draws 
attention to weapon systems in which the human being is either entirely out 
of the attack decision-making loop or in which he is “on the loop” with the 
possibility of intervention but with limited supervision. The Human Rights 
Watch Report calls for prohibition, at this stage, of all future autonomous 
weapons capabilities, basing themselves on the need to protect civilians. 
However, that is banning something, the capabilities and characteristics of 
which we do not presently know. And that, it seems to me, is something 
that States are very unlikely to be willing to do. States in practice, in my 
experience, want to know what the opportunities of new weapons 
capabilities are and what the risks and dangers are. Because once a new 
technology has been worked through, once the opportunities have become 
clear and once the dangers and risks have become clear, then you have a 
firm basis upon which to conduct a sensible discussion over whether or not 
this is a capability that we ought to be proceeding with or not. Whereas to 
do that sort of thing, to come to that sort of position, in advance of having 
seen what the capabilities and possibilities are, is inappropriate. Particularly 
inappropriate, in my view, in a situation where, as the technology currently 
is, there is no doubt that such systems are not lawful and ought not to be 
introduced by States. It isn’t that we are talking about a legal vacuum. That 
is absolutely not the case. The law is there, the law should be complied 
with. The States represented in this room and States not represented in this 
room ought to be complying with that law. They ought to be undertaking 
these weapon reviews. 
So, what is the solution? It seems to me that the solution is engagement 
among States. The solution is the sort of discussions that are taking place in 
Geneva as part of the CCW process. But the solution also lies possibly in 
other engagements between States on this topic, on a bipartisan and on a 
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multi-partisan basis. Because States, by engaging with one another, can 
start to develop their views which they can then incorporate into their 
weapons reviews as the technology evolves. And that will then help to 
produce informed weapons reviews of these sorts of technologies. The 
direction of scientific and technological development, it seems to me, is 
clear. We are going to see increasing autonomy in our daily lives as well as, 
in my view, in the battle space in the military sphere. I think what we need 
to do is to see how that technology evolves and to be prepared to accept the 
advantages that it may bring while prohibiting or constraining the 
disadvantages. After all, if you have, for instance, a system that operates on 
a point defence basis, of the Iron Dome variety, and you incorporate within 
that system an autonomous facility and the autonomy is directed at 
improving, rather than diminishing, the ability of the system to act in a 
discriminating way; because it distinguishes between inbound civilian 
airliners on the one hand and inbound rocket systems on the other, you 
would regard that, I trust, as being a positive development. I certainly 
would. So let’s not go running away with the idea that all autonomy is a 
bad thing. I am not here to defend it. I am not here to argue for it. What I 
am here to say is that this is not the time to prohibit it. This is the time to 
see how the technology develops and to be prepared, at an appropriate time, 
to take a sensible view as to whether, in the long run, this is technology that 
is going to benefit or whether this is technology that is going to damage. 
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Autonomous weapons: requirement of human 
judgement in targeting decision-making. 
Legal aspects1 
Kathleen Lawand 
Head of Arms Unit, Legal Division, International Committee 
of the Red Cross, Geneva 
In the last two years we have really seen a dramatic increase in the 
debate about autonomous weapons. This has really taken off 
tremendously and the ICRC is very pleased with this, of course, because 
we have been calling for such a discussion and examination at least 
since 2011 in our report on contemporary challenges to international 
humanitarian law (IHL).  
In March of this year the ICRC held its own expert meeting on the 
subject and this was attended by a range of governmental and independent 
experts, some of them are in this room today. A summary report of that 
meeting is available on the ICRC’s website and we will be publishing the 
full report in the next weeks. So, many of the points I will be making in my 
presentation are informed by what we learned at that expert meeting, as 
well as by what we learned and contributed to at the CCW expert meeting 
on autonomous weapons held in May of this year. I should stress that on 
thinking about this complex subject which we had first articulated, as I 
said, in 2011 challenges report, it continues to evolve as we gain a better 
understanding of the technological capabilities, military intent and the 
legal/ethical issues raised by this new technology of warfare. For want of 
time and in view of Peter Asaro’s presentation which will follow mine, I 
will not address autonomous weapons from the point of view of the 
principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience, that is the 
Martens Clause, except to recall the profound ethical and societal issues 
raised by the idea of a weapon system that places the use of force beyond 
human control and this is a concern again that was expressed by the ICRC 
in the 2011 challenges report. 
Now, although the ICRC, as I said, very much welcomes the 
increased attention the international community is paying to 
autonomous weapons, at times, discussions have lacked focus due to a 
difficulty in grasping exactly what the issue is. This is partly due, and 
this has been underlined by the previous speaker, to the fact that today 
there is no internationally recognized definition of an autonomous 
                                                     
1 Text not revised by the author.  
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weapons systems. In addition, positions have often been based on 
assumptions and speculations about the future capabilities and uses of 
autonomous weapons, sometimes involving quite fanciful scenarios, and 
this appears to be coming from both sides of the debate on the 
acceptability of autonomous weapons. 
In the ICRC’s view, it would be more helpful to ground the discussion 
on how weapons technology is actually developing rather than attempting 
to predict the future. In this respect, I will begin by offering some thoughts 
on how the debate can be framed to facilitate more informed discussions, 
looking particularly at whether we are speaking about autonomous weapons 
or autonomy in weapons, and at issues that Paul Sharre has just mentioned. 
A second framing question is a question which has arisen in quite a lot 
of literature as to whether or not autonomous weapons are inherently 
unlawful. So, starting first with the initial question of how to define the 
issue – is it concerned with autonomous weapons or autonomous functions 
in weapons? In preparation for the ICRC expert meeting in March we 
surveyed the various definitions in use and found that common to all 
definitions of autonomous weapons systems is the inclusion of weapons 
systems that independently select and attack targets with or without human 
oversight and by oversight I mean the ability of a human to supervise and 
override the system’s actions as described by Paul. Looking at the 
definitions, we found that the distinction between autonomous and 
automated or semi-autonomous weapons systems is not always clear as 
both are described as having the capacity to independently select and attack 
targets within the bounds, of course, of their human determined program. 
Now the difference appears only to be in the degree of freedom with which 
the autonomous weapons can select and attack targets. Indeed, as a number 
of authors have underscored it is difficult to draw bright lines between the 
categories and use and indeed this task would seem rather arbitrary. So, the 
defining issue is the one of the degree of human involvement and the 
intended circumstances of use in our view.  
Currently used categories and definitions might not fully capture this 
granularity. So, for the ICRC’s part we have suggested, and Paul mentioned 
this in discussions on autonomous weapons that it may be more useful to 
focus on autonomy in what we have called the critical functions of the 
weapons system and, that is, the functions required for acquiring, tracking, 
selecting and attacking targets. Indeed these are the functions directly 
relevant to targeting decision making and thus the ability of using the 
system in compliance with IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities. So, 
framing the discussion in terms of the critical functions of concern of 
what’s getting bogged down into a definitional exercise at least at this very 
early stage of the debate. 
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This approach is far from conclusive or perfect but we believe that it 
provides a useful starting point to facilitate constructive discussion. It 
seems clear, based on this approach, that weapons with significant 
autonomy in the critical functions of selecting and attacking targets are 
already in use today and both Paul Sharre and Bill Boothby have outlined 
some of them and some of these systems have existed for quite some time. 
Today, these weapons systems tend to be highly constrained in the tasks 
they carry out, the types of targets they attack and the contexts in which 
they are used, again as Paul has mentioned. My point here is that closer 
examination, and the ICRC has emphasised this repeatedly, closer 
examination of existing autonomous weapons, including existing 
constraints placed on their operation, may provide insights into what types 
of autonomous weapons would be considered acceptable and, in particular, 
what level of human control would be considered appropriate and in what 
circumstances both from a legal and ethical standpoint. Now in this regard I 
would just like to make a remark. I would caution against overplaying the 
defensive or offensive divide factor as has been mentioned, particularly by 
Paul, there exist relatively simple autonomous weapons systems that 
operate in offensive mode. What is crucial in that instance is looking at the 
time and space limitation of the system given its constraints in targeting 
and ability to distinguish military objectives from civilians and civilian 
objectives.  
I shall conclude my first point on this note. In order to ensure informed 
discussion the ICRC is encouraging transparency about existing and 
emerging autonomous weapons systems and, in particular, we are 
encouraging States, to the extent possible, to share information on their 
legal reviews of existing and emerging systems. This will better inform 
debates about autonomous weapons. Looking at existing technology and 
foreseeable future developments, roboticists on the whole agree today that 
machines generally do better than humans in quantitative analysis, 
repetitive actions and sorting data and I might note that perhaps this 
explains why robots win at jeopardy as they can press the button faster. 
Roboticists certainly agree that humans will continue, at least in the 
foreseeable future, to outperform machines in actions that require 
qualitative judgements and reasoning. These technological limits and 
realities are critical to keep in mind when discussing the ability of the 
autonomous weapon to be used in accordance with IHL rules governing the 
conduct of hostilities. 
This brings me to the second frame in question. Are autonomous 
weapons, and as I have just explained I am using this term as short hand 
to mean weapons systems that have autonomy in the critical functions 
thereby allowing them to independently select and attack targets, are 
autonomous weapons inherently unlawful? Conversely, can we say they 
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are not inherently unlawful? I am not convinced that this question is 
appropriately framed in so far as our starting point is autonomy as a 
characteristic of a technology attached to a function or functions of a 
weapon system and not the weapons system itself. In this sense, 
autonomous weapons can be seen as an umbrella or a catch all term 
covering a range of different kinds of autonomous weapons systems each 
of which differs from the other based on a number of factors and 
variables. These factors include, and Paul has mentioned some of them, 
the type of task the particular weapon is being used for, offensive or 
defensive, the context in which it is being used – air, ground, sea, simple 
or cluttered environments, etc, the type of target, the type of force being 
used – non kinetic force versus kinetic force – and in this respect it is 
important to note that an autonomous weapon should also be seen as a 
munitions delivery platform such that the kind of munition that is being 
used, e.g. an autonomous weapon fitted with a chemical munition would 
obviously contravene IHL. Of course, we also look crucially, for the 
purposes of proportionality and precautions in attack, at the freedom the 
weapon has to move in space and in the time frame of action of the 
weapon. All of these factors are, of course, critical in determining the 
foreseeable effects of a particular weapon in ensuring it can be used in 
conformity with the rules of proportionality and precautions in attack as I 
have said. Like any new weapon, new weapons with autonomy and 
critical functions must undergo rigorous legal reviews taking into account 
the expertise needed, so applying a multi-disciplinary approach.  
The obligation to carry out legal reviews of new weapons creates an 
onus on the State developing or acquiring the weapon to show that it is 
capable of being used in accordance with the rules of distinction of 
proportionality and precautions in attack among others. According to the 
commentary of Article 36 of Additional Protocol 1 that requires legal 
reviews of new weapons, the review should consider whether the 
employment of the weapon for its normal or expected use would be 
prohibited under some or all circumstances. This requires examining the 
foreseeable effects of the autonomous weapons system, that is, how it is 
expected to function based on its design and based on the circumstances in 
which it is intended and expected to be used, including the factors and 
variables that have been mentioned. 
So, returning to the question of whether an autonomous weapon is 
inherently unlawful, as I mentioned, the question perhaps should be 
reframed by reference to the particular kind of autonomous weapon under 
consideration. Arguably the legal review of a new kind of weapons systems 
may come to the conclusion that the particular autonomous weapon would 
be per se that is, inherently unlawful, in view of its intended use. Let’s 
consider the example presented by Mike Schmidt and Jeff Turner of an 
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autonomous anti-personnel weapons system designed for employment in an 
urban area. Because it is contemplated for use where combatants are co-
mingled with civilians the system must have sufficient sensors in artificial 
intelligence capability to distinguish civilians from combatants. According 
to Schmidt and Turner if the system does not have such capability it 
qualifies as indiscriminate per se because there are no circumstances, given 
its intended use, in which it can be used discriminately. Therefore, the 
weapons system is inherently unlawful. 
Conversely, if the same autonomous, anti-personnel system being 
unable to distinguish between civilians and combatants is programmed and 
planned for use where civilians are not present it would not be unlawful per 
se, however, its use must be subject to geographical restrictions and 
arguably also to temporal limitations since few areas are always completely 
devoid of civilians and civilian objects. Any limits on the use imposed by 
the legal review must, of course, be incorporated into the instructions and 
rules of engagement applying to the weapons, to ensure it is not misused. 
However, it may happen that the permitted circumstances of use are so 
limited or complex that it is unrealistic to apply in real-world scenarios and 
it may be more appropriate in such cases to prohibit the weapon’s use all 
together. 
My final question is whether there is requirement of human 
judgement in targeting decision making. Now, at the ICRC’s expert 
meeting on autonomous weapons, participants recognised the 
importance of maintaining human control over selecting and attacking 
targets notably because of existing and foreseeable technological 
limitations mentioned previously. This means that programming a 
weapon to undertake the quality, and some would say subjective and 
this term has come up in our discussions the last two days when 
speaking about the rule of proportionality in attack and precautions in 
attack, the subjective assessments required by these rules, particularly in 
complex and dynamic environments, would make autonomous weapons 
systems extremely challenging. However, there was less clarity in the 
discussion at our expert meeting on the degree of human control that 
would be acceptable including legal acceptability and this is really the 
crux of the matter.  
Does IHL require human judgement in targeting decision making? As 
pointed out by Marco Sassolì, clearly the only subjects of IHL rules are 
human beings – we are responsible for complying with them, in particular, 
the obligation to take precautions in attack. The addressees of this 
obligation remain humans who plan, decide and execute the attack to use 
the terms referred to explicitly or implicitly through the ICRC commentary 
– the actions used in reference to the article 57 obligation. Moreover, it is 
positive that the feasibility of precautions would be determined based on 
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the possibilities available to the human who plans and decides upon the 
attack and not on the capabilities of the weapons system. 
So, based on current and foreseeable technological limitations we 
could assume that, at least in the near future, humans will remain in 
charge of at least planning the attack. However, when the human 
commander deploys an autonomous weapon for a particular mission – we 
are speaking here of an offensive mission – and that autonomous weapon 
will independently select and attack targets, is the commander delegating 
his or her responsibilities to decide and/or execute the attack to the 
weapon system itself? I think Bill Boobthy articulated this point well at 
the beginning of his presentation, are we really speaking of machine 
decision making here?  
Now it could be argued, and a number of authors are doing this, that an 
autonomous weapons system is never completely independent in its actions 
as it always operates within the human design limits of its software 
algorithms – Paul touched upon this. Some argue that a human is always 
involved if only in the programming of the autonomous weapon and the 
decision to deploy it. In this respect, Turner has suggested that because 
autonomous weapons are unlikely to be capable of performing the 
subjective evaluations involved and applying the rules of proportionality 
and precautions in attack.  
Humans will need to inject themselves at various points into the process 
and make the necessary subjective determinations. And he identifies the 
last point as ordering the deployment of the autonomous weapons system. 
Here the person ordering the deployment of the weapon will be expected to 
make a reasonable decision about the appropriate amount of risk in using 
the autonomous weapon system. The commander ordering the deployment 
of the weapon as the last human intervention in the process is my 
understanding of how UK policy views the responsibility of using 
autonomous weapons. 
At any rate, the obligation to take all feasible precautions in deciding to 
deploy the autonomous weapon would at a minimum require an 
understanding and consequent foresight of what the weapon system can or 
cannot do in the context in which it is deployed. This means the weapon 
should have some degree of predictability which gets more difficult as the 
technology becomes more complex and has greater and greater levels of 
autonomy. This is, therefore, another important question to address: what is 
the degree of predictability required for the purposes of the rules of 
proportionality and precautions in attack?  
Autonomous weapons raised a number of issues, notably in terms of 
precautions regarding the obligations to cancel or suspend an attack if it is 
found that, at the moment of execution of the attack, the target is not in fact 
a military objective, or the rule of proportionality in attack cannot be 
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respected. I will not have time to get into that but suffice it to say again that 
in respect of that consideration the longer the time frame between the 
deployment of the weapon and the actual execution of attack will raise 
concerns especially in a dynamic environment where the estimated 
incidental civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects done in the 
proportionality assessment before deploying the weapon that this 
estimation may no longer be reliable.  
 
 
218 
Ethical and societal perspectives 
on the development of autonomous weapons 
Peter Asaro 
Assistant Professor and Director of Graduate Programs, School 
of Media Studies, The New School for Public Engagement, New York 
I will just try to fill in a little bit some of the questions that have been 
left open with regard to the nature of the ethical and moral questions 
involved, in particular, the relationship between automatic and automated 
processes and the human decision-making and how that relates to legal 
notions as well as moral notions. There are many different ways to define 
autonomous weapons systems, but I think we have established quite clearly 
that it’s about these critical functions: about target identification and the 
decision to use force. Those are the critical functions. There are different 
ways to articulate that and the human relation to that: humans in-the-loop, 
humans on-the-loop, humans out-of-the-loop. A lot of the so-called 
confusion around autonomous weapons are these different ways of defining 
autonomy, different ways of defining weapons and how they might operate 
and function. These are attempts to create some rule that will identify all 
and only those kinds of weapons that we might want to regulate or prohibit. 
I think it is more useful to think in terms of meaningful human control as a 
norm that would be required for any kind of weapon system, and to think 
about how we might articulate that in international law. So I want to go 
through some of the issues that come up in that regard. 
In particular, is this notion of automating the reasoning that humans 
currently do, and in particular the requirements of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) on commanders to do certain kinds of decision 
making and reasoning. I think there is also an important distinction to raise 
here between the compliance with IHL in terms of the effects of military 
action and the realisation of that compliance. There are somewhat different 
ideas between IHL and Human Rights Law in terms of how it looks at the 
implementation of law. Where IHL looks at influencing the decision 
making of commanders, Human Rights Law is more focused on the 
forensic uncovering of responsibility for violations of the law after the fact. 
So there is a temporal dimension as well as a psychological dimension to 
how we understand the implementation of International Humanitarian Law. 
It has been pointed out quite clearly already that there are the primary 
principles or requirements of IHL in terms of the principle of distinction, 
the principle of proportionality, the obligation to take precautions in attack 
and the evaluation of military necessity. I just want to go through those in 
terms of what it means to actually automate that. Right now we are in a 
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situation where humans are making these judgements and deciding to use a 
weapon to achieve a certain military objective. And when they do that they 
are required to make distinction judgements, to determine who is hors de 
combat, to determine when civilians are directly participating in hostilities 
and just in general to distinguish between civilians and combatants. All of 
these are very difficult for humans to do in many cases and as we have seen 
in many other panels over the week we don’t even necessarily agree 
completely on the rules that should be implemented for civilians directly 
participating in hostilities.  
I think the ICRC guidelines are quite reasonable and effective. There are 
those who do not agree with that. But then if we think what would it mean 
to implement that as computer code, I think we are in another task 
altogether. There is a degree of complexity that would be involved in trying 
to articulate what are often ambiguous or somewhat uncertain rules. And 
we’ve heard this also in terms of the implications for proportionality 
judgements in terms of the use of human shields, whether they are 
voluntary or involuntary. What are the particular circumstances of their 
being designated human shields? What are the implications for judgements 
of distinction and proportionality in the light of that? And if that is not 
settled in terms of agreement amongst all the IHL lawyers, how are we 
going to convince computer programmers of what the right rule is that they 
should be implementing in some computer programme that would try to be 
operating in an environment where it was supposed to be making those 
decisions. As Ms Lawand pointed out, the value judgements that are 
involved in proportionality are not things that are calculable or 
computational in the way that computers are generally devised to make 
computations. So when we are deciding, or a commander is deciding on the 
value of some military objective relative to the risk that would be posed by 
an attack towards civilians in the area, this is a value judgement. What is 
the value of the military objective? What are the risks and the negative 
values to civilians who are in the immediate area? How do we pre-
programme that? Who decides what the values are? Once this is 
programmed into the machine, they are fixed, they are set. What we see in 
real military engagement is a lot of dynamics, things change over time. 
There has to be a continuous evaluation and re-evaluation of the value of 
military objectives. These are all done in the context of situational 
awareness, which is a very sophisticated cognitive process that artificial 
intelligence systems, even Deep Blue and Watson, are not capable of in any 
meaningful sense. We have even heard in the discussion, of military objects 
and military objectives, so we can create some computer programme that 
can pick out targets, those become targets. But, as we saw, there is a degree 
of complexity of what is a target. Is the whole building a target? Is only the 
piece of the building that is being used for military operations a target? 
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Once you write the code, that becomes fixed, that is not revisable anymore. 
So I think, in general, the threat to IHL is not only in the implementation 
and realisation of systems that would be conducting IHL, but in the ability 
of lawyers and IHL lawyers to continue to evolve our discussion and 
understanding of what the basic concepts of IHL are and how those ought 
to evolve over time.  
There’s been some discussion about whether IHL is sufficient to 
regulate autonomous weapons systems as they develop, and we’ve heard 
various views including the notion that in fact there is no explicit 
prohibition on these sorts of systems. So as long as they could pass an 
Article 36 review, then they would be acceptable. But we could also ask: is 
Article 36 review sufficient to regulate this kind of weapon, which is really 
a new means and method of warfare? So it is not simply an effect. I don’t 
know that the question of just whether it is possible to use a given weapon 
system in some context in a way that would comply or conform to IHL is 
sufficient to really answer the question of whether replacing the moral 
obligations and legal obligations of IHL with automated algorithms that 
would be making those decisions going forward is a sufficient kind of 
review process. So, again, what we are talking about is removing human 
decision-making, human agency and human lawyers, in fact, from 
decisions about what is morally acceptable, legally acceptable, what is a 
lawful target, what is an acceptable killing and what is an unacceptable 
killing. I think that, in general, lawyers share with computer scientists and 
engineers a love of rules, so we like to make up rules and think that if 
everything conforms to the rules in the world, then justice would be done, a 
system would be efficient. Of course, there are violations of rules and the 
world never quite operates according to them, so there is a lot of frustration. 
But I think we also need to be very careful about what we wish for. It may 
seem very appealing to create a computer programme that would 
implement IHL and do it very efficiently and avoid all the human mistakes 
and errors and foibles, but the reality of how computer systems are actually 
built and designed, if we just look at database systems or healthcare 
database systems, perfectly well meaning, well intended, but the millions of 
individual questions that have to be answered in order to implement the 
engineering of these kinds of systems is enormously complex and rarely 
conforms precisely to the intended legal, social and moral objectives of the 
system. Engineers make shortcuts, they figure out ways to represent things 
that the computer can manage because a lot of what we actually talk about 
in law is abstract, it is not something you can easily programme into a 
machine. We can approximate those things, but making those 
approximations has implications, implications that we may not be able to 
see immediately. It is not simply that mistakes will be made, but we are in 
fact changing the nature of this relationship between humans and the 
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decisions to use force. We have also seen numerous times that there are 
existing ambiguities in the law, and if those ambiguities exist in the law, 
they are either going to be implemented as ambiguous in the machines or 
they are going to be settled in some sense arbitrarily by engineers who just 
need to get some system to work. And, fundamentally, this changes then 
the norms of decision-making, and I think Mr. Scharre was quite articulate 
about how it changes the nature of how commanders decide to make an 
attack in terms of what their relationship to a weapon system is. If we have 
these sorts of ‘black boxes’ then more and more soldiers and officers and 
commanders will start thinking «well, that’s the IHL component, I don’t 
need to talk to my IHL lawyer anymore, I don’t need to make the 
proportionality and distinction decisions, I don’t need to take the 
precautions, that’s all built into the system already, I’m just going to point 
it and press the button», it changes then the norms. This has very real 
implications for jurisprudence and if we think about what it means for war 
crimes, any kind of accountability after the fact, certainly the relinquishing 
of the responsibility and the delegation of authority to make these kinds of 
decisions to machines is going to make it much more difficult to prosecute 
anybody for even intentional wrong-doing. How do you demonstrate the 
intention when you can’t really know what the intention inside the machine 
is? Maybe the operator knew that to some extent the system might have a 
negative implication, but how do you prove that? In Court, it is going to 
become much more difficult as these systems have greater autonomy and 
that also changes the internal reasoning process that commanders and 
soldiers and officers are using, and this is the psychological element. The 
notion that IHL is primarily giving guidance, moral guidance and legal 
guidance, to commanders who are making decisions—automating these 
decisions is going to change that pretty fundamentally. 
I want to talk about the Martens clause in this context. It’s had much 
iteration over the years, but the fundamental notion that in cases not 
covered by Protocol I or by other international agreements, civilians and 
combatants remain under the protection of an authority of the principles of 
international law derived from established custom and from the principles 
of humanity and the dictates of public conscience. I think there are different 
ways of interpreting this. One is that just because something is not 
explicitly illegal in the letter of the law doesn’t imply that it is legal or 
moral. In fact, I think that the morality element of it is foregrounded in a 
way that if we think about what should become international law, whether 
it is customary or treaty law, that we should look towards the moral 
guidance of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public 
conscience in shaping that international law. The ICRC Commentary on the 
Martens clause, specifically refers to the applicability of the principles 
mentioned, regardless of subsequent developments in types of situations or 
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technology. I think what the Martens clause is also getting at is that authors 
of these international treaties should understand that the law needs to be 
dynamic and it needs to evolve over time because technology is evolving 
over time, conflict is evolving over time. We saw this quite clearly in the 
discussion of non-international armed conflict, where we saw how new 
kinds of conflict did not conform to our existing treaties and laws. We need 
to find ways of articulating that, offering clarification and guidance. I think 
what we really need to be doing in the debate and discussion about 
autonomous weapons systems is offering this kind of clarification and 
guidance in terms of what constitutes meaningful human control over the 
selection of targets and the decisions to use force. I think in that context we 
can look historically at other kinds of international norms and particularly 
the concepts of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering which are in 
some sense abstract notions, somewhat vague notions. That terminology 
has been around for 160 years, but it is still being articulated in particular 
instances. We know what it means when we see it, we understand it, in a 
moral relation, that there are certain kinds of injuries that are unnecessary 
and superfluous, and there is suffering that is unnecessary to achieve 
military objectives. We can’t necessarily itemise every single weapon that 
might do that and there might be some logical inconsistencies with banning 
small explosive bullets while we allow big explosive artillery shells. But, at 
the same time, it captures something that I think is essential and caught up 
in the public conscience and the principles of humanity. The necessity of 
meaningful human control in any kind of use of force in military conflict, 
has been mentioned. So, in particular, how do we articulate that into 
technologies as they emerge and evolve and how can we put that into an 
international agreement that creates a norm that could be something that 
holds people accountable for the adoption of systems but also shapes the 
emergence of new technological systems? So any of these technologies 
could be used to improve discrimination and proportionality. We could 
come up with something that does that. We can also design a system 
whereby the human, who has the ultimate decision about the use of force, is 
informed. 
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Closing remarks 
Fausto Pocar 
President, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Sanremo 
We have come to the conclusion of this Round Table. We have come to 
the end of fascinating debates conducted during these two and a half days 
on critical issues of International Humanitarian Law triggered by the 
subject of this Round Table “The conduct of hostilities: the practice, the 
law and the future”.  
I wish, first of all, to thank all the speakers of the panels, all those who 
participated in the debates and the panel moderators who led the debates. I 
believe that all of them, all of you attending this Round Table, have done a 
very good job in dealing with these very complex matters. 
During these days we have taken up a number of questions, perhaps too 
many considering the short time available. But then, on the other hand, 
dealing with a wide range of subjects and trying to explore them in depth 
but not necessarily exhausting the debate have always been among the 
purposes of the Sanremo Round Table. This has been the case in so many 
situations in the past whereby this Institute, on the occasion of these Round 
Tables, launched the debate on some specific issues which were then 
further elaborated in other fora. 
I will not try to mention all of the subjects that have been taken up, as 
they are reflected in the programme as this would be an exercise that would 
probably keep you here for another couple of hours. We examined them 
from a practical point of view and from a legal point of view. The latter 
approach is obviously critical when we speak of the conduct of hostilities 
because, while many rules of IHL of mere protection look as hard rules that 
do not allow for flexibility in their application, rules of conduct of 
hostilities are grounded on solid principles that aren’t challenged or in any 
event should not be challenged. It is true, however, that when you come to 
their application in concrete terms on the battlefield, there is some margin 
for flexibility subject to interpretation, quick interpretation, by commanders 
that have to make decisions during the hostilities. It is clear that distinction, 
proportionality, precautions, necessity require or imply a margin of 
appreciation in the application of the law as practice clearly shows. But this 
is also one of the reasons why the scope of application of many rules of 
protection has been clarified and adjudicated by Courts. This is not the case 
for rules on conduct of hostilities, where Courts have either avoided dealing 
with them - perhaps they have dealt with them and have taken 
interpretations - or in other cases they have just circumvented the problem 
or avoided the problem without giving guidelines, as jurisdiction should 
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normally do. I will not refer to any specific decision but some have been 
mentioned here during the debates by speakers. 
Our task here has been to clarify the law, to clarify it on the basis of 
practice. We have done, and I believe you’ll go home with a better 
understanding both of the law and the practices, but we have to recognise 
that a vast number of questions raised during these days leaves room for 
more complete answers, for more in depth consideration in the future. 
Debates cannot be considered as exhaustive on all the issues, on some 
perhaps, but not necessarily. Some will have to be taken up again in future 
debates. This seems even heavier and more complex when we look at the 
future. 
The panel this morning on autonomous weapons, on cyber-warfare, on 
automation and autonomy of weapons, raised a number of problems and we 
had answers from the speakers, we had answers in the debate, but certainly 
there is room to explore this issue more in depth.  
Not that the conduct of hostilities poses less problems. Again, this was 
discussed within the context of non-international armed conflicts, 
considering both the applicability of the law and the scope of the 
obligations of the parties, in particular non-state actors, in the conflict. I 
hope that the debates we have had here, we have engaged in during these 
days at the Round Table, will stimulate further debate, with a view to an 
increased understanding of the law and how it has to be applied. This is 
also critical if we look from the perspective of the supervision of the 
conduct of hostilities by the international community. We don’t have many 
instruments for that supervision, but we will have them in the future. It’s 
clear that supervisory mechanisms imply good knowledge of the law and 
good competence in the law. I hope that we may have mechanisms of this 
kind in the future. There are initiatives in this sense and this Institute is 
obviously looking forward to giving its contribution to achieving that goal. 
I wish again to thank all those who contributed to making this Round 
Table a success: the Committee of colleagues that coordinated the 
programme and the preparation of the Round Table and, in particular, the 
interpreters which made our debate possible. I wish all of you a safe return 
to your homes and I hope to see you all again at the next Round Table or in 
future activities of this Institute in Sanremo or elsewhere. 
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Closing remarks1 
Helen Durham 
Director of International Law and Policy, International Committee 
of the Red Cross, Geneva 
It gives me great pleasure to formally close the Thirty-Seventh Round 
Table on the “Conduct of hostilities: the practice, the law and the future”. 
As was expressed by the President of the Institute, Prof. Pocar, I feel it 
would be neither wise nor have intellectual integrity if I tried to neatly sum 
up the wide range of issues that we have discussed over the last few days. 
And as I am a good ICRC girl, I hope I have both wisdom and integrity, so 
I am not going to attempt to do that task. What I did want to do is to spend 
a few minutes flagging some of the key themes that came out again and 
again, as we reflected on these very important principles, rules and 
application in the reality. 
I think we started with almost a collective sense of shock, in a way, that 
a topic that we dealt with during the Sanremo Round Table in 2007, and 
that had been identified at least a year ago, was so deeply relevant to what 
we are witnessing today, so deeply an issue that needed reflection when we 
look at some of the ways armed conflict is being fought at the moment. But 
I think there are some things we definitely all agreed on, which, once again, 
are the basic principles as articulated, the very fundamental rules, and that 
in the current fog of war, which gets foggier at times, particularly with 
fighting in heavily populated areas, this fog needs to have as much clarity 
around the rules and their application as possible. 
We were sternly warned by Professor Hampson of the need to identify 
the areas where we do agree on. I think we do spend a lot of time 
necessarily discussing the areas we don’t, but her estimation was 95 per 
cent of the time we agree on things. Whatever the proportional amount is, 
she warned us that if we don’t, as a group of IHL lawyers from very, very 
different areas and very different ways of applying, start expressing our 
agreement on things and find some common ground, the other side of the 
family, the Human Rights lawyers, may come in, as she expressed, and 
start interpreting through Human Rights mechanisms such as Human 
Rights Courts. 
I think it was very important that time and time again, particularly from 
a military perspective, we were reminded that these principles, whilst 
having a legal containment and an understanding of the precision, need to 
be applied and that commanders and others need to understand the 
                                                     
1 Text not revised by the author. 
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operational environment before they actually get to the application of the 
law, whether this be understanding that in some communities it is 
appropriate that farmers dig at night or whether it be the very complex 
interface in some armed conflicts between the law enforcement paradigm 
and IHL in places such as Colombia. So that need to have a contextual 
understanding as well as a legal precision, I think was highlighted a number 
of times. 
There were some topics though, distinct and discrete topics, that we 
clearly had more work to do on, and I think that’s important to highlight. 
The definition of military objective is a really interesting debate, whether it 
be about cables, whether it be about data, whether it be about the range of 
ways these principles, many of them having a subjective as well as 
objective element, are applied and the interface between many of these 
principles. As I started from an ICRC perspective, we have really come to 
engage with all of you to get a better understanding of the notion of 
indiscriminate attacks in populated areas. We are open, we are engaged, but 
we have clear views based on the operational experiences that as an 
Institution working in the field we experience. 
There was obviously a lot of debate about capture and kill and I think 
that panel had a really, I would say not extreme but a polarised view, not so 
much on the law but on the application of the law and the types of law that 
can be utilised. But what was really interesting to see, and I think reminded 
us of the value of this Institute, was that, at the end of that panel, the idea of 
the sentence that was articulated that ‘there is no obligation to detain 
unless, dot, dot, dot,” there seemed to be at least a step forward in some 
common understanding to move forward, at least from that panel. So I 
think it’s really excellent when you see genuine, authentic, robust debate 
and then at the end at least an understanding that there is common ground 
to stand and to move forward. 
We heard that bodies or organisations such as NATO and others very 
much have a strong respect and application of IHL and a low rate of 
civilian casualties despite all the complexities in governance and inter-
operability issues. But concurrently we were warned not to fall for the 
fantasy, the political construct of military activities that had zero fatalities 
or zero casualties. I think it was a very clear warning that we are not 
politicians in here, we are lawyers and we are practitioners and we are 
people who are engaged in IHL, and that this fallacy of being able to 
undertake military activities with a zero casualty rate was something we 
were very carefully warned about. 
Time and time again very different speakers raised the issue of training, 
training and the need for such training to be clear, to be concise, which 
goes back to the points we’ve all been making in relation to the clarity of 
the applicability of the rules. I think one of the big issues was the 
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difficulties involved in training. Not just States with the dispersion of 
capacity for a State to absorb and despite the resources put into training, but 
also the big issue that has hummed in this conference, if I may say, the 
training of non-state actors, the engagement with non-State actors and, 
particularly, as we were very clearly cautioned, not to create clear 
categories of States that always apply, because some States don’t, and non-
State armed groups that always don’t want to apply because many, or some, 
do. We need to be a bit more sophisticated and nuanced in our 
understanding of what we call fighters and combatants. 
I also think that there were questions, raised from the floor, related to 
how do we can capture, so to speak, the outcomes of our preventative work, 
our training, and once again I would urge that we need to think very 
carefully about how we can start expressing and doing some analysis of the 
benefits, of the impact or otherwise of that training. We have also heard 
sporadic examples from military generals and highlevel commanders to 
members of civil society, examples of how training can impact and 
influence behaviour. It would be great if we, as a community, developed a 
better analysis of that. 
We heard about the complexity of Non-International Armed Conflict 
(NIAC) and situations of fighting fragment, and we were warned very 
carefully about the use of words when talking about these types of things. 
Furthermore, there was the issue of autonomous weapons in the last 
session. What came across very clearlywas the need for us to be very 
careful in making sure we know exactly what we are talking about: the 
distinction between the type of weapons, the type of systems, getting a 
deeper understanding of the issues at hand. 
There is no doubt that out there in the community as well as in this room 
there is a deep discomfort at the idea of allowing machines to make life or 
death decisions with little or no human involvement, but that may not be 
always the essence of the question we are talking about, we have to clarify 
those areas. Ultimately, it would be the international community that 
obviously has to decide what level of human control is required in relation 
to these machines not only within the law, but also in what is morally 
acceptable. 
So there were certainly a few key issues throughout the Round Table 
that I think came to the fore. Some areas where we agreed, some where we 
disagreed. Often the most interesting and enlightening discussions 
happened at the coffee breaks, which is why an event like this is so 
important. I wanted to echo my thanks to everyone who was involved, 
everyone who contributed, and not just the speakers and the presenters but 
all those who asked questions.  
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Acronyms 
AJP Allied Joint Doctrine 
API Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
APII Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
CCW Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
CICR Comité International de la Croix-Rouge 
CIJ Cour Internationale de Justice 
CoESPU Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units 
DPH Direct Participation in Hostilities 
DPKO  Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
EU European Union 
GOP Guidance for Operations Planning 
HRL Human Rights Law 
IAC International Armed Conflict 
ICC International Criminal Court 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
ICT Information and Communication Technologies 
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
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IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IHL International Humanitarian Law 
IIHL International Institute of Humanitarian Law 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
JAG Judge Advocate General 
KFOR Kosovo Force 
LOAC Law of Armed Conflict 
MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
 Mission in Mali 
MONUSCO Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la 
 Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo 
MRLS Multiple Rocket Launching System 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NIAC Non-International Armed Conflict 
OAE Operation Active Endeavor 
OPLAN Operations Plan 
OUP Operation Unified Protection 
RoE Rules of Engagement 
RPGs Rocket- Propelled Granades 
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
TDA Target Damage Assessment 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
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UCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle 
UCV Unmanned Combat Vehicle 
UN United Nations 
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research 
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution 
UV Unmanned Vehicle 
VRT Virtual Reality Training Tool 
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